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Essays in Revision Games
ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays related to revision games.
The ﬁrst essay proposes and analyzes a new model that we call “revision
games,” which captures a situation where players in advance prepare their actions
in a game. After the initial preparation, they have some opportunities to revise
their actions, which arrive stochastically. Prepared actions are assumed to be mu-
tually observable. We show that players can achieve a certain level of cooperation.
The optimal behavior of players can be described by a simple differential equation.
The second essay studies a version of revision games in which revision oppor-
tunities are asynchronous across players. In 2-player “common interest” games
where there exists a best action proﬁle for all players, this best action proﬁle is
the only equilibrium outcome of the revision game. In “opposing interest” games
which are 2 x 2 games with Pareto-unranked strict Nash equilibria, the equilibrium
outcome of the revision game is generically unique and corresponds to one of the
stage-game Nash equilibria. Which equilibrium prevails depends on the payoff
structure and on the relative frequency of the arrivals of revision opportunities for
each of the players.
The third essay studies a multi-agent search problem with a deadline: for in-
stance, the situation that arises when a husband and a wife need to ﬁnd an apart-
ment by September 1. We provide an understanding of the factors that determine
iiithe positive search duration in reality. Speciﬁcally, we show that the expected
search duration does not shrink to zero even in the limit as the search friction van-
ishes. Additionally, we ﬁnd that the limit duration increases as more agents are
involved, for two reasons: the ascending acceptability effect and the preference hetero-
geneity effect. The convergence speed is high, suggesting that the mere existence
of some search friction is the main driving force of the positive duration in reality.
Welfare implications and a number of discussions are provided. Results and proof
techniques developed in the ﬁrst two essays are useful in proving and understand-
ing the results in the third essay.
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viii1. INTRODUCTION
This dissertation consists of three essays related to revision games.
The ﬁrst essay proposes and analyzes a new model that we call “revision
games,” which captures a situation where players in advance prepare their actions
in a game. After the initial preparation, they have some opportunities to revise
their actions, which arrive stochastically. Prepared actions are assumed to be mu-
tually observable. We show that players can achieve a certain level of cooperation.
The optimal behavior of players can be described by a simple differential equation.
The second essay studies a version of revision games in which revision oppor-
tunities are asynchronous across players. In 2-player “common interest” games
where there exists a best action proﬁle for all players, this best action proﬁle is
the only equilibrium outcome of the revision game. In “opposing interest” games
which are 2 x 2 games with Pareto-unranked strict Nash equilibria, the equilibrium
outcome of the revision game is generically unique and corresponds to one of the
stage-game Nash equilibria. Which equilibrium prevails depends on the payoff
structure and on the relative frequency of the arrivals of revision opportunities for
each of the players.
The third essay studies a multi-agent search problem with a deadline: for in-
stance, the situation that arises when a husband and a wife need to ﬁnd an apart-
ment by September 1. We provide an understanding of the factors that determine
the positive search duration in reality. Speciﬁcally, we show that the expected
1search duration does not shrink to zero even in the limit as the search friction van-
ishes. Additionally, we ﬁnd that the limit duration increases as more agents are
involved, for two reasons: the ascending acceptability effect and the preference hetero-
geneity effect. The convergence speed is high, suggesting that the mere existence
of some search friction is the main driving force of the positive duration in reality.
Welfare implications and a number of discussions are provided. Results and proof
techniques developed in the ﬁrst two essays are useful in proving and understand-
ing the results in the third essay.
These essays enhance our understanding of dynamic incentives in ﬁnite hori-
zon, and raises many interesting questions for future research. These open ques-
tions are noted at the conclusion section of each chapter.
22. REVISION GAMES1
2.1 Introduction
In social or economic problems, agents often prepare their actions in advance
before they interact. Consider researchers who are competing to win research
grants. “Actions” in this context correspond to research proposals to be submit-
ted by a prespeciﬁed deadline. Researchers prepare their proposals in advance,
and proposals are usually subject to some revisions before submission. Since they
have other obligation, such as teaching and committee work, a revision can be
made only when an opportunity to work on the proposal arrives. Researchers may
also obtain some information about their rivals’ proposals. Based on such informa-
tion, researchers revise their proposals, and they submit what they have when the
deadline comes.
In the present paper, we introduce a stylized model to capture such a situation,
which we call a revision game. In a revision game, a component game is played only
once, and players must in advance prepare their actions. They have some oppor-
tunities to revise their prepared actions, and the opportunities for revision arrive
stochastically. Prepared actions are assumed to be mutually observable, and the
1 This is a joint work with Michihiro Kandori (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo). We
thank Drew Fudenberg, Barton Lipman, Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi, and the seminar partic-
ipants at the 2009 Far East and South Asia Meetings of the Econometric Society, 2009 Evolution of
Cooperation Conference at IIASA, Boston University, University College London, Harvard Univer-
sity, and Oxford University.
3ﬁnal action in the last revision opportunity is played in the component game. We
show that, under some regulatory conditions, players can achieve a certain level of
cooperation.
Let us contrast our model with the well-known fact that players can cooperate
in a repeated game. If players expect a sufﬁcient future reward, they can sustain
costly cooperation. It must be the players’ best interest to carry out the future
reward, which is guaranteed by reward in the further future, and so forth till in-
deﬁnitely. In this paper we argue that players can sometimes cooperate even though
the game is played only once. Cooperation can be sustained by revision process of
players’ actions.
The basic mechanism to sustain cooperation in a revision game is similar to that
in a repeated game, although the mechanism operates in somewhat disguised way.
This is best seen when the revision process is stationary. Suppose players prepare
their action in each period, and the prepared actions are played in the component
game with a (small) constant probability. Once a component game is played, the
game is over and there is no further interaction. In Section 2.2 we present a simple
observation that such a model is actually isomorphic to an inﬁnitely repeated game
with a (high) discount factor.
The heart of the paper analyzes a more realistic case, where the component
game is played at a predetermined deadline. Players obtain revision opportunities
according to a Poisson process, and the ﬁnally-prepared actions are played at the
deadline. In the class of component games that we focus on, we will show that an
optimal symmetric trigger-strategy equilibrium exists and it is essentially unique.
The equilibrium is characterized by a simple differential equation, which we apply
to a variety of economic examples. In particular, the revision game of a Cournot
4duopoly game can achieve, in expectation, more than 96% of the full collusive pay-
off.
The key difﬁculty in sustaining cooperation comes with the fact that the prepa-
ration phase ends at a predetermined deadline: As time approaches the deadline,
the probability of being rewarded in the future shrinks to zero. This means that the
instantaneous cost of cooperation (the gain from deviation) must shrink to zero as
well for incentive compatibility to be met at each moment of time.2 We construct a
trigger strategy equilibrium with such a property. On the equilibrium path of play,
players prepare action x(t) if they obtain a revision opportunity at time t; upon
deviation players revert to the (unique) Nash action. x(t) is a full collusive action
when time t is sufﬁciently far away from the deadline, and it (continuously in t)
approaches the Nash action towards the deadline. At the deadline, no more op-
portunity for reward is expected, so the only sustainable action proﬁle is the static
Nash action proﬁle. For a 2-player good exchange game, we depict in Figure 2.1
the path x(t) of the optimal equilibrium among all the trigger strategy equilibria,
and a sample equilibrium path of play given x(t).3
As the action approaches the Nash equilibrium, the instantaneous cost of co-
operation shrinks to zero. However, it turns out that this is not enough to sustain
cooperation. We further need that the instantaneous cost shrinks sufﬁciently fast. To
see this point, note that as the action approaches the Nash action, the magnitude of
the beneﬁt from the opponent’s future cooperation (conditional on there being an
opportunity) shrinks to zero as well.4 Since these beneﬁts realize with a vanishing
2 Under certain regularity assumptions.
3 The formal analysis can be found in Section 2.5.1.
4 Under a continuity assumption.
5Figure 2.1: The optimal path and a sample path for a good exchange game.
probability, the cost must be negligible relative to the beneﬁt when the action is close to
Nash. We show that under an assumption on payoff structure that many economic
applications satisfy,5 the cost indeed shrinks fast enough.
2.1.1 Related literature
Although in revision games the component game is played only once, features
of the model and the dynamic of the equilibrium that they imply are closely related
to those in ﬁnitely repeated games. A striking fact that the repetition of defections
is the only subgame perfect equilibrium in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma is over-
come by a variety of “twists” in the literature, such as multiple Nash payoffs.6,
5 This is expressed in Assumption A4 that we state in Section 2.4.
6 Harrington (1987), Benoit and Krishna (1985, 1993).
6bounded rationality7, reputational effects8, non-common knowledge of the timing
of the deadline9, social preferences10, and so forth. Among others, the model of
fu Chou and Geanakoplos (1988) is the most related to ours. They consider ﬁnite
horizonrepeatedgamesinwhichaplayercancommittoa(contingent)actionatthe
ﬁnal period, and show that in “smooth games” a folk theorem obtains. The trigger-
strategy equilibrium that we construct is reminiscent of theirs in that the action on
the equilibrium path converges to the static Nash action, and the idea is related in
the sense that in both models a small amount of cooperation at periods close to the
deadline builds up a basis for a large cooperation in the entire game. The key dif-
ference, besides the fact that the component game is played only once in revision
games, is that we do not use commitment to achieve cooperation—our players are
fully rational. In our model rational players can cooperate even when the deadline
is very close because there is no pre-determined “ﬁnal period” at which players
take actions with a positive probability.
Bernheim and Dasgupta (1995) consider inﬁnite horizon repeated games in
which the discount factor falls over time to approximate zero, and show that coop-
eration can be sustained if the speed at which the discount factor falls is sufﬁciently
slow. They obtain a sufﬁcient condition for the sustainability of cooperation but
did not explore characterization of optimal equilibria. Although the mechanism to
sustain cooperation in their model is similar to ours, in Section 2.6.2 we show some
crucial differences and demonstrate that our model cannot be mapped into their
7 Fudenberg and Levine (1983), Kalai and Neme (1992), Neyman (1985, 1998).
8 Sobel (1985), Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982), and Fudenberg and Maskin (1986).
9 Neyman (1999).
10 Ambrus and Pathak (2011).
7model.
Pitchford and Snyder (2004) and Kamada and Rao (2009) consider situations
in which two parties dynamically transfer a ﬁxed amount of divisible goods that
beneﬁt the other party.11 In the equilibria they construct, a failure to transfer the
speciﬁed amount of goods at the speciﬁed date causes the opponent to stop trans-
ferring in the future. The remaining amount of the good in hand converges to zero
as the transactions occur a number of times, so the relevant stake of the game gets
smaller and smaller over time, reminiscent of our equilibrium form in which x(t)
approaches 0 as the deadline comes close. Also, as in our model, there cannot be a
ﬁnal transaction period, since if there can, then the parties do not have an incentive
to make a transfer: the transactions need to occur indeﬁnitely. The key difference
is that in their models the transaction amount is speciﬁed in the way that the game
becomes “isomorphic” from one period to the other in an appropriate sense (this is
possible since the horizon is inﬁnite), while in our equilibrium the balance of cost
and reward for cooperation changes over time, as we have already discussed.
At a technical level, our model is related to that of Ambrus and Lu (2010a)
who analyze a multilateral bargaining problem in a continuous-time ﬁnite-horizon
setting where opportunities of proposal arrive via Poisson processes. If an agree-
ment is reached at any time, the game ends then. If no offer is accepted until the
deadline, players receive the payoff 0. They show that there is a unique Markov
perfect equilibrium in which the ﬁrst proposal is accepted, so the proposals that
different players make converge to the same limit as the horizon length becomes
large. Although their basic framework is similar to ours, there are two main differ-
ences. First, in their model the game can end before the deadline, if an agreement
11 See related papers on gradualism, e.g. Admati and Perry (1991), Marx and Matthews (2000), and
Compte and Jehiel (2003) and monotone games, e.g. Gale (1995, 2001).
8is reached. Second, they focus on Markov perfect equilibrium, which in our model
corresponds to the repetition of the component game Nash equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section presents a class
of revision games without a deadline to help the readers build up some intuition.
The main model with a deadline is presented in Section 2.3. The results on a gen-
eral setting with one-dimensional continuous strategies are given in Section 2.4..
Section 2.5 provides a number of applications. Section 2.6 discusses the robustness
of our results to ﬁne changes of the speciﬁcation of the model, identiﬁes the con-
dition for the sustainability of cooperation, and compares our model to an inﬁnite
horizon model with a decreasing discount factor. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 An Example (Two Samurai): Stationary Revision Games
The purpose of this paper is to analyze a class of games where (i) a component
game is played only once, (ii) players must prepare their actions in advance, (iii)
prepared actions are observable, and (iv) the probability that the prepared actions
are actually played is strictly positive but not one. We refer those games as revision
games. In this section, we start with a simple case, where the problem is stationary
in the sense that in each period t = 0,1,2,... there is a ﬁxed, positive probability
p with which the component game is played. We refer to this class of revision
games as stationary revision games. This class will turn out to be isomorphic to a
familiar class of games, and it helps to build some intuition on how revision games
in general work. The point we make is a simple one, so we just present an example
of stationary revision games.
Suppose that a rural village faces an attack of bandits. In each period t =
0,1,2,... the bandits attack the village with probability p 2 (0,1) around midnight.
9Table 2.1: The Samurai example.
Defend Hide
Defend 2, 2 -1, 3
Hide 3, -1 0, 0
They attack only once. The villagers hired two samurai, i = 1,2, and they must
prepare to defend the village (to show up at the village gate around midnight)
or not (to hide away and watch the gate from a distance). Hence in each period
they observe each other’s prepared actions. The acts of preparation themselves
(showing up and hiding away) have negligible effects on the samurai’s payoffs.
When the bandits attack, however, their prepared actions have huge impacts on
their payoffs. Payoffs are summarized in Table 2.1. This is a Prisoner’s Dilemma
game. Now consider player i’s expected payoff. We denote player i’s payoff by
πi(t), when the bandits’ attack occurs at time t. We also assume that players have
a common discount factor δ 2 (0,1). Player i’s expected payoff is
pπi(0) + δ(1¡ p)pπi(1) + δ2(1¡ p)2pπi(2) + ¢¢¢
= p
∞
∑
t=0
δ
t
πi(t),
where δ := δ(1 ¡ p). Hence, stationary revision games are isomorphic to inﬁnitely re-
peated games, and cooperation can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium
if p is small. Even though the component game is played only once, when (i) a
component game is played only once, (ii) players must prepare for their actions
in advance, (iii) prepared actions are observable, and (iv) the probability that the
prepared actions are actually played is strictly positive but not one (and the prob-
10ability with which the game is played is sufﬁciently low as well as the discount
factor is sufﬁciently high), then players manage to cooperate. The mechanism to
sustain cooperation works, for example, as follows. As long as the samurai have
been showing up at the gate, they continue to do so (to prepare to defend the vil-
lage). If anyone hides away, however, they stop preparing to defend.
The next section deals with our main model, where there is a ﬁxed deadline
to prepare action in the component game. We will show that some cooperation
can be sustained in such games (revision games with a deadline), and the basic
mechanism to sustain cooperation is essentially the same as in this bandits story.
2.3 Revision Games with a Deadline - The Main Model
Consider a normal form game with players i = 1,..., N. Player i’s action and
payoff are denoted by ai 2 Ai and πi(a1,...,aN), respectively. This game is played
at time 0, but players have to prepare their actions in advance, and they also have
some stochastic opportunities to revise their prepared actions. Hence, technically
the game under consideration is a dynamic game with preparation and revisions of
actions, where the normal-form game π is played at the end of the dynamic game
(time 0). To distinguish the entire dynamic game and its component π, the former
is referred to as a revision game and π is referred to as the component game.
Speciﬁcally, we consider two speciﬁcations. In both cases, time is continuous,
¡t 2 [¡T,0] with T > 0. At time ¡T, each player i chooses an action from Ai si-
multaneously. In time interval (¡T,0], revision opportunities arrive stochastically,
according to a process deﬁned shortly. There is no cost of revision. At period 0,
the payoffs π(a0) = (π1(a0
1),...,πN(a0
N)) materialize, where a0
i is i’s ﬁnally-revised
action.
111. Synchronous revision game: There is a Poisson process with arrival rate λ > 0
deﬁned over the time interval (¡T,0]. At each arrival, each player i chooses
an action from Ai simultaneously. We analyze this case in the present paper.
2. Asynchronous revision game: For each player i, there is a Poisson process with
arrival rate λi > 0 deﬁned over the time interval (¡T,0]. At each arrival,
i chooses an action from Ai. We analyze this case in Kamada and Kandori
(2011a).
We assume that players observe all the past events in the revision game, and
analyze subgame perfect equilibria. In synchronous revision games, if the com-
ponent game has a unique pure Nash equilibrium, one obvious subgame perfect
equilibrium is the strategy proﬁle in which players choose a static Nash action at
time ¡T, and they do not revise their actions until time 0. In what follows, we
show that, under some regulatory conditions, revision games have other subgame
perfect equilibria, where players are better off than in the static Nash equilibrium.
2.4 Characterization of Optimal Trigger Strategy Equilibrium
In this section, we consider the case of synchronous moves. We restrict our-
selves to two players with one-dimensional continuous action space. This case
subsumes, for example, good exchange games, Cournot duopolies, Bertrand com-
petitions, and so forth. These applications are discussed in Section 2.5. We assume
two players, but this is just to simplify the exposition: Our results easily extend to
the case of N players. The assumption of continuous actions is discussed in a great
depth in Section 2.6.
Consider a general two-person symmetric component game with action ai 2 Ai
12and payoff function πi. Two players are denoted i = 1,2, and a player’s action
space Ai is a convex subset (an interval) in R: Examples include Ai = [ai,ai] or
[0,∞). Symmetry means A1 = A2 =: A and π1(a,a0) = π2(a,a0) for all a,a0 2 A.12
We assume that the component game has a unique symmetric pure Nash equilib-
rium (aN,aN), whose payoff is πN := πi(aN,aN). Here we conﬁne our attention to
symmetric revision game equilibrium x(t) that uses the “trigger strategy.” The ac-
tion path x(t) means that, when a revision opportunity arrives at time ¡t, players
are supposed to choose action x(t), given that there has been no deviations in the
past. If any player deviates and does not choose the prescribed action x(t), then
in the future players prepare the Nash equilibrium action of the component game
aN, whenever a revision opportunity arrives. This is what we mean by the trigger
strategy in revision games. Below we identify the optimal symmetric equilibrium
in the class of trigger strategy equilibria. By the “optimal equilibrium” in a given
class of equilibria, we mean that the strategy proﬁle achieves (ex ante) the highest
payoffs in that class. Let the symmetric payoff function be
π(a) := π1(a,a) = π2(a,a),
and deﬁne the best symmetric action a¤ := argmaxa2A π(a) and let π¤: = π(a¤)
denote the highest symmetric payoff.13 We assume the following regularity condi-
tions. Unless otherwise noted, these assumptions are imposed only in this section.
1. A1: A pure symmetric Nash equilibrium (aN,aN) exists, and it is different
from the best symmetric action proﬁle (a¤,a¤).
12 When we write πi(x,x0), x is player i’s action and x0 is player ¡i’s action.
13 Assumption A2 that we state shortly ensures that all these pieces of notation are well-deﬁned.
132. A2: The payoff function πi for each i = 1,2 is twice continuously differen-
tiable.14
3. A3: There is a unique best reply BR(a) for all a 2 A.
4. A4: At the best reply, the ﬁrst and second order conditions are satisﬁed: For
each i = 1,2,
∂πi(BR(a),a)
∂ai
= 0,
∂2πi(BR(a),a)
∂2ai
< 0.
5. A5: π(a) is strictly increasing if a < a¤ and strictly decreasing if a¤ < a.
6. A6: The gain from deviation
d(a) := πi(BR(a),a) ¡ πi(a,a) (2.1)
is strictly decreasing if a < aN and strictly increasing if aN < a.
A trigger strategy equilibrium is characterized by its equilibrium path (revision
plan) x : [0,T] ! A (recall that x(t) denotes the equilibrium action to be taken
when a revision opportunity arrives at time ¡t). The expected payoff at the begin-
ning of the game (i.e., at time ¡T) associated with x is deﬁned by
V(x) := π(x(T))e¡λT +
Z T
0
π(x(t))λe¡λtdt. (2.2)
We say that a path x is feasible if the expected payoff (2.2) is well-deﬁned. Since
(2.2) represents an expected payoff, the second term in (2.2) should be regarded as
14 When A is not an open set, we assume that there exists an open interval ˜ A such that A ½ ˜ A
and πi can be extended to a function ˜ πi over ˜ A £ ˜ A that is twice continuously differentiable, i.e.
˜ πi(a,a0) = πi(a,a0) if (a,a0) 2 A £ A.
14Lebesgue integral. Consequently the set of feasible paths is formally deﬁned by
X := fx : [0,T] ! A j π ± x is measurableg.
Given a feasible path x 2 X, the incentive constraint at time t is
(IC(t)): d(x(t))e¡λt ·
Z t
0
³
π(x(s)) ¡ πN
´
λe¡λsds, (2.3)
where d(x(t)) represents the gain from deviation (see (2.1)). The set of trigger
strategy equilibrium paths is formally deﬁned as
X¤ := fx 2 X j IC(t) holds for all t 2 [0,T]g.
Thus, by optimal path we mean the path that achieves (ex ante) the highest payoff
with in X¤.
First, we show formally that an optimal trigger strategy equilibrium path exists
and it is differentiable (Proposition 1). Based on this, we then derive a differential
equation to characterize the optimal path (Theorem 1).
Proposition 1. There exists an optimal trigger strategy equilibrium x(t) (V(x) =
maxx2X¤ V(x)) which is (i) continuous for all t, (ii) differentiable in t when x(t) 6= aN,a¤.
Furthermore, x(t) satisﬁes the following binding incentive constraint if x(t) 6= a¤:
d(x(t))e¡λt =
Z t
0
³
π(x(s)) ¡ πN
´
λe¡λsds. (2.4)
(Sketch of the proof): This proposition is proved by a series of propositions in
Appendix A.1. First, we show that the optimal trigger strategy equilibrium exists
anditiscontinuousin t. Thenweusethecontinuitytoshowthatitisdifferentiable.
15The proofs rely on the following three elementary technical facts:
1. Foracollectionofcountablymanymeasurablefunctions πn(t), n = 1,2,..., supn πn
is measurable. We use this fact to construct a candidate optimal payoff π(t)
that is measurable (as the supremum of a sequence π(xn(t)), where xn is a se-
quence in X¤ whose payoffs approach supx2X¤ V(x): Proposition 33). Then,
pretending that this is the optimal payoff, we construct the candidate optimal
path x(t) by the binding “pseudo incentive constraint”
d(x(t))e¡λt =
Z t
0
³
π(s) ¡ πN
´
λe¡λsds. (2.5)
Note that we have yet to show that this implies the true incentive constraint.
2. Lebesgue integral
R t
0 f(s)ds is continuous in t for any measurable function f. This
fact shows that the right-hand side of the above equation (2.5), whose in-
tegrand is measurable by Step 1, is continuous in t, leading to the conti-
nuity of x(t) (Proposition 33). We also show that π(t) · π(x(t)) so that
the pseudo incentive constraint (2.5) implies the true incentive constraint
d(x(t))e¡λt ·
R t
0
¡
π(x(s)) ¡ πN¢
λe¡λsds. We go on to show that this weak
inequality is actually satisﬁed with equality (Proposition 34), so that we have
the binding incentive constraint (2.4).
3. Lebesgue integral
R t
0 f(s)ds is differentiable in t if f is continuous.15 This fact
shows that the right-hand side of the binding incentive constraint (2.4),
whose integrand is continuous by Step 2, is differentiable in t, and this leads
to the differentiability of x (Proposition 34). Q.E.D.
15 When f is continuous,
R t
0 f(s)ds is equal to Riemann integral and this is just the well-known
fundamental theorem of calculus: d
dt
R t
0 f(s)ds exists and equal to f(t).
16Next we show that there is essentially a unique optimal path. Note ﬁrst that there
are in fact multiple optimal paths which attain the same expected payoff. Let
x(t) be the optimal trigger strategy equilibrium path identiﬁed by the previous
proposition. Then,
x(t) :=
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
aN if t is in a measure zero set
x(t) otherwise
.
is also a trigger strategy equilibrium path that achieves the same expected payoff
as x(t) does. However, it is easy to show that the following is true.
Proposition2. Theoptimalpathisessentiallyunique: If y(t)isanoptimaltriggerstrategy
equilibrium path, then y(t) = x(t) almost everywhere, where x(t) is the optimal path that
satisﬁes the binding incentive constraint (2.4).
The proof is given in Appendix A.2. Hereafter, the continuous and differen-
tiable optimal path x(t) identiﬁed in Proposition 1 is referred to as the essentially
unique optimal path, or simply as the optimal path. Now we are ready to state our
main result in this section: The optimal path is characterized by a differential equa-
tion.
Theorem 1. The optimal path x(t) is the unique path with the following properties: (i) it
is continuous in t and departs aN at t = 0 (i.e., x(t) = aN if and only if t = 0), (ii) for
t > 0, it solves differential equation
dx
dt
=
λ
¡
d(x) + π(x) ¡ πN¢
d0(x)
=: f(x) (2.6)
until x(t) hits the optimal action a¤, and (iii) if x(t) hits the optimal action a¤, it satays
17there (¯ x(t) = a¤ implies ¯ x(t0) = a¤ if t0 > t). Furthermore, if T is large enough, x(t)
always hits the optimal action a¤ at a ﬁxed ﬁnite time,
t(a¤) := lim
a!aN
Z a¤
a
1
f(x)
dx (2.7)
which is independent of T.
(Sketch of the proof): Technical details can be found in Appendices. Let us
nowconﬁneourattentiontothecase aN < a¤ (asymmetricproofappliestothecase
a¤ < aN). Lemma 2 in Appendix refapppaper1a implies that the essentially unique
optimal path lies between the Nash and optimal actions (x(t) 2 [aN,a¤] for all t).
By differentiating the binding incentive constraint (2.4), we obtain a differential
equation (2.6) when d0(x) 6= 0. Under Assumption A6, we have d0(aN) = 0 and
d0(x) > 0 if x 6= aN (d0 can be shown to exist (Lemma 3)). (Recall that d0(aN) = 0 is
the ﬁrst order condition that the gain from deviation d(x) is minimized at the Nash
action x = aN.) Thus we have obtained a differential equation on an open domain
(x,t) 2 (aN,a¤ + ε) £ (¡∞,∞), for some ε > 0.16 Note well that the domain
excludes the Nash action aN, where f(aN) is not deﬁned because d0(aN) = 0.
The optimal path x(t) satisﬁes the following conditions:
² (i) it lies in [aN,a¤] for all t,
² (ii) it is continuous in t,
² (iii) it follows the differential equation when x 2 (aN,a¤), and
² (iv) it starts with Nash action aN at t = 0.
16 If a¤ is a boundary point of A, extend f(x) to (aN,a¤ + ε) by any continuously differentiable
function and apply the same proof in what follows. This is possible under A2 and footnote 2.
18It turns out that there are multiple paths which satisfy conditions (i)-(iv). For
example, trivial constant path x(t) ´ aN satisﬁes those conditions. In what follows,
we identify all paths that satisfy conditions (i)-(iv) and ﬁnd the optimal one among
them.
The crucial step is to show that there is a non-trivial path to satisfy (i)-(iv). Is
there any solution to dx/dt = f(x) which departs from aN and reach some action
a0 2 (aN,a¤] at some ﬁnite time? The answer is positive if and only if the following
ﬁnite time condition
t(a0) := lim
a!aN
Z a0
a
1
f(x)
dx < ∞ (2.8)
is satisﬁed. As we will show, t(a0) represents the time for a solution to the dif-
ferential equation dx
dt = f(x) to travel from aN to a0. The reason is the following.
Under Assumptions A5 and A6, f(x) =
λ(d(x)+π(x)¡πN)
d0(x) > 0 when x 2 (aN,a¤].
Hence any solution x(t) to dx
dt = f(x) is strictly increasing in t. Therefore, x(t)
has inverse function t(x), and its derivative is given by dt
dx = 1
f(x). This implies
that t(a0) = lima!aN
R a0
a
dt
dxdx represents the time for a solution to the differential
equation dx
dt = f(x) to travel from aN to a0.
It is straightforward to check that this ﬁnite time condition (2.8) is satisﬁed for
any x0 2 (aN,a¤], under our assumptions (Lemma 6 in Appendix A.3). Given
those observations, all paths that satisfy (i)-(iv) can be written as follows:
xτ(t) :=
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
aN if t 2 [0,τ]
x¤(t ¡ τ) if t 2 (τ,τ + t(a¤))
a¤ if t 2 [τ + t(a¤),∞)
,
19where x¤(t) is the solution to dx/dt = f(x) with boundary condition x¤(t(a¤)) =
a¤. This path xτ(t) departs from aN at time τ, follows the differential equation, and
then hits the optimal action a¤ and stays there. (More precisely, we must consider
the restriction of xτ(t) on [0,T].)
Those paths obviously satisfy (i)-(iv). Next we show the converse: any path
satisfying (i)-(iv) is equal to xτ(t) for some τ 2 [0,∞]. This comes from the standard
result in differential equation: dx/dt = f(x) deﬁned on an open domain (x,t) 2
(aN,a¤ +ε)£(¡∞,∞) has a unique solution given any boundary condition, if f(x)
is continuously differentiable. Under our assumptions, it is easy to check that f(x)
is indeed continuously differentiable on (aN,a¤) (Lemma 4 in Appendix A.3). The
uniqueness of the solution then implies that any path satisfying (i)-(iv) is equal to
xτ(t) for some τ 2 [0,∞] .17
Among the paths xτ(t), τ 2 [0,∞] the one that departs from aN immediately
(i.e., x0(t)) obviously has the highest payoff. Therefore the optimal path is given
by the restriction of x0(t) on [0,T], which has the stated properties in Theorem 1.
Q.E.D.
In the optimal trigger strategy equilibrium identiﬁed in the previous theorem,
players act as follows. Recall that x(t) is the action to be taken at time ¡t. If the
time horizon is long enough, (i.e., if T ¸ t(a¤)), players start with the best action
17 Formal proof goes as follows. The trivial path, which satisfy (i)-(iv), is equal to xτ with τ = ∞.
Consider any non-trivial path x0(t) that satisfy (i)-(iv), where x0(t0) =: a0 2 (aN,a¤) for some t0.
Deﬁne t0 := t0 ¡ lima!aN
R a0
a
1
f(x)dx, so that x¤(t ¡ t0) hits a0 at time t0. The uniqueness of the
solution to the differential equation (for boundary condition x(t0) = a0) implies x0(t) = x¤(t ¡ t0).
If t0 ¸ 0, we obtain the desired result x0(t) = xτ(t) for τ = t0. If t0 < 0, x0(0) = x¤(¡t0) > aN
and x0(0) cannot satisfy (iv). (We have x¤(¡t0) > aN because we are considering the case aN < a¤,
where the solution x¤(t) is strictly increasing).
20a¤, and even if a revision opportunity arrives, they do not revise their actions until
time ¡t(a¤) is reached. After that, if a revision opportunity arrives, they choose
an action x(t), which is closer to the Nash action. The closer the timing of the
revision opportunity is to the end of the game, the closer the revised action x(t)
is to the Nash equilibrium. At the end of the game, the actions chosen at the last
revision opportunity are implemented. Hence the best symmetric trigger strategy
equilibrium induces a probability distribution of actions in between the best and
Nash actions. The nature of this equilibrium distribution will be examined in the
following propositions (Propositions 3 and 4).
One might expect that the outcome of the component game, and hence the pay-
offs, may depend on the arrival rate λ. The next proposition, which is actually
nothing but a simple observation, shows that this is not the case. To state the
proposition, we need to introduce the following notation. We denoted the ﬁrst
time to hit the optimal action by t(a¤) in Theorem 1 (see (2.7)), but to explicitly
show its dependence on arrival rate λ, let us now denote it by tλ(a¤).
Proposition 3. (Arrival Rate Invariance) Under the best symmetric trigger strategy
equilibrium, the probability distribution of action proﬁle at period 0 is independent of the
Poisson arrival rate λ, provided that the time horizon T is long enough. Speciﬁcally, Let
tλ(a¤) be the (ﬁrst) time to reach the optimal symmetric action, stated in Theorem 1. Then,
as long as tλ(a¤) · T, the probability distribution of the action proﬁle at period 0 is inde-
pendent of λ.
Proof. Consider λ such that tλ(a¤) · T and call it Model 1. Rewrite this model by
changing the time scale in such a way that one unit of time in Model 1 corresponds
to λ units in the new model. Under the new time scale, the model is identical to
the revision game with arrival rate 1 and time horizon λT. Call it Model 2. The
21best symmetric trigger strategy equilibrium path in Model 1 should be transformed
into the best symmetric trigger strategy equilibrium path in Model 2. In particular,
it must be the case that t1(a¤), the ﬁrst time the optimal path hits a¤ in Model 2, is
equal to λtλ(a¤), and this is smaller than the time horizon of Model 2 (λT). Hence
in Model 2, there is no revision of action in the best symmetric trigger strategy
equilibrium for t 2 [¡λT,¡t1(a¤)], and therefore the probability distribution of
action proﬁle at t = 0 is unchanged if the game starts at ¡t1(a¤) (instead of ¡λT).
Hence, the probability distribution of action proﬁle at t = 0 under any arrival rate
λ such that tλ(a¤) · T is equal to the probability distribution under arrival rate 1
and time horizon t1(a¤).
Note that the fact that payoffs realize only at the deadline t = 0 played a crucial
role in this proposition (otherwise, the expected payoffs would be affected by the
arrival rate and the discount factor). Proposition 3 shows the following attractive
feature of revision games: we can obtain a unique prediction that does not depend
on the ﬁne detail, namely the arrival rate λ of the revision opportunities. In partic-
ular, even if λ is sufﬁciently high (so that there are many chances to revise actions
right before the component game), the expected outcome in the component game
is the same as in the case of low λ.
The proof also shows how to calculate the cumulative distribution function of
symmetric action a, denoted by F(a). Again we consider the case with aN < a¤
(a symmetric argument applies to the other case). Let x1(t) be the optimal trigger
strategy equilibrium path under λ = 1, and denote the time for x1(t) to hit a 2
22[aN,a¤] by t1(a). The latter is given by equation (2.8) for λ = 1:
t1(a) := lim
a0!aN
Z a
a0
d0(x)
d(x) + π(x) ¡ πNdx. (2.9)
For a 2 (aN,a¤), F(a) =
R
ftjx1(t)·ag e¡tdt =
R t1(a)
0 e¡tdt = 1 ¡ e¡t1(a). The ﬁrst
equality follows from the fact that the density of action x1(t) · a is the product of
² 1 (the density of revision at time t) and
² e¡t (the probability that the revised action at time t, x(t), will never be revised
again).
At a¤, the distribution function F(a) jumps by e¡t1(a¤) and F(a) = 1 for a ¸ a¤.
This means that the optimal action a¤ is played with probability e¡t1(a¤). This is the
probability that no revision opportunity arises under λ = 1. Below we summarize
our arguments.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the time horizon is long enough so that the efﬁcient action a¤
is chosen at the beginning of the revision game, under the best symmetric trigger strategy
equilibrium. When aN < a¤, the cumulative distribution function of the symmetric action
realized at t = 0 is given by
F(a) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if a < aN
1¡ e¡t1(a) if aN · a < a¤
1 if a¤ · a
,
where t1(a) is given by (2.9) and represents the time for the best symmetric trigger strategy
action path to reach a 2 [aN,x¤], when the arrival rate is λ = 1. When a¤ < aN, it is
23given by
F(a) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if a < a¤
e¡t1(a) if a¤ · a · aN
1 if aN < a
.
2.5 Applications
In this section, we use the general framework given in the previous section to
analyze various games of interest. Speciﬁcally, we use the differential equation
provided in Theorem 1 to analyze good exchange games (prisoner’s dilemma),
Cournot duopolies, Bertrand competition with product differentiation, and elec-
tion campaign. Unless otherwise noted, the component games in these examples
satisfy Assumptions A1-A6.
We will be considering two measures of the degree of cooperation. Let the ex-
pected payoff from the optimal trigger strategy equilibrium when T is sufﬁciently
large be ˜ π. The two measures are:
R :=
˜ π
π(a¤)
and ˜ R :=
˜ π ¡ πN
π(a¤) ¡ πN.
The ﬁrst one simply takes the ratio of the equilibrium payoff to the fully collu-
sive payoff. The second is a conservative one, which compares the improvement
of the payoff relative to the Nash payoff (the static equilibrium payoff) with the
maximum possible payoff improvement.
2.5.1 Good Exchange Game
For each player i = 1,2, let the payoff function be πi(ai,a¡i) = ak
¡i ¡ c ¢ a2
i ,
where c > 0, k 2 (0,2), and the action space is ai 2 [0,∞). This game represents
24the following situation. Two players i = 1,2 exchange goods they produce. That
is, player 1 produces one unit of good and gives it to player 2 (and vice versa). The
quality of the good player i produces is equal to ak
i, and i incurs a convex cost c ¢ a2
i
to provide a good with quality ai. Alternatively, one can interpret ak
i as the quantity
of goods i provides given effort level ai and assume that c¢ a2
i is the cost to exert the
effort level ai. Note that ai = 0 is the dominant strategy, while the best symmetric
action a¤ =
³
k
2c
´ 1
2¡k
is strictly positive. Hence this can be regarded as a version of
the prisoner’s dilemma game with continuous actions. Notice that the larger k is,
the smaller is the gain from a very small amount of action (i.e., ak < ak0
if k > k0
and a is small).
The differential equation in Theorem 1 for this example is
dx
dt
=
λ
¡
d(x) + π(x) ¡ πN¢
d0(x)
=
λ(cx2 + (xk ¡ cx2) + 0)
(cx2)0 =
λxk
2cx
.
Note that, since 0 is a dominant action, the Nash payoff πN is zero, and the best
reply to any action is zero: BR(a¡i) = 0. The latter implies d(x) = cx2. The
above differential equation has a solution x(t) =
³
2¡k
2c λt
´ 1
2¡k
which departs from
0 (the Nash action) at time t = 0. The time at which x(t) reaches the best action,
denoted t(a¤), can be calculated by (2.7), but it is equivalently obtained by solving
a¤ = x(t(a¤)) =
³
2¡k
2c λt(a¤)
´ 1
2¡k
. We summarize our ﬁndings as follows.
Proposition 5. In the good exchange game, the optimal trigger strategy equilibrium, x(t),
25Figure 2.2: The optimal path for the good exchange game: λ = 1.
is characterized by
x(t) =
8
> <
> :
³
2¡k
2c λt
´ 1
2¡k
if t < t(a¤)
a¤ =
³
k
2c
´ 1
2¡k
if t(a¤) · t
,
where t(a¤) = k
λ(2¡k).
The path characterized in Proposition 5 is depicted in Figure 2.2.
In Figure 2.2, as k increases, the time that the path departs from the optimal
action (t(a¤)) becomes larger, and the path approaches 0 more quickly. These ob-
servations suggest that it is more difﬁcult to cooperate when parameter k is large.
This is in line with our earlier observation that a larger k implies a smaller gain
from cooperation around the Nash equilibrium (0,0) (hence it is more difﬁcult to
sustain cooperation).
Corollary 1. In the good exchange game, R (= ˜ R) is decreasing in k. It approaches 1 as
k & 0, and approaches 0 as k % 2.
26The proof is straightforward calculation and therefore omitted. We can also
explicitly calculate the expected payoff when the parameter k is just in the middle
of (0,2). That is, when k = 1, the expected payoff is 1
2ec2, which implies R = ˜ R =
2
e
» = 0.74 (this is independent of the value of c). The revision game attains 74% of
the fully cooperative payoff in this case.
Although there cannot be any cooperation in the Nash equilibrium of the com-
ponent game, in revision games players can achieve around three fourths of the
fully cooperative payoff. The degree of cooperation decreases as the gain from
small cooperation decreases. Thus, a higher degree of overall cooperation is more
difﬁcult to achieve the less gain there is given a small amount of cooperation.
2.5.2 Cournot Duopoly: Collusion Through Output Adjustment Achieves 97% of The
Monopoly Proﬁt
In this subsection, we consider a Cournot duopoly game with a linear demand
curve P = a¡ b(qi + qj) (qi denotes agent i’s quantity) and constant (and identical)
marginal cost c. Hence the (component game) payoff function for player i is πi =
¡
a ¡ b(qi + qj) ¡ c
¢
qi. We suppose a > c > 0 and b > 0. The differential equation
is
dq
dt
=
λ
¡
d(q) + π(q) ¡ πN¢
d0(q)
=
λ
18
(q ¡ 5
a ¡ c
3b
).
This comes from d(q) =
(a¡c¡3bq)2
4b , π(q) = (a ¡ c ¡ 2bq)q, and πN =
(a¡c)2
9b . The
differential equation admits a simple solution q(t) = a¡c
3b (5 ¡ 4e
λ
18t) which departs
from the Cournot Nash output qN = a¡c
3b at t = 0, and this path hits the optimal
27Figure 2.3: The optimal path for Cournot duopoly: λ = 1.
output q¤ = a¡c
4b at t(q¤) = 18
λ ln
¡17
16
¢
. Therefore, we have obtained the following.
Proposition 6. In the Cournot duopoly game, the optimal trigger strategy equilibrium,
q(t), is characterized by
q(t) =
8
> <
> :
a¡c
3b ¢ r(t) if t < t(q¤)
q¤ = a¡c
4b if t(q¤) · t
,
where we let t(q¤) = 18
λ ln
¡17
16
¢
and r(t) = 5¡ 4e
λ
18t.
Note that r(t) is the ratio of the equilibrium quantity at time ¡t to the static
equilibrium quantity, a¡c
3b .
Whentheﬁrmscollude, theyproducelessthantheNashquantity, andtherefore
the optimal trigger equilibrium path that we characterize is deceasing in t. That is,
the ratio r starts from 1 (due to the initial condition), and decreases monotonically
to 3
4. The path of r with respect to t is depicted in Figure 2.3.
Next, we consider the welfare implication of the revision game of the Cournot
28duopoly game. One can compute the equilibrium expected payoff, and it turns out
that a surprisingly high degree of collusion can be achieved in this game. The next
corollary implies that, when two ﬁrms gradually adjust their outputs before the
market is open (and if they closely monitor each other’s output adjustment pro-
cesses), then they can achieve almost 97% of the fully collusive proﬁt (this amounts
to 72% of the gain relative to the Nash proﬁt). We emphasize that those numbers
are independent of the position and the slope of the demand curve (a and b) and
the marginal cost c (and also independent of the arrival rate λ of revision opportu-
nities, as Proposition 3 shows).
Corollary 2. In the Cournot duopoly game, R » = 0.968 and ˜ R » = 0.714, independent of
the values of parameters a, b, and c.
The following story might ﬁt the Cournot revision game. Two ﬁshing boats
depart from a harbor early in the morning, and they must return when the ﬁsh
market at the harbor opens at 6:00 am. They would like to restrict their catch so
as to increase the price at the ﬁsh market. They ﬁrst catch a small amount of ﬁsh
(the collusive quantity). They are operating side by side, closely monitoring each
other’s behavior. Fish schools occasionally visit them, by Poisson process.18 The
arrival rate is λ = 0.1 (and the time unit is a minute), so that a ﬁsh school comes
every ten minutes on average. Since t(q¤) = 18
λ ln
¡17
16
¢
= 10.912 minutes, they
do not catch any additional ﬁsh until eleven minutes before the market opens. In
the last eleven minutes, whenever a ﬁsh school visit them, they catch additional
ﬁsh. If no ﬁsh school visits, they deliver the collusive amount to the market. If
a ﬁsh school comes right before 6:00am, they catch Nash amount. If the last visit
of a ﬁsh school is somewhat before, they catch a smaller amount. On average,
18 Pun not intended.
29they encounter only one revision opportunity in the last eleven minutes (because
λ ¢ t(q¤) ' 1), and they can achieve 97% of fully collusive proﬁt.
2.5.3 Bertrand Competition with Product Differentiation
In this subsection we consider a Bertrand competition with product differen-
tiation. We would like to examine how the degree of product differentiation af-
fects the possibility of collusion in the revision game. To this end, we employ the
Hotelling model of spatial competition with price setting ﬁrms. This model has
an advantage of incorporating the case with no product differentiation as a special
case.
A continuum of buyers are distributed uniformly over [0,1]. Two ﬁrms i =
1,2 are located at positions 0 and 1, respectively. A buyer at x receives payoff
a ¡ djx ¡ yj ¡ p if she buys from the ﬁrm at y with price p, where d 2 [0, 2
3a).
Notice that d is the cost of transportation for the buyers, and it measures the degree
of product differentiation. In particular, d = 0 corresponds to the case in which
there is no product differentiation, and a high d means a high degree of product
differentiation. If the buyer does not buy anything, the payoff is 0. No buyer would
want to buy two or more products. Each ﬁrm’s marginal cost is normalized at 0,
and the ﬁrm’s payoff is the average revenue from a buyer.19
For relatively high product differentiation, namely for d 2 (2
7a, 2
3a), the differ-
19 Firm i’s payoff function has a kink for example when pi = p¡i ¡ d, so A2 is violated. However,
A2 can be shown to be satisﬁed at relevant regions ((p, p) and (BR(p), p) for all p weakly between the
Nash price and the fully collusive price) when d 2 (2
7a, 2
3a). When d 2 (0, 2
7a), A2 is not satisﬁed at
(BR(p), p) for one p on the equilibrium path, but one can show that the optimal path is characterized
by solving two differential equations, one for prices below such p and the other for prices above such
p.
30ential equation is
dp
dt
= λ
p + 3d
2
.
This comes from πN = d
2, π(p) =
p
2, and d(p) =
(p¡d)2
8d .
When d 2 (0, 2
7a], however, the degree of differentiation is so small that when
the opponent sets a price close to the best collusive price, the best reply is to set a
price just enough to take all the buyers, that is, BR(p) = p ¡ d and hence d(p) =
p
2 ¡ d. πN and π(p) are the same as before. Using these formulas, the differential
equation in this case can be written as
dp
dt
= λ(2p ¡ 3d).
Overall, we obtain the following:
Proposition7. IntheBertrandcompetitiongame, theoptimaltriggerstrategyequilibrium
path, p(t), is characterized as follows:
1. If d 2 (2
7a, 2
3a),
p(t) =
8
> <
> :
d
³
4eλ t
2 ¡ 3
´
if t < t(p¤)
p¤ = a ¡ d
2 if t(p¤) · t
,
where t(p¤) = 2
λ ln
¡ a
4d + 5
8
¢
.
2. If d 2 (0, 2
7a],
p(t) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
d
³
4eλ t
2 ¡ 3
´
if t < t1
d
¡ 8
27e2λt + 3
2
¢
if t1 · t < t2
p¤ = a ¡ d
2 if t2 · t
,
31where t1 = 2
λ ln
¡3
2
¢
and t2 = 2
λ ln
¡ a
d ¡ 2
¢
.
3. If d = 0, p(t) = 0 for all t.
The proposition claims that there is a cooperative path if and only if there is a
product differentiation. This highlights the importance of Assumption A4. When
d = 0, the ﬁrst order condition does not hold at the static Nash equilibrium, so
there cannot be a collusive path. The intuition is as follows: If there is no product
differentiation, an inﬁnitesimal price cut can increase the proﬁt discontinuously
almost to the double whenever the current price is strictly higher than the marginal
cost (which is 0 in this example). This is because all buyers switch to the deviating
ﬁrm. Hence, if the current price is not equal to the Nash equilibrium, the gain from
deviation is not of a smaller order in magnitude than the gain from cooperation.
This makes cooperation impossible. If there is a product differentiation, however,
only a small fraction of buyers switch to the deviating ﬁrm, and this makes the
cooperation sustainable.
Note also that p is increasing in d. Hence, the more differentiated the products
are, the more collusion there is. This makes sense: When the degree of product dif-
ferentiation is large, the instantaneous gain from deviation when ﬁrms set prices
close to the Nash price is small relative to the loss from the punishment because
ﬁrms need to decrease the price a lot to steal the opponent’s share. The path char-
acterized in Proposition 7 when d > 0 is depicted in Figure 2.4. In the ﬁgure, we
ﬁx a = 10 and draw the optimal paths for d = 1, d = 2, d = 3, and d = 5. As
expected, the collusive path is close to the best collusive price when the degree of
product differentiation is high.
The expected payoff under the optimal trigger strategy path can be computed
as follows:
32Figure 2.4: The optimal path for Bertrand competition: λ = 1, a = 10.
Corollary 3. Let h := d
a be the degree of product differentiation. Then, the level of
collusion achieved in the revision game, measured by R and e R, is expressed as follows.
1. If h 2 (2
7, 2
3), R =
2h(10¡7h)
(2¡h)(2+5h) and ˜ R = 8h
5h+2.
2. If h 2 (0, 2
7], R =
2h(3¡7h)
(2¡h)(1¡2h) and ˜ R =
2h(2¡5h)
(1¡2h)(2¡3h).
3. If h = 0, R = ˜ R = 0.
4. Both R and ˜ R are strictly increasing in h.
The ratios stated in the corollary The ratio of expected payoff relative to the
fully collusive payoff is calculated in Table 2.2 for several values of h. The table
shows that in the revision game, ﬁrms can achieve quite a bit of cooperation to
obtain high expected payoffs. For example, if h = .5 then, on average, a buyer’s
willingness to pay to the worse good is 71.4% of that of the preferred good. In
such a circumstance, the table shows that 96% (89% even under the conservative
33Table 2.2: Degrees of product differentiation and cooperation.
Degree of product differentiation (r = d
a) 0 .1 .2 .3 .5 .6˙ 6
Expected payoff
Collusive payoff (R) 0 .30 .59 .80 .96 1
Expected payoff - Nash payoff
Collusive payoff - Nash payoff ( ˜ R) 0 .22 .48 .69 .89 1
measure of the degree of cooperation) of payoffs can be achieved by the revision
game.
2.5.4 Election Campaign: Policy Platforms Gradually Converge
In this subsection we consider a simple election model with policy-motivated
candidates. The policy space is an interval [0,1]. As in the standard model of
policy-motivated candidates, the position of the median voter is unknown, but its
distributionisknownastheuniformdistributionoverthepolicyspace, [0,1]. There
are two candidates, i = 1,2, where candidate 1 chooses policy y1 and candidate 2
chooses policy y2.
Given a policy proﬁle (y1,y2), let a random variable w(y1,y2) represent the
“winner” of the election. Let candidate i’s realized payoff be
gi(yi,y¡i) = a ¢ Ifi=w(y1,y2)g + b(jyw(yi,y¡i) ¡ yij)
where a 2 (1
2,1) is a positive constant representing the utility of winning per se,
and b(¢) is a “policy preference term,” which depends on the distance between the
winner’s policy (the policy actually implemented) and candidate i’s “bliss point,”
denoted yi. We assume that y1 = 0 and y2 = 1. That is, candidate 1 is “left wing”
and candidate 2 is “right wing.”
34There are two key assumptions that we impose on this standard election model
with policy-motivated candidates: First, we assume that the payoff function cor-
responding to the policy preference term is convex. As Kamada and Kojima (2012)
discuss, such policy preferences are especially relevant for issues that contain reli-
gious content (e.g. same-sex marriage, abortion, gun control, and so forth), as in
these policy issues it is natural to assume that a player’s utility sharply decreases as
the implemented policy departs from her bliss point.20 Convex utility function im-
plies that a proﬁle (0,1) Pareto-dominates the Nash proﬁle, so there is a potential
room for cooperation in a revision game. For simplicity, we assume the follow-
ing functional form: b(z) = maxf1
2 ¡ z,0g.21 Second, we assume that candidate
1 chooses policy y1 from [0, 1
2] and candidate 2 chooses policy y2 from [1
2,1]. The
motivation behind this assumption is that candidate 1 (resp. candidate 2) faces a
reputational concern, so that she never wants to set a policy to the right (resp. left)
of the middle (Remember that candidate 1 (resp. candidate 2) is “left wing” (resp.
“right wing)). Without this assumption, the best response is always to set a policy
as close as possible to the other candidate, and thus there is a huge gain by de-
viating from the proﬁle close to the Nash equilibrium, which makes cooperation
impossible in a revision game (by the violation of A4).
The payoff functions are not symmetric as they are, but by redeﬁning actions
by
x1 = y1 and x2 = 1¡ y2
20 See Osborne (1995) for a criticism on the use of concave utility function for preferences over
electoral policies.
21 This functional form does not satisfy Assumption A2, but it is straightforward to check that A2 is
satisﬁed over the relevant domain. The assumption that the candidate is exactly indifferent between
two policies that are both further away from her bliss point is made only for the purpose of simplicity,
and does not play any crucial role in our argument.
35we can retain the symmetry. Notice that the probability of i’s winning the election
can be calculated as
1+xi+x¡i
2 .
Now, let us explain what the revision game of this election game corresponds
to. We interpret the revision phase as the time period for “election campaign.”
In the revision phase, candidates obtain opportunities to express their policy posi-
tions, for example at an open broadcast on radio or television. At each opportunity,
candidates can choose their policy announcement that is possibly different from
what they have said before (as is often the case). At “time 0” of the revision game,
the election takes place, and candidates are committed to implementing her ﬁnally
announced policy, given that she is elected.22
The differential equation for candidate 1’s policy platform y1(t) = x(t) is
dx
dt
= λ
2x ¡ 2a ¡ 7
4
.
This follows from π(x) = 1
2
¡
a + 1
2 ¡ x
¢
, πN = 1
2, and d(x) = 1
8(a ¡ 1
2 ¡ x)2. This
has a solution x(t) = 7+2a¡8¢e
λ
2 t
2 which departs from Nash action xN = 2a¡1
2 at t = 0.
Proposition 8. In the election campaign game, the optimal trigger strategy equilibrium,
(y1(t),y2(t)), is characterized by
y1(t) =
8
> <
> :
7+2a¡8¢e
λ
2 t
2 if t < t¤
0 if t¤ · t
,
where t¤ = 2
3λ ln
¡7
2 + a
¢
and y2(t) = 1¡ y1(t).
The above proposition shows that in the election campaign game, each candi-
22 This “policy announcement game” is proposed and analyzed in Kamada and Sugaya (2011), in
which they analyze the case where candidates cannot announce inconsistent policies while they have
an option to announce an “ambiguous policy.”
36Figure 2.5: The optimal path for election campaign (the path of x1): λ = 1.
date starts from announcing their most preferred policies until the time of elec-
tion becomes close, and then begin catering to the middle in the end. Thus the
model captures the well-observed phenomena of candidates changing their policy
announcements, moving to the middle when the election is close. The path charac-
terized in Proposition 8 is depicted in Figure 2.5.
We note that this result does not hold if the policy preference term b is concave,
as usually assumed in the political science literature. If candidates’ policy prefer-
ences are convex, they prefer a diverging policy proﬁle (0,1) to a converging one
(1
2, 1
2). This is because, for example, candidate 1 does not care about the difference
between policies 1
2 and 1 while she perceives a huge difference between policies 0
and 1
2. This is why there can be a nontrivial equilibrium path.
372.6 Discussion
2.6.1 Robustness of Cooperation
As should be clear at this point, the key to the sustainability of cooperation in
revision games is the fact that as the deadline comes close, the gain from defec-
tion becomes arbitrarily smaller than the payoff from cooperation. This was made
possible because we assume continuous action space and continuous time. First,
note that if each player has a dominant action and time is discrete, then by back-
wards induction it is obvious that the only equilibrium is for each player to play the
dominant action at any revision opportunity. Again, drop A1-A6 in this section.
Proposition 9. Consider a component game with an action set Ai with a strictly dominant
action aN
i for each player i, and consider either of the following two cases:
1. Ai is ﬁnite.
2. There exists   > 0 such that all players are restricted to use strategies that, at any
time ¡t, do not condition on what has happened in time (¡t +  ,¡t).
Then, whether in synchronous or asynchronous revision games (with homogeneous or
heterogeneous arrival rates), there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. In this
equilibrium, each player i plays action aN
i conditional on any history.
For part 1, the proof for the result is straightforward. First observe that if Ai
is ﬁnite then there exists   > 0 such that given any action of the opponent, aN
i
gives i a payoff at least   greater than any other actions in Ai. This means that,
if it is true that each player j prepares an action aN
j whenever j gets a revision
opportunity strictly after time ¡t, then by assumption i’s payoff from preparing aN
i
is at least  0 greater than preparing any other action for some  0 > 0. By continuity
38of payoffs with respect to probability, this means that there exists  00 > 0 such that
i strictly prefers preparing aN
i to any other action in the time interval (¡t ¡  00,¡t],
hence whenever i gets a revision opportunity in (¡t ¡  00,¡t] she prepares aN
i .
This establishes the result.23 The intuition is that if the time left until the deadline
is very little, it is a dominant strategy for players to follow the dominant actions,
irrespective of the opponents’ strategies.24 Notice that the above proof is invalid in
our main model because there does not exist such   > 0 that we took above.
The restriction on the strategy stated in part 2 describe the situation where there
exists a ﬁxed positive “response time,” so that any player cannot respond to a de-
fection that has happened in a very close past. The proof is again straightforward.
In time (¡ ,0], there is no reason for any player to play an action other than the
strictly dominant action, as the preparation in that time interval does not affect the
opponents’ future behavior at all. Then, no action prepared in (¡2 ,¡ ] affects the
opponent’s future behaviors, so players prepare aN
i in this time interval as well.
Going backwards, we get the desired result.
The proposition shows that both the continuity of action space and time are
needed to obtain cooperation in revision games. In this particular sense, coop-
eration is not a robust result. However it is not clear why this is the robustness
that we should consider with the ﬁrst-order importance. On the other hand, re-
cent experimental results show that economic agents have altruism motives. In
our model, cooperation is retained by a very slight addition of such a behavioral
23 Whether or not  00 depends on t does not matter for the result (In our case, we can actually take  00
independent of t). For a formal proof of this, see Lemma 1 in Calcagno, Kamada, Lovo, and Sugaya
(2012).
24 Calcagno and Lovo (2010) obtained a similar result when the component game is a two-player
prisoner’s dilemma.
39element to the model. To illuminate this issue, we focus on the continuity of time
and the situation where players are indifferent between very small cooperation and
no cooperation, which is interpreted as an existence of incentives to “give away”
a very small amount.25 Consider a very simple example with the following payoff
function:
πi(ai,aj) = 2aj ¡ maxfai ¡  ,0g,   ¸ 0, ai,aj ¸ 0.
This is a version of the good exchange game in Subsection 2.5.1, where the cost of
cooperation takes a different form. We call this game as a modiﬁed good exchange
game.
The cost term is constant at zero near action 0 if   > 0 but it increases linearly
otherwise. Notice that when   = 0, there is only one Nash equilibrium in which
each player i plays action 0. On the other hand, when   > 0, there are multiple
equilibria. In particular, both (0,0) and ( , ) are Nash equilibria, where the former
gives each player the payoff of 0 but the latter gives 2  > 0. Also notice that this
payoff function does not satisfy Assumption A4 when   = 0.26
Now we consider a discrete time version of synchronous revision game (this
speciﬁcation applies only in this subsection). Time is ¡t = ...,¡2,¡1,0, and at
each period, both players have a revision opportunity with probability p > 0. The
component game is played at time 0 (assume that the revision opportunity may
comealsoattime0(withprobability p)beforethegameisplayed). Weconstructthe
optimal symmetric trigger strategy equilibrium path (analogously deﬁned as was
done so far) that converges to ( , ) as t ! 0 but triggers to (0,0) upon deviation.
25 An analogous discussion for continuity of actions can be easily done.
26 Also, this does not satisfy Assumption A2 when   > 0 (as there is a “kink” at a =  ).
40A straightforward calculation shows that the path is characterized by27:
x(t) =   ¢
µ
1+ p
1¡ p
¶t
.
Notice that when   = 0, the path is a trivial one, i.e. x(t) = 0 for all t. How-
ever, if   > 0, there exists a cooperative path. The nonexistence of cooperative
path when   = 0 is straightforward from backwards induction. The existence of
cooperative path when   > 0 is that the cost of cooperation does not grow near the
Nash action so that players can use the worse equilibria as a threat, and they can
use this tiny threat as a foothold for long-run cooperation. This intuition is analo-
gous to the logic of the sustainability of cooperation in Benoit and Krishna (1985),
who consider a model of ﬁnitely repeated games, and show that an approximate
“folk theorem” holds as the horizon becomes inﬁnitely long when each player has
multiple Nash payoffs.28
Now we turn to our setting with continuous time and smooth payoff func-
tion. Speciﬁcally, consider a payoff function from the exchange of goods game,
πi(ai,aj) = 2aj ¡ a2
i with ai,aj ¸ 0. There is only one equilibrium at (0,0), so in
the above discrete time setting, there is only one equilibrium in the revision game,
by part 2 of Proposition 9. However, recall that there exists a cooperative path
when   > 0 in the modiﬁed good exchange game, and the sustainability of the
path hinges on the fact that the cost of cooperation does not grow near the Nash
action so that players can use the worse equilibria as a threat, and they can use this
tiny threat as a foothold for long-run cooperation. In the above payoff function, the
27 Letting p = λ∆τ, τ = (∆τ) ¢ t and taking the limit as ∆τ ! 0, this converges to the optimal path
of x(τ) =   ¢ e2λτ in continuous time, which can also be obtained by a direct computation.
28 Strictly speaking, Benoit and Krishna (1985) consider the case of ﬂow payoffs (players receive
payoffs each period) thus the two settings are slightly different from each other.
41cost of cooperation, a2
i , has approximately zero growth near the Nash equilibrium.
In the discrete time setting we needed exactly zero growth, but with continuous
time, since at no time except at time 0 players are sure that there exists no more
revision opportunities, the “growth of approximate zero” (which corresponds to
Assumption A4) works as a foothold for long-run cooperation. This is of course
not a rigorous proof for why there exists a cooperative path in our model, but this
is one of the key parts of the intuition behind our result.
Notice that what is important in the above argument is not the ﬁrst order con-
dition (A4) per se, but the fact that the gain from defection is smaller than the loss
associated with it by a positive order. To make this point clear, consider the follow-
ing example.
Consider πi(ai,aj) = paj ¡ ai, with ai,aj 2 [0,∞). Note the Nash equilibrium
action ai = 0 is a corner solution and the ﬁrst order condition is not satisﬁed (the
slope is ¡1). Nevertheless,
x(t) =
λ2
4
t2
constitutes a symmetric trigger strategy path because it satisﬁes the differential
equation (2.6) in Theorem 1 with x(0) = 0 = aN (therefore x(t) satisﬁes the bind-
ing incentive constraint d(x(t))e¡λt =
R t
0
¡
π(x(s)) ¡ πN¢
λe¡λsds).29 This example
shows that the ﬁrst order condition at the Nash equilibrium is not necessary for
a nontrivial path to be sustained. What is important in this example is the fact
that the gain from deviation, a, is one order smaller than the value of cooperation,
p
a ¡ a
(which can be lost after a deviation) near the Nash action of aN = 0. In what follows we
29 Note that (unlike in our model in Section 2.4) the differential equation dx
dt = f(x) ´
λ(d(x)+π(x)¡πN)
d0(x) is well-deﬁned at x = aN, because d0(aN) does not vanish (d0 ´ 1). In particular,
f(aN) = 0. In this case, the differential equation dx/dt = f with boundary condition x(0) = aN = 0
has two solutions. One is x(t) = λ2
4 t2, and the other is the constant path x(0) ´ aN = 0.
42formulate this observation in a precise way.
First let us generalize the Assumptions A1-A6 imposed in Section 2.4. In par-
ticular we consider a general component game with symmetric action space A and
payoff function π.
Proposition 10. Suppose that there is a symmetric isolated Nash equilibrium (aN,aN)
and that there exists   > 0 such that [aN,aN +  ) µ A µ R for each player i. Suppose
also that there exists  0 > 0, r > s > 0 and k,k0 > 0 such that for all a 2 (aN,aN +  0),
d(a) · k(a ¡ aN)r and (2.10)
k0(a ¡ aN)s · π(a) ¡ πN. (2.11)
Then, in a synchronous revision game, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium such that
non-Nash proﬁles are prepared at all time t > 0 on the path of play.
Proof. Take an ˆ   > 0 such that [aN,aN + ˆ  ] µ A, conditions (2.10) and (2.11) hold
for all [aN,aN,aN + ˆ  ] with constants k, k0, r, and s, and
k0λe¡λt(r¡s)
s+r t
s+r
r¡s > kt
2r
r¡s. Such
ˆ   > 0 exists if the premise of the proposition holds. We are going to show that a
trigger strategy path
x(t) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
t
2
r¡s + aN if t < ˆ  
r¡s
2
ˆ   + aN if t ¸ ˆ  
r¡s
2
. (2.12)
satisﬁes the incentive constraint
Z t
0
³
π(x(τ)) ¡ πN
´
λe¡λτdτ ¸ d(x(t))e¡λt (2.13)
43for all t 2 [0,T]. To see this, ﬁrst consider the case t < ˆ  . We have
Z t
0
³
π(x(τ)) ¡ πN
´
λe¡λτdτ ¸
Z t
0
k0
³
x(τ) ¡ aN
´s
λe¡λτdτ =
Z t
0
k0τ
2s
r¡sλe¡λτdτ
¸ k0λe¡λt 1
2s
r¡s + 1
t
2s
r¡s+1 =
k0λe¡λt(r ¡ s)
s + r
t
s+r
r¡s.
= kt
2r
r¡s = k(x(t) ¡ aN)r ¸ d(x(t))e¡λt.
Next, consider the case t ¸ ˆ  . We have
Z t
0
³
π(x(τ)) ¡ πN
´
λe¡λτdτ
¸ e¡λˆ  
³
π(x(ˆ  )) ¡ πN
´
+
Z ˆ  
0
³
π(x(τ)) ¡ πN
´
λe¡λτdτ
¸ d(x(ˆ  ))e¡λˆ   = d(x(t))e¡λˆ   ¸ d(x(t))e¡λt.
Hence, the non-trivial path (2.12) satisﬁes the incentive constraint (2.13) for all
t 2 [0,T]. By deﬁnition, on the path of play of the subgame perfect equilibrium
characterized by this path, non-Nash proﬁles are prepared for all t > 0. This com-
pletes the proof.
The proposition says that a nontrivial path exists when the gain from deviation
d(x) converges to zero faster than the value of cooperation π(x) ¡ πN does, as x ! aN.
If these conditions are met, we can construct a trigger strategy path. Note that
those conditions are satisﬁed in our example (with d(a) = a, aN = πN = 0, and
π(a) ¡ πN =
p
a ¡ a).
A couple of remarks are in order:
² The intuition behind the above proposition can be expressed as follows. As
the deadline comes closer and closer, the probability of punishment upon de-
44viation converges to zero. Hence, to maintain the incentive to follow a non-
trivial path, the instantaneous gain from deviation need to be inﬁnitesimal
relative to the future gain from cooperation, which roughly corresponds to
the static loss from reverting to the Nash equilibrium.
² Remember that this condition fails in Bertrand competition without product
differentiation and the aforementioned modiﬁed good exchange game with
  = 0. Thus nonexistence of cooperative path in those examples are consis-
tent with this proposition.
² The above proposition provides a sufﬁcient condition for the existence of a
non-trivial path. A necessary and sufﬁcient condition is the ﬁnite time con-
dition presented in Section 2.4 (see the discussion following condition (2.8)).
Now let us consider a partial converse of this result. Assume that the payoff for
each player i has an upper bound ¯ π.
Proposition 11. Suppose that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium aN and its payoff
π(aN) = πN. Suppose that infa2A
d(a)
π(a)¡πN > 0. Then, there exists a unique trigger
strategy equilibrium. In this equilibrium, each player prepares aN given any history.
Proof. Let infa2A
d(a)
π(a)¡πN =: m > 0. We will show that there exists   > 0 such that
for any t 2 [0,T], if for all time strictly after ¡t each player prepares aN given any
history then for all time in (¡t ¡  ,¡t], each player prepares aN given any history
in any subgame perfect equilibrium. This gives us the desired result.
So take some t 2 [0,T] and suppose that for all time strictly after ¡t each player
prepares aN given any history. Suppose further that at time ¡t ¡   with   > 0, an
action proﬁle a is played on the path of play. Then, by the incentive compatibility
45constraint, it is necessary that
d(a)e¡λ(t+ ) · e¡λt
Z  
0
( ¯ π ¡ πN)λe¡λτdτ.
This implies
d(a)e¡λ  · λ( ¯ π ¡ πN)  () d(a) · λ( ¯ π ¡ πN) eλ 
() π(a) ¡ πN ·
λ( ¯ π ¡ πN) eλ 
m
Hence, again by the incentive compatibility constraint it is necessary that
d(a)e¡λ(t+ ) · e¡λt
Z  
0
λ( ¯ π ¡ πN) eλ 
m
λe¡λτdτ.
This in turn implies that d(a) ·
λ2( ¯ π¡πN)( eλ )2
m . Iterating, we have that
d(a) ·
λn
mn¡1( ¯ π ¡ πN)( eλ )n for all n = 1,2,....
Since the right hand side of this inequality goes to zero as n goes to inﬁnity if
  < λeλ 
m , d(a) must be zero if   < λeλ 
m . But this means that a must be a Nash
equilibrium aN. Hence in time interval (¡t ¡  ,¡t], each player prepares aN given
any history. This completes the proof.
The proof is based on the idea that the right hand side of the incentive com-
patibility condition is at most some constant times the time left to the deadline.
That is, if the time left to the deadline is very short, the instantaneous gain from
deviation must be very small relative to the payoff from cooperation (See the ﬁrst
remark after Proposition 10). If the ratio of the gain from deviation to the beneﬁt
46of cooperation has a strictly positive lower bound then this is impossible when the
remaining time is sufﬁciently small.
2.6.2 Comparison with Inﬁnite Repeated Games with Decreasing Discount Factors
To compare a revision game with a repeated game, let us employ the standard
way to measure time: a revision game is played over [0,T] where 0 is the start of
the problem and T is the end. The payoff in the revision game at time t is:
e¡λ(T¡t)u(at) +
Z T
t
e¡λ(T¡s)u(as)λds = e¡λ(T¡t)
·
u(at) +
Z T
t
eλ(s¡t)u(as)λds
¸
.
Igroring the constant e¡λ(T¡t), we can regard that a player’s objective function at
time t (i.e., when a revision opportunity arrives at time t) is equal to
u(at) +
Z T
t
eλ(s¡t)u(as)λds. (2.14)
This highlights the similarity and difference between a revision game and repeated
game with shrinking discount factor (Bernheim and Dasgupta, 1995). The objective
function in their model at time t is given by
u(at) +
∞
∑
s=t+1
u(as)
s
∏
τ=t+1
δ(τ),
where the time dependent discount factor δ(τ) shrinks over time (δ(τ) ! 0, as
τ ! ∞). One obvious (but minor) difference is that their model is in discrete time
while ours is in continuous time. Our continuous time formulation enables us
to characterize the optimal path by means of a simple differential equation. To
compare their model with ours more closely, let us consider a continuous time
47version of their model, where the stage game is played according to Poisson arrival
time. A continuous time version of their objective function would be
u(at) +
Z ∞
t
e¡
R τ
t ρ(τ)dτu(as)λds. (2.15)
where instantaneous discount rate diverges (ρ(τ) ! ∞, as τ ! ∞). This is sim-
ilar to our model in the sense that as time passes by (when t is large), the impact
of future payoffs shrinks. However, note the crucial difference that the weight
attached to future payoff u(as) in our objective function (2.14), namely eλ(s¡t), is
increasing in s. That is, a larger weight is attached to future payoff in a revision game.
This is an essential feature - as the deadline comes closer, the probability that the
prepared action today is implemented becomes larger. One important implication
of this fact is that full cooperation cannot be sustained in a revision game. There
is always a positive probability that something very close to the Nash equilibrium
(an action prepared near the deadline) is played. In contrast, in a repeated game
with shrinking discount factor, payoffs in the distant future do not much affect the
average payoff, and the full efﬁciency can be approximately achieved.
The fact that a larger weight is attached to future payoff in a revision game
implies that there is no natural way to map our objective function to theirs. For
example, one may ”stretch” the time in our model to map our time domain [0,T]
to [0,∞) by some increasing function t0 = F(t), but such a transformation does not
alter the property of our model that the weight attached to u(as) is increasing in s.
482.7 Concluding Remarks
We analyzed a new class of games that we call “revision games,” a situation
where players in advance prepare their actions in a game. After the initial prepa-
ration, they have some opportunities to revise their actions, which arrive stochas-
tically. Prepared actions are assumed to be mutually observable. We showed that
players can achieve a certain level of cooperation in such a class of games. Specif-
ically, in the class of component games that we focused on, we showed that an
optimal symmetric trigger-strategy equilibrium exists and it is essentially unique.
We characterized the equilibrium by a simple differential equation and applied it
to analyze a variety of economic examples.
While we are circulating the earlier versions of the present paper, several
follow-up papers have been written. Calcagno and Lovo (2010) and Kamada and
Sugaya (2010) consider revision games with ﬁnite action space and assume that re-
vision opportunities arrive independently across players (asynchronous revision).
In contrast to the present paper, they show that the addition of revision phase
sometimes narrows down the set of equilibria when the component game has mul-
tiple equilibria. They show that when the component game has a strictly Pareto-
dominant Nash equilibrium, it is the only proﬁle that can realize in a correspond-
ing revision game when some regulatory conditions are met.30 They also show
that in battle of the sexes games one of the pure Nash equilibrium is played gener-
ically. Kamada and Sugaya (2011) introduce the ﬁrst model of dynamic election
campaigns into the literature on election by using a variant of the revision games
framework. In their model, the revision phase corresponds to an election cam-
30 Ishii and Kamada (2011) identify the condition under which this result is generalized to the case
of a hybrid version of synchronous and asynchronous revisions. Romm (2011) examines the effect of
reputation in a variant of revision games proposed by Kamada and Sugaya (2010).
49paign phase where candidates announce their policies, and the component game
corresponds to the standard Hotelling-Downs election game.31 The rich dynamic
structure of revision games enables them to endogenize the order of policy an-
nouncements, which are exogenously speciﬁed in the literature.32
We suggest several possible directions for future research. First, we investigate
the case of asynchronous revision in a companion paper (Kamada and Kandori,
2011a) and show that cooperation is still possible in such a setting. Second, we
used trigger strategy equilibrium to sustain cooperation, in which players revert
to Nash actions upon deviation. Although this class of strategies is a natural one
worth investigation, a severer punishment might be possible. In our continuation
work, we consider severer punishment schemes than Nash reversion.
31 In their model a policy announcement at each opportunity is restricted by previous announce-
ments in a particular manner, while in our analysis in Section 2.5.4 no restriction is imposed.
32 Other recent papers on variants of revision games include Ambrus and Burns (2010) and Kamada
and Muto (2011b).
503. ASYNCHRONICITY AND COORDINATION IN COMMON AND
OPPOSING INTEREST GAMES 2
3.1 Introduction
It has been broadly argued that the addition of a pre-play phase to a game has a
nontrivial effect on the outcome of the game. Cheap talk models ` a la Farrell (1987),
Rabin (1994) and Aumann and Hart (2003) describe such a situation, where any
action in the pre-play phase has no binding force. They show that the set of achiev-
able outcomes widens with the addition of a pre-play phase. This paper analyzes
an opposite situation, where any action in the pre-play phase has effects on the
outcome of the game with strictly positive probability. During the pre-play phase,
players prepare the actions that will be played at a predetermined deadline. The
2 This is a joint work with Riccardo Calcagno (Department of Economics, Finance and Control,
EMLYON Business School), Stefano Lovo (Finance Department, HEC, Paris and GREGHEC), and
Takuo Sugaya (Department of Economics, Princeton University), and is the result of a merger be-
tween two independent projects: Calcagno and Lovo’s “Preopening and Equilibrium Selection” and
Kamada and Sugaya’s “ Asynchronous Revision Games with Deadline: Unique Equilibrium in Coor-
dination Games.” We thank Dilip Abreu, Gabriel Caroll, Sylvain Chassang, Drew Fudenberg, Michi-
hiro Kandori, Fuhito Kojima, Barton Lipman, Thomas Mariotti, Sebastien Pouget, Stephen Morris,
Assaf Romm, Satoru Takahashi, Tristan Tomala, Nicolas Vieille, and, particularly, Johannes H¨ orner
and Yuhta Ishii for useful comments and suggestions on either project. We also thank seminar par-
ticipant at the GDR Conference in Luminy 2009, SAET Conference in Ischia 2009, Toulouse School
of Economics, Bocconi University, Research in Behavior in Games seminar at Harvard University,
Student Lunch Seminar in Economic Theory at Princeton University, and at The 21st Stony Brook In-
ternational Conference on Game Theory for helpful comments. We are grateful to three anonymous
referees and the co-editor of Theoretical Economics for insightful comments and suggestions that sub-
stantially improved this paper. Stefano Lovo gratefully acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the
HEC Foundation and from the ANR Grant ANR-10-BLAN 0112.
51action taken at the deadline solely determines players’ payoffs. Prepared actions
can be revised at stochastic (Poisson) opportunities in continuous time before the
deadline. In this framework, Kamada and Kandori (2011b) show that the addition
of pre-play phase can widen the set of achievable payoffs. This paper uncovers an-
other role that the pre-play phase can play. We show that it can narrow down the
set of achievable payoffs. The key assumptions that drive this difference will be
discussed shortly.
We study this problem in two classes of games where coordination is an issue.
The ﬁrst is “common interest” games, in which there is an action proﬁle that all
players strictly prefer to all other proﬁles. For this class of games, we show that, in
2-player games, this “best proﬁle” is the unique outcome of the revision game. The
second class of games is the “opposing interest” games, which are two-player 2 x
2 games with two Pareto-unranked strict Nash equilibria. In this class of games,
we show that generically there is a unique outcome of the revision game, which
corresponds to one of the strict Nash equilibria. Which equilibrium prevails in
the revision game depends on the payoff structure and the relative frequency of
arrivals of revision opportunities for each player.
Besides the importance of assuming that revision opportunities are stochastic,
there are other three key assumptions that are crucial to our results. The ﬁrst one
is observability. If a player is unable to observe what the other player has prepared,
then the revision phase has no binding force, and so the outcome of revision games
would be identical to that of static games. The second is asynchronicity. If revision
opportunities are synchronous all the time, then any repetition of static Nash equi-
libria is subgame perfect. Hence, uniqueness would not hold if there are multiple
static Nash equilibria. However, if opportunities are asynchronous, each player’s
52actionmustbecontingentontheopponent’scurrentaction(byobservability). Thus
a player can induce the opponent to play some particular action, by using as a
threat the possibility that she may not be able to revise her own action before the
deadline. The third key ingredient is ﬁnite actions and strict incentives. As we will ar-
gue, uniqueness is due to a backward induction argument. If there are only ﬁnitely
many actions and the static game best replies to pure actions are strict, then each
player has a single best reply near the deadline (by asynchronicity) in the revision
game, and this constitutes the starting point of our backward induction argument.
These assumptions seem natural in many real-life and economic contexts where
coordination is crucial. For example, such a situation arises in the daily prac-
tice of some ﬁnancial markets, such as Nasdaq or Euronext for example, where
half an hour before the opening of the market, participants are allowed to submit
orders which can be withdrawn and changed until opening time. These orders
and the resulting (virtual) equilibrium trading price are publicly posted during
the whole “pre-opening” period. Only orders that are still posted at the opening
time are binding and hence executed. In this framework, it is natural to assume
asynchronicity and that traders do not always manage to withdraw old orders or
submit new orders instantaneously because it takes a certain random time to ﬁll in
the new order faultlessly. Observability holds as the posted orders are displayed
on the screen, and the number of payoff-relevant orders is practically ﬁnite.3,4
Another example is the case where two ﬁrms are contemplating the possibility
3 Given this application, Calcagno and Lovo (2010) call the revision game a “preopening game”.
4 Biais, Cristophe, and Sebastien (2008) present an experiment simulating preopening in a ﬁnancial
market where the actual play is preceded by (only) one round of pre-play communication, which is
either completely binding or completely non-binding. In both speciﬁcations players choose their
actions simultaneously and there are multiple SPE equilibria. Consistently, they ﬁnd both Pareto
superior and Pareto inferior outcomes are observed in the experiment.
53of investment at some ﬁxed date and need to prepare for it (e.g. negotiating with
banks to have enough liquidity, allocating agents working for the project and so
forth). There are two actions (invest or not) and the investment is proﬁtable only if
the other ﬁrm invests as well. Revision opportunities are naturally asynchronous
and ﬁrms may face several constraints such as administrative procedures or obli-
gations to other projects. Since the ﬁrms cannot change their decisions every time
they want, their opportunities would well be stochastic. Finally, if two ﬁrms are
large, then it is natural to assume that they observe each other’s preparation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related
literature. Section 3.3 introduces the model. In Section 3.4, we present a simple
but a useful lemma that allows us to implement a backward induction argument
in continuous time. Section 3.5 considers 2-player common interest games and
Section 3.6 studies 2-player opposing interest games. Section 3.7 discusses further
results. Section 3.8 concludes. Some of the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
3.2 Literature Review
Cheap talk. It is important to make a distinction between our model and cheap-
talk models such as those in Farrell (1987), Rabin (1994) and Aumann and Hart
(2003). In these models, players are allowed to be involved in preplay non-binding
communication. Quite to the opposite, in our model, at each moment of time, the
prepared action will become the ﬁnal payoff-relevant action with a strictly positive
probability. For this precise reason, the outcome can be affected by the addition of
a revision phase in our model.
Equilibrium selection. It is instructive to compare our selected outcome with
those in that literature. In many works on equilibrium selection, risk-dominant
54equilibria of John and Selten (1988) are selected in 2£2 games. In our model, how-
ever, a different answer is obtained: a strictly Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium is
played even when it is risk-dominated. Roughly speaking, since we assume perfect
and complete information with non-anonymous players, there is only a very small
“risk”of mis-coordination when the deadline is far. There are three lines of the
literature in which risk-dominant equilibria are selected: models of global games,
stochastic learning models with myopia and models of perfect foresight dynam-
ics.5,6 Since the model of perfect foresight dynamics seems closely related to ours,
let us discuss it here.
Perfect foresight dynamics and repeated games. Perfect foresight dynamics,
proposed by Matsui and Matsuyama (1995), are evolutionary models in which
players are assumed to be patient and “foresighted” that is, they value the fu-
ture payoffs and take best responses given (correct) beliefs about the future path
of play.7 There is a continuum of agents who are randomly and anonymously
matched over inﬁnite horizon according to a Poisson process. In this setup, they se-
lect the risk-dominant action proﬁle in 2 x 2 games with two Pareto-ranked (static)
5 The literature on global games was pioneered by Rubinstein (1989), and analyzed extensively in
Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (1998), and Sugaya and Takahashi (2011). They
show that the lack of almost common knowledge due to incomplete information can select an equi-
librium. The type of incomplete information they assume is absent in our model. Stochastic learning
models with myopia are analyzed in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993). They
consider a situation in which players interact repeatedly, and each player’s action at each period
is stochastically perturbed. The key difference between their assumptions and ours is that in their
model players are myopic, while we assume that players take actions anticipating the opponents’
future moves. In addition, the game is repeated inﬁnitely in their models, while the game is played
once and for all in our model.
6 As an exception, Young (1998) shows that in the context of contracting, his evolutionary model
does not necessarily lead to risk-dominant equilibrium (p-dominant equilibrium in Morris, Rob, and
Shin (1995)). But he considers a large anonymous population of players and repeated interaction, so
the context he focuses on is very different from the one of this paper.
7 See also Oyama, Takahashi, and Hofbauer (2008).
55Nash equilibria. The key difference is that they assume anonymous agents while
we assume non-anonymous agents. For the “best action proﬁle” to be selected in
our model, it is important for each player to expect that if she prepares an action
corresponding to the best proﬁle, then that preparation can affect the other player’s
future preparation. This consideration is absent with anonymous players.
Common interest games and asynchronous moves. Farrell and Saloner (1985)
and Lagunoff and Matsui (1997) are early works on the topic of obtaining the
unique outcome in common interest games.8 Dutta (2003) shows convergence to
the unique outcome and Takahashi (2005) proves uniqueness of subgame perfect
equilibria when players move asynchronously. One difference is that we assume
the stochastic order of moves while they consider the ﬁxed order. Also, we obtain a
uniqueness result in a wider environment than in Lagunoff and Matsui (1997) due
to the ﬁnite horizon.
War of attrition. The intuition behind the result for the opposing interest games
is similar to the one for the “war of attrition”. 9 Although the structure of the
equilibria in war of attrition is similar to the equilibria in our model, the reasoning
is different: in our model, players use the probability of not having future revision
opportunities as a “commitment power” while the literature in the war of attrition
assumes the existence of “commitment types” a priori.
Switching cost. Our model assumes there is no cost associated with revision.
8 According to Dutta (1995), this result in Lagunoff and Matsui (1997) is due to the lack of full
dimensionality of the feasible and individually rational payoff set. See also Lagunoff and Matsui
(2001), Yoon (2001), and Wen (2002). Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1995) show that, even when the
discount factor is arbitrarily close to one, the set of SPE payoff vectors of the repeated games resulting
from the repetition of the extensive form game may not coincide with the one resulting from the
normal form game, if the individually rational payoffs are different or full dimensionality is not
satisﬁed.
9 For example, among others, see Abreu and Gul (2000) and Abreu and Pearce (2007).
56Several papers consider a ﬁnite-horizon model with switching cost and show that
a unique outcome prevails in their respective games. Typically, the existence of
switching cost results in different implications on the equilibrium behavior. See,
for example, Lipman and Wang (2000) and Caruana and Einav (2008) for details.
Revision games. Kamada and Kandori (2011b) introduce the model of revi-
sion games. They show that, among other things, non-Nash “cooperative” action
proﬁles can be played at the deadline when a certain set of regularity conditions
is satisﬁed. Hence their focus is on expanding the set of equilibria when the static
Nash equilibrium is inefﬁcient relative to non-Nash proﬁles.10 We ask a very differ-
ent question in this paper: we consider games with multiple efﬁcient static Nash
equilibria and ask which of these equilibria is selected.11 What derives this dif-
ference is that the action space is ﬁnite in our paper, whereas it is not in Kamada
and Kandori (2011b). Kamada and Sugaya (2011) consider a revision game model
with ﬁnite action set in the context of election campaign. The main difference is that
they assume once a player changes her action, she cannot revise it further. Thus the
characterization of the equilibrium is essentially different from the analysis in the
present paper because in our model, when another opportunity arrives, a player
can always change her preparation to the previously-prepared action.12
Further results. Finally, further results beyond what we have in this paper can
be found in either or both of Calcagno and Lovo (2010) and Kamada and Sugaya
(2010). We refer to these papers whenever appropriate.
10 The possibility of cooperation in ﬁnite horizon in Kamada and Kandori (2011b) is closely related
to that of ﬁnitely repeated games with multiple Nash equilibria (Benoit and Krishna, 1985).
11 See also Ambrus and Lu (2010a) for a variant of revision games model of bargaining in which
the game ends when an offer is accepted.
12 van Damme and Hurkens (1996) analyze a related model of “timing games,” in which players
can choose the timing of their move out of two periods and they cannot switch back.
573.3 The Model
We consider a two-player normal-form ﬁnite game
³
(Xi)i=1,2 ,(ui)i=1,2
´
(re-
ferred to as the “component game” in the following) where Xi is the ﬁnite set of
player i’s actions with jXij ¸ 2, X = X1 £ X2 is the set of action proﬁles, and
ui : X ! R is player i’s utility function. Let u = (u1,u2). We use a female (resp.
male) pronoun for player 1 (resp. player 2).
Before players actually take actions, they need to “prepare” their actions. We
model this situation similarly to Kamada and Kandori (2011b): time is continuous,
t 2 [¡T,0], and the component game is played once and for all at time 0. The
game, “revision game” henceforth, proceeds as follows. First, at time ¡T, the ini-
tial action proﬁle is exogenously given.13 In the time interval (¡T,0], each player
independently obtains opportunities to revise their prepared action according to
two random Poisson processes p1 and p2 with arrival rates λ1 and λ2 respectively,
where λi > 0, i = 1,2. As Poisson processes p1 and p2 are independent, the proba-
bility that the two players revise their actions simultaneously is nil. In other words,
only asynchronous revision opportunities arise.14 At t = 0, the action proﬁle that
has been prepared most recently is actually taken and each player receives the pay-
off that corresponds to the payoff speciﬁcation of the component game.
In order to deﬁne the strategy space of the revision game, consider the game
has reached time t. We assume here that each player i at any time t has perfect
information about all past events including whether i has a revision opportunity
13 As we will see, the uniqueness results in Sections 5 and 6 become even sharper if players simul-
taneously choose actions at time ¡T.
14 We refer to Section 3.7 for the discussion of the role played by this assumption. See Calcagno
and Lovo (2010) and Ishii and Kamada (2011) for more general processes underlying the arrival of
revision opportunities.
58at t but excluding whether the opponent gets an opportunity at t.15 Formally, let
ti,k · t be the time when player i has received the k-th revision opportunity until t
and xi,k be the action prepared by player i at ti,k.16 A history for player i at t is
hi(t) = X £
n³
fti,kgk, ti,k·t , fxi,kgk, ti,k<t
´
,
³©
tj,k
ª
k, tj,k<t ,
©
xj,k
ª
k, tj,k<t
´
, t
o
,
where j 6= i, and an element in X denotes the exogenous choice of the action pro-
ﬁle at time ¡T. Let Hi(t) denote the set of all possible histories for player i at
t.17 A strategy for player i is a mapping σi : [0
t=¡THi(t) ! f∅g [ ∆(Xi) where
σi(hi(t)) µ ∆(Xi) if there exists k such that ti,k = t (i.e. at t, player i receives a
revision opportunity) and σi(hi(t)) = ∅ otherwise (i.e. at t, player i does not re-
ceive a revision opportunity). For any given history hi(t), let xi(t) := xi,k¤, 2 Xi
with k¤ := argmax
k
fti,k < tg be player i’s prepared action resulting from his last
revision opportunity (strictly) before t. We shall denote x(t) := fxi(t)gi=1,2 the last
prepared action proﬁle before time t (time t “PAP” henceforth). Note that xi(t) will be
player i’s payoff-relevant action in t = 0 in the event where i receives no further
revision opportunities from time t included, until time 0.
A strategy proﬁle σ¤ forms a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the revision
15 This assumption is expressed in the deﬁnition of history hi(t), where we use a strict inequality
for a proﬁle of tj,k’s. Since simultaneous revision opportunities occur with zero probability, our result
does not depend on this assumption.
16 Notice that ¡T = ti,1 < ¢¢¢ < ti,k · t, that is, we count the revision opportunities from the ﬁrst
one k = 1 after the beginning of the revision game.
17 Note that Hi(¡T) is deﬁned to be X.
59game if for all t, hi(t), i and j 6= i,18
σ¤
i 2 argmax
σi
E
h
ui(x(0))jhi(t),σi,σ¤
j
i
.
Our main results will concern the case when T is large. However, we note that
the model with arrival rate (λ1,λ2) and horizon length T is essentially equivalent
to the model with arrival rates (aλ1,aλ2) and horizon length T
a, for any positive
constant a.19 Hence all our results obtained for T large enough and ﬁxed revision
frequencies (λ1,λ2) can be obtained by keeping ﬁxed the horizon T and having
revisions frequent enough.
To avoid ambiguity, in the rest of the paper, we will use terminology “revi-
sion equilibrium” for a SPE of the whole revision game and “Nash equilibrium” for a
(strict) Nash equilibrium of the component game.
3.4 Backward Induction in Continuous Time
The proofs of our main results will rely on the idea of backward induction.
The standard backward induction argument starts from proving a statement for
“the last period” and then given the statement is true there, it proves the statement
for the “second-last period” and so forth. However, this argument is not immedi-
ately applicable to our continuous-time setting, as there is no obvious deﬁnition of
“second-last period”. In this section we present a lemma that allows us to imple-
ment a backward-induction-type argument in continuous time. The proof is in the
18 Strictly speaking, x(0) is the last action proﬁle prepared before time 0, thus in this formulation
players do not maximize the expected payoff prepared exactly at 0. However, since the probability
that any player obtains a revision opportunity exactly at time 0 is nil, this issue does not affect the
solution of the maximization problem.
19 See the “arrival rate invariance” result discussed in Kamada and Kandori (2011b).
60Appendix.
Lemma 1. Suppose that for any t, there exists   > 0 such that statement At0 is true for
all t0 2 (t ¡  ,t] if statement At00 is true for any t00 > t.20 Then, for any t, statement At is
true.
It is noteworthy that the   in the statement of the lemma can depend on t.
Hence, in particular, the lemma goes through even though the required   shrinks to
zero as t approaches some ﬁnite constant, and then jumps discontinuously there.21
3.5 Common Interest Games
In this section, we consider a component game with an action proﬁle that
strictly Pareto-dominates all other action proﬁles. Formally, we say that an action
proﬁle x¤ is strictly Pareto-dominant if ui(x¤) > ui(x) for all i and all x 2 X with
x 6= x¤. We say that a game is a common interest game if it has a strictly Pareto-
dominant action proﬁle. Notice that if x¤ is strictly Pareto-dominant, then it is a
Nash equilibrium.
For example, games in Table 3.1 are common interest games where (U, L) in
each game is strictly Pareto-dominant, but those in Table 3.2 are not.
The ﬁrst main result of this paper is the following:
20 Note that if t = 0 then it is vacuously true that statement At00 is true for any t00 > t. Thus the
premise of the lemma holds if and only if there exists   > 0 such that At0 is true for all t0 2 (¡ ,0].
21 A version of the lemma that switches the order of quantiﬁers (so that   cannot depend on t)
appears in Chao (1919).
61Table 3.1: Common interest games.
L R
U 2,2 ¡10,1
D 1,¡10 1,1
L C R
U 2,2 1,0 ¡4,3
M 1,1.5 1,1 ¡3,1
D 1,0 0,1 0,0
Table 3.2: Non-common interest games.
L R
U 2,2 3,0
D 0,3 1,1
L R
U 2,2 0,0
D 2,0 1,1
Theorem 2. Consider a common interest component game and let x¤be the strictly Pareto-
dominant action proﬁle. Then for any   > 0, there exists T0 such that for all T > T0, in all
revision equilibria, x(0) = x¤ with probability higher than 1¡  .
3.5.1 Intuition
The proof consists of two steps. First, we show that x¤ is absorbing in the revi-
sion game: since the action space is ﬁnite, the difference between ui(x¤) and i’s sec-
ond best payoff is strictly positive. Therefore, when the PAP is x¤, no player wants
to prepare another action and to create a possibility that she cannot have further
revision opportunities and will be forced to take a second best or even worse action
proﬁle.
Second, given the ﬁrst step, each player i “knows” that if the opponent ¡i has
a revision opportunity while player i prepares x¤
i , then the opponent will prepare
x¤
¡i. Hence, the lower bound of the equilibrium payoff for each player is given by
62always preparing x¤
i whenver she receives the revision opportunity. If T is suf-
ﬁciently large, then this strategy gives her a payoff very close to ui(x¤), which
means x¤ should be taken with high probability at the deadline in any revision
equilibrium.
3.5.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Now we offer the formal proof. Steps 1 and 2 in the formal proof correspond to
those in the intuitive explanation above.
Step 1:
Let m := mini,x6=x¤(ui(x¤) ¡ ui(x)) be the minimum payoff difference between
the best payoff and the second best payoff. Since X is ﬁnite and x¤ is strictly Pareto-
dominant, the minimum is well deﬁned and m > 0.
Fix t · 0 arbitrarily. Suppose that for all time after time t < 0, each player i has
a strict incentive to prepare x¤
i if the opponent ¡i prepared action is x¤
¡i.22 Suppose
alsothatplayer i obtainsarevisionopportunityattime t¡  and¡i preparedaction
is x¤
¡i. Then, the payoff from preparing x¤
i is at least
ui(x¤) ¡ (1¡ e¡(λi+λ¡i) )M (3.1)
where M := maxi,x6=x¤(ui(x¤) ¡ ui(x)) < ∞, because with probability at least
e¡(λi+λ¡i) , no further revision opportunities arrive between t ¡   and t and the
PAP at time t is x¤. In such a case, action x¤ will be played at the deadline by as-
sumption. On the other hand, the payoff from preparing an action xi 6= x¤
i is at
22 For t = 0, this is vacuously true.
63most
ui(x¤) ¡ e¡λi(¡t+ )m, (3.2)
because with probability e¡λi(¡t+ ), player i never has a revision opportunity again
and in such a case, the action proﬁle at the deadline cannot be x¤.
Notice that expression (3.1) is strictly greater than expression (3.2) for   = 0.
Also by continuity of (3.1) and (3.2) with respect to  , there exists  0 > 0 such that
for all   2 (0, 0), expression (3.1) is strictly greater than expression (3.2).23 Hence,
by Lemma 1, we have that for any t < 0, each player i has a strict incentive to
prepare x¤
i if the opponent ¡i prepares x¤
¡i.
Step 2: Since in any subgame perfect equilibrium, players can guarantee at least
the payoff that can be obtained by always playing the action x¤
i , it sufﬁces to show
that the payoff of always preparing x¤
i converges to the strictly Pareto-dominant
payoff as T goes to inﬁnity. This will imply that the probability of action being x¤
at the deadline converges to 1, as desired.
By Step 1, the action proﬁle x¤ is the absorbing state: each player has a strict
incentive to prepare x¤
i if the opponent ¡i prepares x¤
¡i. In 2-player games, since
player i is the unique opponent of player ¡i, player ¡i prepares x¤
¡i if player i pre-
pares x¤
i . Therefore, the payoff of always preparing x¤
i guarantees a payoff which
converges to ui(x¤).
3.5.3 Remarks
Four remarks are in order at this stage.
First, if players choose their actions at ¡T, then we can pin down the behavior
23 Note that here we again use the assumption that the action space is ﬁnite, so that the maximum
payoff difference is bounded.
64of players on the equilibrium path. In fact, in the appendix, we show that in a com-
mon interest game deﬁned as above, players prepare the strictly Pareto-dominant
proﬁle x¤ at all times t 2 [¡T,0] on the (unique) path of play in any revision equi-
librium.
Second, notice that if there exist two strict Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria in a
2£2 component game, then the game is a common interest game. Hence in such a
case, the Pareto-superior Nash equilibrium is the outcome of the revision game.24
Third, the outcome of the revision game is the strictly Pareto-dominant proﬁle
even if it is risk-dominated by another Nash equilibrium. For example, in the left
payoff matrix in Table 3.1, the action proﬁle (U, L) is risk-dominated while it is
the outcome of the revision game. The key is that, whenever a player prepares
x¤
i (the action that corresponds to the Pareto-dominant proﬁle), the opponent will
move to the Pareto-dominant proﬁle whenever she can revise and they stay at this
proﬁle until the deadline (Step 1 of the proof in the previous subsection). Therefore,
if the remaining time is sufﬁciently long, then the “risk of mis-coordination” by
preparing x¤
i can be arbitrarily small (Step 2).25
Fourth, notice that we allow for the component game to be different from a pure
coordination game (i.e. a game in which two players have identical payoff func-
tions). This result is in a stark difference from Lagunoff and Matsui (1997), whose
result only applies to pure coordination games (see Yoon, 2001). This difference
comes from the different assumptions on the horizon: since their models have an
24 Note that Kamada and Kandori (2011b) prove that if each player has a strictly dominant action
when the action space is ﬁnite, then it is played in asynchronous revision games.
25 With more than two players, if all the players are preparing actions different from the Pareto
dominant one, no player can create a situation where it is enough for only one player to change her
preparation in order to go to the Pareto dominant action proﬁle. Hence, the same proof does not
work. See Kamada and Sugaya (2010) for the details.
65Table 3.3: Opposing interest games.
L R
U 3,3 0,1
D 0,5 1,6
L C
U 2,1 0,0
M 0,0 1,2
Table 3.4: The general opposing interest game.
L R
U u1(U, L),u2(U, L) u1(U,R),u2(U,R)
D u1(U,D),u2(U,D) u1(D,R),u2(D,R)
inﬁnite horizon, there can be an inﬁnite sequence of punishments. On the other
hand, in our model, there is a deadline so the incentives near the deadline can be
perfectly pinned down as x¤ is strictly Pareto-dominant. Hence, we can implement
backward induction starting from the deadline.
3.6 Opposing Interest Games
In the previous section, we analyzed games in which there is the “best” action
proﬁle for both players. Now we turn to the class of games in which different
players have different “best” action proﬁles. Examples of games that we consider
in this section are given in Table 3.3.
Generally, we consider 2-player component games with the payoff matrix as in
Table 3.4 with two strict Nash equilibria (U, L) and (D,R) such that
u1(U, L) > u1(D,R) and u2(U, L) < u2(D,R). (3.3)
66The ﬁrst inequality implies that player 1 strictly prefers (U, L) to (D,R) among
pure Nash equilibria while the second implies that player 2’s preference is oppo-
site. Note that, since (U, L) and (D,R) are strict Nash equilibria of this component
game, these conditions imply (U, L) (resp. (D,R)) gives player 1 (resp. player 2) a
strictly better payoff than any other action proﬁle.
Let
t¤
1 = ¡
1
λ1 + λ2
ln
µ
λ1
λ2
u1 (D,R) ¡ u1 (U,R)
u1 (U, L) ¡ u1 (D,R)
+
u1 (U, L) ¡ u1 (U,R)
u1 (U, L) ¡ u1 (D,R)
¶
, (3.4)
and
t¤
2 = ¡
1
λ1 + λ2
ln
µ
λ2
λ1
u2 (U, L) ¡ u2 (U,R)
u2 (D,R) ¡ u2 (U, L)
+
u2 (D,R) ¡ u2 (U,R)
u2 (D,R) ¡ u2 (U, L)
¶
. (3.5)
Theorem 3. Suppose that a component game of a revision game satisﬁes condition (3.3).
If t¤
1 6= t¤
2, then there exists a unique revision equilibrium for all T. As T converges to
inﬁnity,
1. if t¤
1 > t¤
2, then the equilibrium payoffs converge to ui(U, L).
2. if t¤
1 < t¤
2, then the equilibrium payoffs converge to ui(D,R).
Notice that t¤
1 = t¤
2 happens only in a knife-edge set of parameter. In this non-
generic case, the revision game has multiple equilibria.26
Theorem 2 proves that for almost all parameter values, there is a unique revi-
sion equilibrium payoff and the outcome at the deadline will form one of the un-
derlying game Nash equilibria with probability that converges to 1 as T increases.
26 See Kamada and Sugaya (2010) for a characterization of the set of revision equilibrium payoffs
for the case t¤
1 = t¤
2.
67Which Nash equilibrium is prepared depends on a joint condition on the payoff
function (u) and the ratio of arrival rates (
λ1
λ2), as t¤
1 and t¤
2 depend on these param-
eters. In Table 3.3, if λ1 = λ2, then t¤
1 > t¤
2 in the left game and t¤
1 = t¤
2 in the right
game. Hence if λ1 = λ2, then (U, L) is the (limit) outcome in the left game, while
the theorem does not cover the case in the right game. However, if λ1 < λ2 (resp.
λ1 > λ2) then the theorem implies that in the right game, the (limit) outcome is
(U, L) (resp. (D,R)).
In the proof, we actually completely pin down the behavior at any time t in this
unique revision equilibrium. In particular, players prepare the action correspond-
ing to the limit payoff proﬁle for sufﬁciently long time on the path of play. This
implies that if they were to choose actions simultaneously at ¡T, then they choose
these actions and they never revise them on the path of play.
In Subsection 3.6.1, we provide an interpretation of this result. Subsection 3.6.2
provides the proof, and Subsection 3.6.3 fully describes the equilibrium dynamics,
including off-path plays.
3.6.1 Interpretation of Theorem 3
The ﬁrst step of the proof of Theorem 2 shows that when t is close to zero, each
player strictly prefers to prepare the component game best response to the last pre-
pared action of his opponent. Hence, in the game of Figure 3, when getting closer
to time zero, players will move away from PAP (U,R), to reach either (U, L) or
(D,R) and then stay there until the deadline.27 If t becomes increasingly far from
0, player i’s expected continuation payoff from PAP (U,R) gets closer to a convex
combination of ui(U, L) and ui(D,R) since the probability that no players revise
27 Note that the incentive is strict at the deadline t = 0.
68their actions between t and 0 gets smaller. Hence, there is a ﬁnite time t¤ such that,
when the PAP is (U,R), one player, whom we will call the strong player, becomes
indifferent at time t¤ between (a) preparing the component game best response to
his/her opponent’s prepared action and (b) preparing the action necessary to form
his/her preferred component game Nash equilibrium. Strictly before t¤, the strong
player strictly prefers choice (b) in all PAPs. As the proof in the next subsection
clariﬁes, t¤ = minft¤
1,t¤
2g is the time such that the strong player is indifferent be-
tween these two actions. The condition t¤
1 > t¤
2 implies the player 1 is the strong
player. In other words, player 1 can stick to non-Nash proﬁles longer than player
2 to induce player 2 to coordinate on her own preferred Nash equilibrium. The
condition t¤
1 > t¤
2 thus means that the strength with which player 1 can stick to a
non-Nash proﬁle is greater than that of player 2.
To see how this “strength” is affected by the parameters of the model, we con-
sider two special cases. First, suppose that λ1 = λ2. In this case, t¤
1 > t¤
2 is equiva-
lent to
u2 (D,R) ¡ u2 (U,R)
u2 (D,R) ¡ u2 (U, L)
>
u1 (U, L) ¡ u1 (U,R)
u1 (U, L) ¡ u1 (D,R)
.
The formula compares how strongly each player likes (U,R) relative to the other
two Nash equilibria. If player 1 likes it more, then she suffers less from mis-
coordination at (U,R), so as a consequence it is more likely that the inequality is
satisﬁed. If player 1 likes (D,R) less, then she expects less from moving away from
(U,R) to (D,R), and so the inequality is more likely to be satisﬁed if we decrease
u1(D,R).28
Second, consider the case with symmetric payoff functions: u1(U, L) =
u2(D,R), u1(D,R) = u2(U, L), and u1(U,R) = u2(U,R). In this case, t¤
1 > t¤
2 is
28 Note that a risk-dominated Nash equilibrium in the component game may be the (limit) outcome
69equivalent to λ1 < λ2. This means that λ1 < λ2 (resp. λ1 > λ2) implies that (U, L)
(resp. (D,R)) is the outcome of the revision game. More generally,
jt¤
1j
jt¤
2j is increas-
ing in
λ1
λ2: if player 1’s relative frequency of the arrival of revision opportunities
compared to player 2’s frequency decreases, then player 1’s commitment power
becomes stronger, so (U, L) is more likely to be selected.
These results are reminiscent of the ﬁndings in the bargaining literature. Player
i’s bargaining power increases in the disagreement payoff ui (U,R), decreases with
the steepness of preference over the two “agreement outcomes” ( ju1 (U, L)¡
u1 (D,R)j for player 1 and ju2 (D,R) ¡ u2 (U, L)j for player 2) and increases in the
ability to commit 1/λi on a proposal.
3.6.2 Proof of Theorem 3
In this subsection, we provide the proof of the convergence of the equilibrium
payoff in Theorem 3.29 The proof consists of the following three steps.
Step 1:
First, for each player i, we deﬁne t¤
i as the inﬁmum of time t such that given that
both players prepare the component game best responses against the opponent’s
action at any t0 > t, i strictly prefers to prepare a component game best response to
any other action. Since the incentive to take a static best response in the component
of the revision equilibrium: Consider the payoff matrix
L R
U 2+  ,1 0,0
D 2 ,0 1,2
with   > 0. (U, L) is risk-dominated by (D,R), while it is the (limit) outcome of the revision equilib-
rium when λ1 = λ2.
29 The intuition behind this proof idea is analogous to the one provided in Kamada and Sugaya
(2010)’s “three-state example.” We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the way to extend it.
70game is strict at the deadline, this is true for t close enough to 0. By this deﬁnition
and continuity of expected payoffs (with respect to probabilities and so to time),
player i must be indifferent between the two actions at t¤
i given that (i) the PAP at
t¤
i is (U,R) and that (ii) both players prepare best responses against the opponent’s
action at time t > t¤
i . Then, from a straightforward calculation contained in the
Appendix, we show that for each i = 1,2, t¤
i deﬁned in this way coincides with t¤
i
deﬁned in (3.4) and (3.5).
Step 2:
Suppose w.l.o.g. that t¤
1 > t¤
2 and ﬁx t 2 (¡∞,0]. Suppose that the following
statements are true for any t0 > t:
1. t¤
1 · t0 or player 1 strictly prefers preparing U at t0 whatever the opponent’s
current prepared action is;
2. t¤
1 · t0 or player 2 strictly prefers preparing L at t0 when player 1’s current
prepared action is U.
These two statements are trivially true for t0 close enough to 0. We will show
that there exists   > 0 such that these two statements are true also for all t0 2
(t ¡  ,t], which proves that the statements are true for any t, by Lemma 1.
Step 2-1: First, consider player 1’s incentive when she obtains an opportunity
at time t < t¤
1 (In the other case (i.e. t ¸ t¤
1), the conclusion trivially holds). Suppose
ﬁrst that player 2 is currently preparing L, or he has a chance to revise strictly after
time t but strictly before time t¤
1. If player 1 prepares action U, then statements (1)
and (2) and Step 1 imply that the action proﬁle at the deadline is (U, L), which gives
player 1 the largest possible payoff that she can obtain in this revision game. On
the other hand, if she prepares D, then there is a positive probability that she will
71obtain no other chances to revise. In such a case, the action proﬁle at the deadline
is not (U, L). Hence, player 1 receives a payoff strictly less than the best possible
payoff u1(U, L).
Suppose next that the current action of player 2 is R, and he will not have any
chance to revise strictly after time t but strictly before time t¤
1. In this case player 1’s
expected payoff is the same as the continuation payoff when player 2’s prepared
action is R at time t¤
1.30 Hence, player 1 must be indifferent between U and D at t¤
1
by Step 1.
Overall, player 1 is strictly better off by preparing U at time t. Hence statement
(1) is true at time t.
Step 2-2: Now consider player 2’s incentive when he obtains an opportunity at
time t < t¤
1 (Again, the other case is trivial). Suppose that player 1’s current action
is U (Note that statement (2) concerns only such a case). If player 2 prepares L,
then statements (1) and (2) and Step 1 imply that both players never change their
actions in the future. Hence, the action proﬁle at the deadline is (U, L), which leads
to the payoff of u2(U, L). On the other hand, suppose that he prepares R. Player
2 prepares L if he obtains a revision opportunity strictly after time t but strictly
before time t¤
1, which results in the payoff of u2(U, L). If he does not obtain any
revision chance within that interval, then the expected payoff is the same as the
continuation payoff given action proﬁle (U,R) at time t¤
1. The latter is strictly less
than u2(U, L), since, by the assumption that t¤
2 < t¤
1, player 2 has a strict incentive
to prepare L given that player 1 is preparing U at all t > t¤
1.
Overall, player 2 is strictly better off by preparing L when player 1 prepares U
at time t. Hence statement (2) is true at time t.
30 Note that the probability of player 2 getting a revision opportunity at t¤
1 is zero.
72Step 2-3: By continuity (of expected payoffs with respect to time), Steps 2-1 and
2-2 imply that there exists   > 0 such that for all t0 2 (t ¡  ,t], both statements (1)
and (2) hold. Thus by Lemma 1, we have the desired result.
Step 3:
Statement (1) in Step 2 shows that at any t < t¤
1, player 1 prepares U. Hence for
any ﬁnite t0 < t¤
1, the probability that player 1 prepared action is U at t0 converges
to 1 as T increases. If player 1 prepared action is U at t0, then between t0 and t¤, by
statement (2), player 2 must prepare L and by statement (1) player 1 keep preparing
U. Hence the probability that the PAP at t¤
1 is (U, L) can be made arbitrarily close
to 1 by setting T large enough. Considering that the probability of revision at time
t¤
1 is zero, Step 1 implies that, if the PAP at t¤
1 is (U, L), then players keep preparing
(U, L) until the deadline.
3.6.3 Equilibrium Dynamics
The proof in the previous subsection characterizes the strong player’s equilib-
rium strategy fully but the weak player’s equilibrium strategy only after the strong
player prepares the action corresponding to the strong player’s preferred Nash
equilibrium.31 Here we provide the full characterization of the equilibrium dy-
namics, which will imply that the equilibrium strategy is unique. The proof of
the result stated in this subsection is provided in Calcagno and Lovo (2010) and
Kamada and Sugaya (2010).
The equilibrium dynamics are summarized in Figure 3.1 for the case t¤
1 > t¤
2.
The dynamics consists of three phases. In each phase, the arrow that originates
31 If players choose their actions simultaneously at ¡T, then it is common knowledge that the
strong player prepares the action corresponding to the strong player’s preferred Nash equilibrium at
¡T. Hence, the proof is sufﬁcient to fully characterize the path of play in the revision equilibrium.
73from a PAP x represents what players will prepare if they are given an opportunity
toreviseduringthatphasewhenthePAPis x. Morespeciﬁcally, anarrowfromPAP
(xi,x¡i) to PAP (x0
i,x¡i) means that if player i is given an opportunity to revise at
that phase when the PAP is x 2 f(xi,x¡i),(x0
i,x¡i)g, then player i would prepare
x0
i. If a player does not switch her action, then there is no arrow corresponding to
that strategy. Hence, in particular, if there are no arrows originating from x, then
that means that no player would change actions if given a revision opportunity.
When the deadline is close, each player prepares a component game best re-
sponse to the PAP (each player “equilibrates”). This phase is (t¤
1,0] shown in the
far-right panel of Figure 3.1 where t¤
1 is given in Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 3.
Since t¤
1 is the time at which player 1 is indifferent between U and D, given that
player 2 is preparing R, in the next phase the direction of the arrow that connects
(U,R) and (D,R) is ﬂipped. This is shown in the middle panel.
The proof shows that the directions of arrows in this ﬁgure stay unchanged for
all t further back from t¤
1, except the one that connects (D, L) and (D,R). Direct
calculation in Calcagno and Lovo (2010) and Kamada and Sugaya (2010) show that
the direction of the arrow does change at some ﬁnite t¤¤ and then stays unchanged
for all further t’s back.
In summary, for large T, the dynamics start from the phase where both players
try to go to the (U, L) proﬁle irrespective of the current PAP. When the deadline
comes closer, there comes the second phase where player 2 would choose R given
that 1 chooses D. Finally, when the deadline is close, both players prepare the
component-game best-reply to the PAP.
The above observation implies that if players choose their actions at ¡T, then
they will immediately select (U, L) and on the equilibrium path, no player will
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Figure 3.1: On and off equilibrium dynamics.
change actions.
3.7 Homogeneity and Asynchronicity
In the main section, we assumed that the Poisson processes are homogeneous
across time (the arrival rate λi is time-independent) and perfectly asynchronous.
In this section, we discuss the role of these assumptions.
First, consider the following non-homogeneous Poisson processes: the arrival
rate for player i at time s, λi(s), is a measurable function of s and so the expected
number of revision opportunities between t and t0 is
Li(t,t0) =
Z t0
t
λi(s)ds.
WemaintaintheassumptionthatthePoissonprocessesareperfectlyasynchronous.
75Since the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 do not use the fact that λi(s) is constant
over time, Theorems 2 and 3 hold for non-homogeneous Poisson processes. The
only difference is in the expression of t¤
i , which is given in the Appendix.
Second, consider the effect of different degrees of asynchronicity. For this pur-
pose, inadditiontothetwoindependentprocessesspeciﬁedinSection3.3, consider
another independent Poisson process p12 with arrival rate λ12 > 0, at which both
players revise simultaneously. For simplicity, we assume the Poisson process is ho-
mogeneous. At the time of decision corresponding to each revision opportunity,
player i does not know whether such an opportunity is driven by the process pi or
by p12. If λ1 = λ2 = 0 and λ12 > 0, then all revision opportunities are synchronous
and it is straightforward to show that any repetition of a Nash equilibrium is an
equilibrium of the revision game. The following result shows that it is not enough
to have only a slightest degree of asynchronicity to rule out the multiplicity of equi-
libria.
Theorem 4. Suppose that x 2 X is a strict Nash equilibrium of the component game.
Then, there exist strictly positive λ1,λ2,λ12 such that it is a SPE for each player i to
always prepare action xi all the time.
The proof and a detailed discussion can be found in Calcagno and Lovo (2010).
Note that λ1 and λ2 in the theorem are required to be strictly positive. This means
that the only slight degree of asynchronicity is not enough to eliminate multiple
equilibria. This raises the question of how much of asynchronicity is needed to
obtain equilibrium uniqueness in a revision equilibrium. Ishii and Kamada (2011)
characterize the parameter regions such that multiplicity persists in common in-
terest games; in particular, their results imply that the complete asynchronicity as-
sumed in the present paper is not a knife-edge case.
763.8 Concluding Remarks
We analyzed revision games where the component game is a coordination
game. Two players prepare their actions before they play a normal-form coordina-
tion game at a predetermined date where in the preparation stage, players obtain
opportunities to revise their actions according to independent Poisson processes,
and the ﬁnally-revised action is played at the deadline. In common interest games,
thestrictlyPareto-dominantproﬁleistheonlyoutcomeoftherevisiongame. Inop-
posing interest games, generically there is a unique outcome of the revision game,
which corresponds to one of the strict Nash equilibria. Which equilibrium prevails
in the revision game depends on the payoff structure and the relative frequency
with which revision opportunities arrive at each player.
Let us conclude this paper by coming back to the three key assumptions dis-
cussed in the Introduction and suggesting possible directions of future research.
First, we assumed perfect observability of the opponent’s play. In general, one
could think of a model in which a player may only imperfectly observe the oppo-
nent’s revision. It is an open question how unobservability affects the outcome of
revision games.
Second, we assumed perfect asynchronicity. To understand the exact effect of
asynchronicity, it is desirable to characterize the outcome in a model with both
synchronous and asynchronous revision opportunities. Calcagno and Lovo (2010)
formulate such processes. Section 3.7 of this paper and Ishii and Kamada (2011)
analyze such a model and partially characterize the condition such that uniqueness
obtains. A thorough investigation would be desirable to better understand the
exact role of asynchronicity.
Third, we assume ﬁnite actions and strict incentives. Our proof hinges on these
77assumptions and we do not know whether these assumptions are necessary in all
cases.32 Although these assumptions hold in many applications and many coordi-
nation games discussed in the literature, it is of theoretical interest to investigate
how it affects the outcome of revision games.
Finally, wefocusedon2-playercomponentgameswhilethemodelcanbeeasily
extended to more-than-two-player games. At this point, we do not know which
results of the 2-player set-up are robust. For example, Kamada and Sugaya (2010)
provide a sufﬁcient condition for an n-player asynchronous revision game to have
a unique revision equilibrium and they give an example in which uniqueness does
not hold when the condition is violated. A general characterization of revision
equilibria is an important topic for future research.
32 Note that Kamada and Kandori (2011b) show that with a continuous action space, it is possible
that the set of equilibrium payoffs widens.
784. MULTI-AGENT SEARCH WITH DEADLINE1
4.1 Introduction
This paper studies a search problem with two features that arise in many real-
life situations: The decision to stop searching is made by multiple individuals, and
there is a predetermined deadline by which a decision has to be made. Our primary
goalistoprovideanunderstandingofthefactorsthatdeterminethepositivesearch
duration in reality.
To ﬁx ideas, imagine a couple who must ﬁnd an apartment in a new city by
September 1, as the contract with their current landlord terminates at the end of
1 This is a joint work with Nozomu Muto (Departament d’Economia i d’Hist` oria Econ` omica, Uni-
versitat Aut` onoma de Barcelona, and MOVE). We thank David Ahn, Attila Ambrus, Pol Antr` as,
Katie Baldiga, Alessandro Bonatti, Georgy Egorov, Drew Fudenberg, Chiaki Hara, Johannes H¨ orner,
Chong Huang, Haruo Imai, Yuhta Ishii, Atsushi Kajii, Fuhito Kojima, David Laibson, Bart Lip-
man, Mihai Manea, Jordi Mass´ o, Akihiko Matsui, Sho Miyamoto, Akira Okada, Wojciech Olszewski,
Daisuke Oyama, Debraj Ray, Al Roth, Yuval Salant, Larry Samuelson, Bruno Strulovici, Tomasz
Strzalecki, Takuo Sugaya, Satrou Takahashi, Kentaro Tomoeda, Takahiro Watanabe, Alex Wolitzky,
Yuichi Yamamoto, Yosuke Yasuda, and seminar/conference participants at Universitat Aut` onoma
de Barcelona, Brown University, Columbia University, Harvard University, Hitotsubashi University,
Kyoto University, University of Tokyo, Yale University, the 22nd Summer Festival on Game Theory
(International Conference on Game Theory) at Stony Brook, SWET 2011 at Hokkaido University, and
GDRI Workshop Marseille for helpful comments. In addition, Morgan McClellon read through the
previous version of this paper and gave us very detailed comments, which signiﬁcantly improved
the presentation of the paper. A portion of this research was conducted while Kamada was visiting
Institut d’An` alisi Econ` omia at Universitat Aut` onoma de Barcelona; he thanks the university and es-
pecially Joan Esteban for the hospitality during the stay. Kamada thanks his advisors, Attila Ambrus,
Al Roth, Tomasz Strzalecki, and especially Drew Fudenberg for extensive discussions and comments
as well as continual guidance and support. Muto gratefully acknowledges support from the Span-
ish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grant “Consolidated Group-C” ECO2008-04756 and
FEDER.
79August. Since they are not familiar with the city, they ask a broker to identify new
apartments as they become available. The availability of new apartments depends
on many factors; there is no guarantee that a new apartment will become available
every day. Whenever the broker ﬁnds an apartment, the husband and wife both
express whether they are willing to rent it or not. If they cannot agree, they forfeit
the offered apartment—since the market is seller’s market, there is no option to
“hold” an offer while searching for a better one. Although the couple agree on
the need to rent some apartment, their preferences over speciﬁc apartments are
not necessarily aligned. The search ends once an agreement is made; if the couple
cannot agree on an apartment by September 1, they will be homeless.
To analyze these situations, we consider an n-player search problem with a
deadline. Time is continuous and “opporunties” arrive according to a Poisson pro-
cess. Opportunties are i.i.d. realizations of payoffs for each player. After viewing
an opportunity, the players respond with “yes” or “no.” The search ends if and
only if all players say “yes.” If the search does not end by the deadline, players ob-
tain an a priori speciﬁed ﬁxed payoff. Notice that the arrival rate of Poisson process
captures “friction” inherent in the search process: larger arrival rates correspond
to smaller friction. Since there is a trivial subgame perfect equilibrium in which
all players always reject, we analyze an (appropriately deﬁned) trembling-hand
equilibrium of this game.
Our analysis consists of three steps. In the ﬁrst step, we show that for any num-
ber of players and under very weak distributional assumptions, the expected du-
ration of search does not shrink to zero even in the limit as the friction of search
vanishes. Hence the mere existence of some search friction has a nonvanishing
80impact on the search duration. This result is intuitive but by no means obvious.2
The incentives are complicated. Waiting for a future opportunity to arrive offers an
incremental gain in payoffs, but an increased possibility of reaching the deadline.
Both the rewards and the costs go to zero as the search friction vanishes; the opti-
mal balance is difﬁcult to quantify because agents need to make decision of before
observing all future realizations of offers. For this reason, we employ an indirect
proof that bounds the acceptance probability at each moment.
In the second step, we show that in the limit, expected duration increases with the
number of agents involved in the search. This happens for two reasons, which we
call the “ascending acceptability effect” and the “preference heterogeneity effect.”
Roughly put, the ascending acceptability effect refers to the fact that a player faces
a larger incentive to wait if there are more opponents, as in equilibrium the oppo-
nents become increasingly willing to accept offers as time goes on. The preference
heterogeneity effect refers to the fact that such these future opportunities include
increasingly favorable offers for the player due to heterogeneity of preferences.
In the third step, we show that the speed of convergence for the expected search
duration is fast. Moreover, we use numerical examples to show that as the friction
disappears, the limit duration of search is actually close to durations with non-
negligible search friction. This provides evidence that our limit analysis contains
economically-meaningful content, and the mere existence of some friction is actu-
ally the main driving force of the positive duration in reality—so the effects that
we identify in the ﬁrst and second steps are the keys to understand the positive
duration in reality.
In Figures 4.1 and 4.2, we depict how the duration can be decomposed into
2 Indeed, we offer examples where our assumptions do not hold and the result fails.
81the effects mentioned above when there are two players, the offer distribution is
uniform over a feasible payoff set that has all nonnegative payoff proﬁles with the
sum of coordinates being no more than 1 (Figure 4.3), the arrival rate is 10, and
the horizon length is 1. This corresponds to the case where there are ten weeks to
search an apartment, and the information of a new apartment comes once every
week on average—quite a high friction. Even in this case, it is clear in the ﬁgure
that the ﬁniteness of arrival rates has a very little effect on the duration, while
other effects are signiﬁcant. The limit expected duration is directly computed from
a key variable r determined by the details of the model (X,µ). The larger the r
is, the longer the duration is. The increase in r from the one-player model to the
two-player model is accounted for by the ascending acceptability effect and the
preference heterogeneity effect. In this example, the former effect is larger than the
latter.3
The two key features in our model, deadline and multiple agents, give rise to new
theoretical challenges. In particular, these two things interact with each other. First,
the existence of a deadline implies that the problem is nonstationary: the problems
faced by the agents at different moments of time are different. Nonstationarity of-
ten results in intractability, but we partially overcome this by taking an indirect
approach: we ﬁrst analyze the limit expected duration (the ﬁrst and the second
steps) which is easier to characterize, and then argue that the limit case approx-
imates the case with ﬁnite arrival rates reasonably well (the third step). Second,
one may argue that since each player’s decision at any given opportunity is essen-
tially conditional on the situation where all other agents say “yes,” the problem
essentially boils down to a single-player search problem. This argument misses an
3 At the end of the main section (Section 4.4), we will be explicit about how we conducted this
decomposition.
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one player: 0.333 Search friction eﬀect: 0.0370
Duration with λ = 10: 0.608
Limit Duration with
two players: 0.571
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Figure 4.1: Decomposition of search durations: The case with uniform distribution over
the space depicted in Figure 4.3 and the horizon length of 1. The one player
duration is computed by assuming uniform distribution over the unit interval.
r1 and r2 are illustrated in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Decomposition of r2 ¡ r1.
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Figure 4.3: An example of the
domain of feasible
payoff proﬁles.
important key property of our model. It is indeed true that at each given oppor-
tunity the decisions by the opponents do not affect a player’s decision. However,
the player’s expectation about the opponents’ future decisions affects her decision
today, and such future decisions by opponents are in turn affected by other agents’
83decisions even further in the future. The two “futures” discussed in the previous
sentence are different precisely due to the nonstationarity—hence the two features
interact. It will become clear in our analysis that it is this interaction that is crucial
to our argument in the three steps.
Besides the results on duration, we provide a number of additional results.
Most prominently, we study welfare implications our model. In order to isolate
the effects of multiple agents and a ﬁnite horizon as cleanly as possible, the de-
parture from the standard model is kept minimal. This enables us to modify our
model in a wide variety of directions and also to conduct comparative statics. To
give some examples, we study the case when payoffs realize upon agreement (cor-
responding to the situation where the couple can rent an apartment as soon as they
sign a contract); the robustness of our results to different arrival processes; the case
with the presence of ﬁxed time costs; offer distributions varying over time; changes
in bargaining power over time; the optimal choice of horizon length (in a market-
design context); the case of majority rule rather than unanimity; the possibility of
negotiation. All these and many other things can be and will be discussed in our
framework.
4.1.1 Literature Review
Finite vs. inﬁnite horizon with multiple agents.
First, although there is a large body of literature on search problems with a sin-
gle agent and an inﬁnite horizon, there are only few papers that diverge from these
two assumptions.4 Some recent papers in game theory discuss inﬁnite-horizon
search models in which a group of decision-makers determine when to stop. Wil-
4 See Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) for a survey.
84son (2001), Compte and Jehiel (2010), and Cho and Matsui (2011) consider search
models in which a unanimous agreement is required to accept an alternative, and
show that the equilibrium outcome is close to the Nash bargaining solution when
players are patient. Despite the absence of a deadline, these convergence results to
the Nash bargaining solution have a similar ﬂavor to our result in Section 4.6 where
payoffs realize as soon as an agreement is reached. In Section 4.7.3, we will discuss
a common logic behind these convergence results. Compte and Jehiel (2010) also
analyze general majority rules to discuss the power of each individual to affect
outcomes of search, and the size of the set of limit equilibrium outcomes. Albrecht,
Anderson, and Vroman (2010) consider general majority rules, and show that the
decision-makers are less picky than the agent in the corresponding single-person
search model, and the expected duration of search is shorter if they are sufﬁciently
patient. Alpern and Gal (2009), and Alpern, Gal, and Solan (2010) analyze a search
model in which a realized object is chosen when one of two decision-makers ac-
cepts it, unless one of them casts a veto which can be exercised only a ﬁnite number
of times in the entire search process. Moldovanu and Shi (2010) analyze an inﬁnite-
horizon two-agent search problem with interdependent preferences with respect
to private signals of the payoffs realized in every period. They also show that the
duration becomes longer if the number of decision-makers increases from one to
two while retaining the information structure.5 Bergemann and V¨ alim¨ aki (2011)
provide an efﬁcient dynamic mechanism with a presence of monetary transfer in
an n-agent model with private signals of agents’ private values. Importantly, in
all of these papers the search duration converges to zero as the frequency of offer
5 Moldovanu and Shi (2010) show that agents are pickier when there is a larger conﬂict in prefer-
ences, whereas if the signals are public, they are less picky and the duration is shorter with a larger
conﬂict.
85arrivals tends to inﬁnity. The key distinction is that discounting is assumed and
payoffs realize upon agreement in these papers, while in our model payoffs realize
at the deadline, the assumption that ﬁts to our motivating example of apartment
search.
Multiple vs. single agent search with deadline.
A single-agent search problem with deadline is explored in much detail in the
operations research literature on the so-called “secretary problem.” There is an
important difference between this literature and our model. In secretary problems,
there are n potential candidates (secretaries) who arrive each date, and the decision
maker makes acceptance decisions. The key difference from our analysis is that in
secretary problems the decision maker does not have cardinal preferences but or-
dinal preferences, and attempts to maximize the probability that the best candidate
is chosen. Since the number of candidates is ﬁnite, this is technically a search prob-
lem with ﬁnite horizon. The optimal policy as the number of candidates grows to
inﬁnity is to disregard all candidates for some time before choosing, so this model
also has a positive limit search duration. The reason for positive duration is, how-
ever, different from ours. In secretary problems, the decision maker must gather
information about available alternatives to make sure what she chooses is reason-
ably well-ranked. In our setting with cardinal preferences and known distribution
of payoffs, there is no information gathering. Rather, what underlies the positive
duration is the tradeoff between the potential gain from waiting for a better allo-
cation in the future and the loss from reaching the deadline. This tradeoff is not
an issue in secretary problems as the decision maker beneﬁts only from the best
candidate. See Ferguson (1989) for an extensive survey of the literature.
86Single-agent search with inﬁnite horizon.
The so-called “search theory” literature has focused mainly on a single-agent
search problem with inﬁnite horizon and extended such a model to the context of
large population. Seminal papers by McCall (1970) and Mortensen (1970) explore
models in which a single agent faces an iid draw of payoffs over an inﬁnite hori-
zon. These models are extended in many directions.6 A common feature in these
papers is that the model has some form of “waiting costs” either as a discounting
or as a search cost, irrespective of the length of the horizon (ﬁnite or inﬁnite). This
assumption would be a reasonable one in their context as their main application
was job search, where the overall horizon length (in ﬁnite horizon models) is sev-
eral decades, and one period corresponds to a year or a month. On the other hand,
our interest is in the case where the horizon length is rather short, as in the apart-
ment search example we provided in the introduction. This naturally gives rise to
the assumption that payoffs realize at the deadline—which would not have made
sense in the job search application. Because of this difference, the limit search du-
ration as the friction goes away in models of this line of the literature is zero, so
they could not implement the exercise that we do in this paper. Later work ex-
tended the model to a large population model in which the search friction is given
endogenously through a “matching function.” Again, in a nutshell, these analyses
are more or less extensions of the single-agent search model with inﬁnite horizon,
and thus there has been no question on the “limit duration” as the friction vanishes.
6 An extensive survey of the literature can be found in Lippman and McCall (1976).
87Multi-agent search with ﬁnite horizon.
A few papers consider multi-person decision problems (See Ferguson (2005)
and Abdelaziz and Krichen (2007) for surveys), but none has looked at the search
duration. Sakaguchi (1973) was the ﬁrst to study a multi-agent search model with
ﬁnite horizon. Sakaguchi (1978) proposed a two-agent continuous-time ﬁnite-
horizon stopping game in which opportunities arrive according to a Poisson pro-
cess as in our model. He derived the same ordinary differential equations (ODE)
as ours and provided several characterizations,7 and then computed equilibrium
strategies in several speciﬁc examples.8 However, no analysis on duration ap-
peared in his papers. Note that obtaining the ODE constitutes only a preliminary
part of our contribution; our focus is on the search duration implied by this equa-
tion.
Ferguson (2005)’s main interest is in existence and uniqueness of the stationary
cutoff subgame perfect equilibrium with discrete time, general voting rules, vary-
ing distributions over time, and presence of ﬁxed costs of search.9,10 The sufﬁcient
condition for uniqueness that he obtains is different from ours.11
7 Speciﬁcally, he showed that (a) the cutoffs are nondecreasing and concave in the time variable,
and (b) in the independent environment, players are less picky than in the single player case.
8 Examples he examined are (1) the Bernoulli distribution on a binary domain, (2) h(x,y) =
f(x)g(y)(1 + γ(1 ¡ 2F(x))(1 ¡ 2G(x))) for f, g being arbitrary density functions, and γ being a pa-
rameter that measures correlation, (3) an exponential distribution, and (4) a direct product of expo-
nential and uniform distributions. Apart from case (1) in which the limit search duration is trivially
zero, our results imply that all cases have positive limit durations.
9 Hementionstheideaoftrembling-handequilibriumonlyverbally, anddoesnotprovideaformal
deﬁnition. Instead, there is an assumption that agreement probability is always positive.
10 He also analyzes an exponential case and does a comparative statics in terms of individual search
costs.
11 The condition states that the distribution of offers is independent across agents and the distance
to the conditional expectation above value vi is decreasing in vi for all player i.
88Multi-agent search vs. bargaining.
The multi-agent search problems are similar to bargaining problems in that
both predict what outcome in a prespeciﬁed domain is chosen as a consequence
of strategic interaction between agents. However, as discussed by Compte and Je-
hiel (2004, 2010), the search models are different from bargaining models in that in
the former, players just make an acceptance decision on what is exogenously pro-
vided to them, while in the latter, players have full control over what to propose.
Our model is a search model, and thus in our model players are “passively” assess
exogenous opportunities. This assumption captures the feature of situations that
we would like to analyze. For example many potential tenants do not design their
houses for themselves, but they simply wait for a broker to pass them information
regarding new apartments. The distinction between these “passive” and “active”
players is important when we consider the difference between our work and the
standard bargaining literature.12
Another important issue in relation with the bargaining literature is the distinc-
tion between positive search duration and so-called “bargaining delay.” Bargain-
ing delay is particularly important because it is often associated with inefﬁciency
caused by discounting. In our model payoffs realize at the deadline (so in essence
agents do not discount the future), so the positive-duration result does not nec-
essary imply inefﬁciency. Actually, we prove that generically the expected payoff
proﬁle cannot be Pareto inefﬁcient in the limit as the search friction vanishes. We
do not view this as necessarily detrimental to our contribution, as our primary aim
12 Cho and Matsui (2011) present another view: A drawn payoff proﬁle in the search process can
be considered as an outcome of a (unique) equilibrium in a bargaining game which is not explicitly
described in the model and does not depend on the future equilibrium strategy proﬁle. According to
this interpretation, every player is “active” although the “activeness” is embedded in the model.
89is to provide a deeper understanding of the positive duration in reality.13
Multi-agent search vs. bargaining with ﬁnite horizon.
AmbrusandLu(2010a), Gomes, Hart, andMas-Colell(1999)andImaiandSalo-
nen (2011) consider a bargaining model with ﬁnite horizon, in which players obtain
an opportunity to propose a share distribution of the surplus at asynchronous tim-
ings, havingfullcontroloverproposals, andanalyzetheequilibriumpayoffs.14 The
important distinction from our search model is that without any further assump-
tions (such as private information) that can be resolved over time or an “option to
wait” as assumed in Ma and Manove (1993), the ﬁrst player who obtains the op-
portunity makes an offer that all players would accept in equilibrium. This is in
line with the intuition of Rubinstein (1982)’s canonical model of alternating-offer
bargaining, and implies that as the timing of proposals becomes frequent the du-
ration until the agreement can become arbitrarily small.15 In our model, however,
there is a trade-off as the search friction decreases between more arrivals today and
more arrivals in the future. Our main objective of this paper is to discuss the effects
driven (at least in part) by this trade-off, while bargaining models do not have such
a trade-off (thus a question on duration is trivial).
A part of results by Gomes, Hart, and Mas-Colell (1999) and Imai and Salonen
(2011) shows that in some cases the limit equilibrium is the Nash bargaining solu-
tion. Although these results about equilibrium payoff proﬁles is reminiscent of our
13 In our framework, we can also ask a normative question: In Section 4.7.9, we examine a market
designer’sproblemtotuneparametersofthemodel(thehorizonlengthandthedistributionofoffers)
when the search friction is ﬁnite so the Pareto-efﬁciency result does not have bite.
14 See Ambrus and Lu (2010b) for an application of their model to legislative processes.
15 A ﬁnite horizon version of Rubinstein (1982)’s model with Poisson opportunities is a special case
of Ambrus and Lu (2010a)’s model, so the limit duration is zero in such a model.
90result in Section 4.6, the results are different in the conditions that determine the
limit proﬁles.16
Revision games.
Broadly, this paper is part of a rapidly growing literature on “revision games,”
which explores implications of adding a revision phase before a predetermined
deadline at which actions are implemented and players receive payoffs. The ﬁrst
papersonrevisiongamesbyKamadaandKandori(2011b,a)showthepossibilityof
cooperation in such a setting,17 and Calcagno and Lovo (2010), Kamada and Sug-
aya (2010), and Ishii and Kamada (2011) examine the effect of asynchronous tim-
ings of revisions on the equilibrium outcome in revision games. Kamada and Sug-
aya (2011) apply the revision games setting to election campaigns. Romm (2011)
analyzes the implication of introducing a “reputational type” in a variant of a revi-
sion game introduced by Kamada and Sugaya (2010). General insights from these
works are that when the action space is ﬁnite (as in our case) the set of equilibria is
typically small and the solution can be obtained by (appropriately implemented)
backwards induction, and that a differential equation is useful when characterizing
the equilibrium. In our paper we follow and extend these methods to characterize
equilibria and apply the framework to the context of search situations that often
arise in reality. Some examples we provide in this paper are reminiscent of those
provided in Kamada and Sugaya (2010).
16 See Remark 2 in the previous version of this paper (Kamada and Muto (2011b)) for a more com-
prehensive comparison between our work and these papers. There we argue that under different
conditions the limit equilibrium payoff proﬁle is the Nash bargaining solution in each model when
the discount rate and the frequency of opportunities converge simultaneously.
17 See Ambrus and Burns (2010) for a related work on an analysis of eBay-like auctions.
91The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a model. In Section 4.3
we provide some preliminary results. In particular, we show that trembling-hand
equilibria take the form of cutoff strategies, by which we mean each player at each
moment of time has a “cutoff” of payoffs below which they reject offers and oth-
erwise accept. Section 4.4 is the main section of the paper. Subsections 4.4.1, 4.4.2,
and 4.4.3 correspond to Steps 1, 2, and 3 of our argument, respectively. Section 4.5
provides a welfare analysis of our main model. Section 4.6 considers the case in
which payoffs realize upon agreement and there is a discounting—the case anal-
ogous to analyses in the previous work. In Section 4.7, we provide a number of
discussions. Among others, we show that even if agents can negotiate and transfer
utilities after each realization of payoffs, our basic result of positive duration is still
valid. Section 4.8 concludes. Proofs are given in the Appendix unless otherwise
noted.
4.2 Model
The Basic Setup
There are n players searching for an indivisible object. Let N = f1,...,ng be
the set of players. A typical player is denoted by i, and the other players are de-
noted by ¡i. The players search within a ﬁnite time interval [¡T,0] with T > 0,
on which opportunities of agreement arrive according to the Poisson process with
arrival rate λ > 0. At each opportunity, nature draws an indivisible object which
is characterized by a payoff proﬁle x = (x1,...,xn) following an identical and in-
dependent probability measure µ deﬁned on the Borel sets of Rn. A payoff proﬁle
x 2 Rn is often referred to as an allocation. After allocation x is realized, each
player simultaneously responds by either accepting or rejecting x without a lapse
92of time. Let B = faccept,rejectg be the set of responses in this search process. If all
players accept, the search ends, and at time 0 the players receive the corresponding
payoff proﬁle x. If at least one of the players rejects the offer, then they continue to
search. If players reach no agreement before the deadline at time 0, they obtain the
disagreement payoff proﬁle normalized at xd = (0,...,0) 2 Rn.18
Support and Pareto Efﬁciency
Let X = fx 2 Rn jµ(Y) > 0 for all open Y 3 xg be the support of µ. Note that
X µ Rn is a closed subset on which µ is full support. Without loss of generality,
we assume that X µ Rn
+.19 An allocation x = (x1,...,xn) 2 X is Pareto efﬁcient in
X if there is no allocation y = (y1,...,yn) 2 X such that yi ¸ xi for all i 2 N and
yj > xj for some j 2 N. An allocation x 2 X is weakly Pareto efﬁcient in X if there is
no allocation y 2 X such that yi > xi for all i 2 N. The set of all (weakly) Pareto
efﬁcientallocationsin X iscalledthe(weak, resp.) Paretofrontierof X. Wesometimes
consider weak Pareto efﬁciency also on ˆ X = fv 2 Rn
+ j x ¸ v for some x 2 Xg
which is the nonnegative region of the comprehensive extension of X.
Assumptions
We make the following weak assumptions throughout the paper.
Assumption 1. (a) The expectation
R
X xi dµ is ﬁnite for all i 2 N.
18 This is without loss of generality as long as payoffs realize at the deadline. When the payoffs
realize upon agreement as in Section 4.6, this does change some of the analysis (the initial condition
of the differential equation (4.10) changes), but we restrict ourselves to xd = (0,...,0) as the change
is minor.
19 This is without loss of generality as long as there is a positive probability in Rn
+ since the strategic
environment is identical to the case where the arrival rate is adjusted to µ(Rn
+)λ because players
prefer to reject any negative payoffs.
93(b) If n ¸ 2, for all i 2 N, i’s marginal distribution of µ has a density function that
is locally bounded.20
If condition (a) is violated, a player always wants to wait for better payoffs
before the deadline, so a best response does not exist. Condition (b) rules out a
distribution which has inﬁnitely large density at some point, while it still allows
for a distribution under which there is a positive probability that an allocation falls
on degenerate subsets such as a line segment which is not horizontal or vertical. In
Section 4.7.5, we will provide an example that demonstrates the need for Condi-
tion (b) for our main results to hold.
Histories and Strategies
Let us deﬁne strategies in this game. A history at ¡t 2 [¡T,0] where players
observed k (¸ 0) offers in [¡T,¡t) consists of
1. a sequence of times (t1,...,tk) when there were Poisson arrivals before ¡t,
where ¡T · ¡t1 < ¡t2 < ¢¢¢ < ¡tk < ¡t,
2. allocations x1,...,xk drawn at opportunities t1,...,tk, respectively,
3. acceptance/rejection decision proﬁles (b1,...,bk), where each decision pro-
ﬁle bl (l = 1,...,k) is contained in Bn n f(accept,...,accept)g,
4. allocation x 2 X [f∅g at ¡t (x = ∅ if no Poisson opportunity arrives at ¡t).
20 A function g(y) deﬁned on R is locally bounded if for all y, there exists C > 0 and ε > 0 such
that jg(y0)j · C for all y0 2 (y ¡ ε,y + ε).
94We denote a history at time ¡t by
¡
(t1,x1,b1),...,(tk,xk,bk),(t,x)
¢
. Let ˜ Hk
t be the
set of all such histories at time ¡t, ˜ Ht =
S
k=0,1,2,... ˜ Hk
t and ˜ H =
S
¡t2[¡T,0] ˜ Ht.21 Let
Hk
t =
©¡
(t1,x1,b1),...,(tk,xk,bk),(t,x)
¢
2 ˜ Hk
t j x 6= ∅
ª
be the history at time ¡t when players have an opportunity and there have been
k opportunities in the past. Let Ht =
S
k=0,1,2,... Hk
t and H =
S
¡t2[¡T,0] Ht. A
(behavioral) strategy σi of player i is a function from H to the set of probability
distributions over the set of responses B. Let Σi be the set of all strategies of i, and
Σ = £i2NΣi. For σ 2 Σ, let ui(σ) be the expected payoff of player i when players
play σ.22
Equilibrium Notions
A strategy proﬁle σ 2 Σ is a Nash equilibrium if ui(σi,σ¡i) ¸ ui(σ0
i,σ¡i) for all
σ0
i 2 Σi and all i 2 N. Let ui(σjh) be the expected continuation payoff of player i
given that a history h 2 ˜ H is realized and strategies taken after h is given by σ. A
strategy proﬁle σ 2 Σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium if ui(σi,σ¡i jh) ¸ ui(σ0
i,σ¡i jh)
for all σ0
i 2 Σi, h 2 H, and all i 2 N. A strategy σi 2 Σi of player i is a Markov
strategyifforhistory h 2 Ht at¡t, σi(h) dependsonlyonthetime¡t andthedrawn
allocation x. A strategy proﬁle σ 2 Σ is a Markov perfect equilibrium if σ is a subgame
21 Precisely speaking, there are histories in which inﬁnitely many opportunities arrive. We ignore
these possibilities since such histories happen with probability zero.
22 The function u(σ) is well-deﬁned for the following reason: Hk :=
S
t Hk
t is seen as a subset
of R(2n+1)k+(n+1), and thus endowed with a Borel sigma-algebra. We assume that H =
S
k Hk is
endowed with a sigma-algebra induced by these sigma-algebras on Hk, and a strategy must be mea-
surable with respect to this sigma-algebra. The measurability ensures that a strategy proﬁle generates
a probability measure on the set of terminal nodes. See Stinchcombe (1992) for a detailed treatment
of strategies in general continous-time games.
95perfectequilibriumand σi isaMarkovstrategyforall i 2 N. Wewilllatershowthat
players play a Markov perfect equilibrium (except at histories in a zero-measure
set) if they follow a trembling-hand equilibrium deﬁned below. For ε 2 (0,1/2),
let Σε be the set of strategy proﬁles which prescribe probability at least ε for both
responses in faccept,rejectg after all histories in H. A strategy proﬁle σ 2 Σ is a
trembling-hand equilibrium if there exists a sequence (εm)m=1,2,... and a sequence of
strategy proﬁles (σm)m=1,2,... such that εm > 0 for all m, limm!∞ εk = 0, σm 2 Σεm
,
σm is a Nash equilibrium in the game with a restricted set of strategies Σεm
(εm-
constrained game) for all m, and limm!∞ σm(h) = σ(h) for all h 2 H according to
the pointwise convergence in histories.23
4.3 Preliminary Results
In this section, we present preliminary results which will become useful in
the subsequent sections. We will show that there exists an essentially unique
trembling-hand equilibrium, in which every player plays a “cutoff strategy.” We
will derive an ordinary differential equation that characterizes the cutoff proﬁle in
the equilibrium. In addition, we will observe a basic invariance: The change in
equilibrium continuation payoffs when raising the arrival rate is the same as that
when stretching the duration from the deadline with the same ratio. Finally, by ex-
amining the differential equation, the limit equilibrium payoff as λ ! ∞ is shown
to be weakly efﬁcient.
The next proposition shows that trembling-hand equilibrium is essentially
23 This equilibrium concept is an analog of extensive-form trembling-hand equilibrium, as opposed
to its normal-form counterpart. Although our extensive-form game involves uncountably many
nodes and hence the standard deﬁnitions of trembling-hand equilibria are not directly applicable,
it is for this reason that we call this notion a trembling-hand equilibrium.
96unique and Markov.
Proposition 12. Suppose that σ and σ0 are two trembling-hand equilibria. Then ui(σjh)
= ui(σ0 jh0) for almost all histories h,h0 2 ˜ Ht n Ht and all i 2 N.
That is, regardless of the history, any two trembling-hand equilibria give rise
to the same continuation payoff at time ¡t. Three remarks are in order: First, we
ruled out histories in Ht, because different realization of payoffs that players accept
clearly give rise to different continuation payoffs on the equilibrium path. Second,
since agents move simultaneously, there exist subgame perfect equilibria in which
all players reject any allocations.24 We introduced the trembling-hand equilibrium
to rule out such trivial equilibria. In an ε-constrained game, a player will optimally
accept a favorable allocation for herself, expecting the others to accept it with a
small probability. Third, and relatedly, there exist sequential equilibria in which
every player has a strict incentive at almost all histories.25 Our trembling-hand
equilibrium rules out such equilibria.
A Markov strategy σi of player i 2 N is a cutoff strategy with cutoff vi(t) ¸ 0
if player i who is to respond at time ¡t accepts allocation x 2 X whenever xi ¸
vi(t), and rejects it otherwise. For a proﬁle v = (v1,...,vn) 2 Rn
+, we deﬁne a
set of allocations by A(v) = fx 2 X j xi ¸ vi for all i 2 Ng. When players play
cutoff strategies with cutoff proﬁle (v1(t),...,vn(t)), we sometimes call A(v(t))
an “acceptance set” as they agree with an allocation x at time ¡t if and only if
x 2 A(v(t)). We often denote this acceptance set by A(t) with a slight abuse of
24 If players respond sequentially, we can show that any subgame perfect equilibrium consists of
cutoff strategies. Therefore our results are essentially independent of the timing of responses of
players.
25 An example similar to the one in Cho and Matsui (2011, Proposition 4.4) can be used to show this
result.
97notation when the cutoff proﬁle in consideration is not ambiguous. Suppose that
all players play Markov strategies σ, and there is no Poisson arrival at time ¡t 2
[¡T,0]. Then player i has an expected payoff ui(σjh) at ¡t independent of history
h 2 ˜ Ht n Ht played before time ¡t. We denote the continuation payoff at time
¡t by vi(t,σ) = ui(σjh). For simplicity of notations, we hereafter omit to write a
cutoff strategy proﬁle σ explicitly, and denote by vi(t) the continuation payoff of
player i at time ¡t.
Thefollowingpropositionshowsthatthereexistsatrembling-handequilibrium
that consists of cutoff strategies, and characterizes the path of cutoffs.
Proposition 13. There exists a trembling-hand equilibrium that consists of (Markov) cut-
off strategies. Moreover, an equilibrium continuation payoff proﬁle v(t) = (v1(t),...,
vn(t)) at time ¡t 2 [¡T,0] is given by a solution of the following ordinary differential
equation (ODE)
v0(t) = λ
Z
A(t)
¡
x ¡ v(t)
¢
dµ (4.1)
with an initial condition v(0) = (0,...,0).
This proposition is shown by the following argument. An equilibrium contin-
uation payoff vi(t) supported by a cutoff strategy proﬁle is given by the following
recursive expression: For i 2 N,
vi(t) =
Z t
0
µZ
XnA(τ)
vi(τ)dµ +
Z
A(τ)
xi dµ
¶
λe¡λ(t¡τ) dτ
=
Z t
0
µ
vi(τ) +
Z
A(τ)
¡
xi ¡ vi(τ)
¢
dµ
¶
λe¡λ(t¡τ) dτ. (4.2)
After time ¡t, players receive the ﬁrst Poisson opportunity at time ¡τ with proba-
98bility density λe¡λ(t¡τ). If player i ﬁnds that the drawn payoff xi to her is no worse
than her continuation payoff vi(τ), i optimally accepts this allocation x, otherwise,
i rejects it. If all players accept x, i.e., x 2 A(τ), then they reach an agreement
with x. If some player rejects x, then search continues with continuation payoff
proﬁle v(τ). This discussion shows that a cutoff strategy proﬁle with cutoffs v(t)
characterized by equation (4.2) is a Markov perfect equilibrium.
Bellman equation (4.2) implies that vi(t) is differentiable in t. Multiplying both
sides of (4.2) by eλt and differentiating both sides yield the ordinary differential
equation (4.1) of continuation payoff proﬁle v(t) deﬁned in ˆ X.
Now, a standard argument of ordinary differential equations shows that ODE
(4.1) has a solution whenever Assumption 1 holds.26 The above argument only
shows that the cutoff strategy proﬁle with a cutoff proﬁle given by this solution of
ODE (4.1) is a Markov perfect equilibrium. In the Appendix, we will show that it
is in fact a trembling-hand equilibrium.
By Proposition 12, the solution of ODE (4.1) is unique. Therefore the game has
essentially a unique trembling-hand equilibrium for any given X and µ satisfying
Assumption 1. Let us denote the unique solution of (4.1) by v¤(t;λ), the continu-
ation payoff proﬁle in the trembling-hand equilibrium. We simply denote this by
v¤(t) as long as there is no room for confusion. The probability that all players
accept a realized allocation at time ¡t on the equilibrium path conditional on the
event that an opportunity arrives at ¡t is referred to as the “acceptance probabil-
ity” at time ¡t.
Let us make a couple of observations about ODE (4.1). Figure 4.4 describes an
illustration of a typical path and the velocity vector that appear in this ODE for
26 This is because Assumption 1 (b) ensures continuity in v of the right hand side of (4.1). See
Coddington and Levinson (1955, Chapter 1) for a general discussion about ODE.
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x2
v(0) = 0
A(t)
X
v(t)
v∗
v′(t)
barycenter of A(t)
Figure 4.4: The path and the velocity vector of ODE (4.1).
n = 2. The shaded area shows the acceptance set A(t), whose barycenter with
respect to the probability measure µ is
R
A(t) xdµ
±
µ(A(t)). Therefore the velocity
vector v¤0(t) is parallel to the vector from v¤(t) to the barycenter of A(t), which
represents the gain upon agreement relative to v¤(t). The absolute value of v¤0(t)
is proportional to the weight µ(A(t)). Note that ODE (4.1) immediately implies
v¤0
i (t) ¸ 0 for all t and i 2 N, and v¤0
i (t) = 0 if and only if µ(A(t)) = 0. For each
i 2 N, the continuation payoff v¤
i (t) grows as t increases, and eventually either
converges to a limit payoff v¤
i , or diverges to inﬁnity.
Since the right hand side of ODE (4.1) is linear in λ, we have v¤(t;αλ) =
v¤(αt;λ) for all α > 0 and all t such that ¡t,¡αt 2 [¡T,0]. By considering the
limit as α ! ∞, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 14. The two limits of v¤(T;λ) coincide, i.e., limλ!∞ v¤(T;λ) = limT!∞
v¤(T;λ), if one of them exists.
100We henceforth denote this limit by v¤. In the next section, we sometimes deal
with these two limits interchangeably. Note that the equality implies limλ!∞ v¤
(T;λ) does not depend on T > 0.
Finally, we argue weak Pareto efﬁciency of the limit allocation. Suppose that
v¤ = limλ!∞ v¤(T) = limT!∞ v¤(T) exists but is not weakly Pareto efﬁcient. Then
there exists x 2 X that strictly Pareto dominates v¤. Since x belongs to the support
of µ, µ(Y) > 0 for any open set Y µ Rn
+ that includes x. For Y sufﬁciently small,
A(v¤) contains Y, and thus µ(A(v¤)) > 0. This implies that the right hand side of
ODE (4.1) is positive, contradicting the fact that v¤ = limλ!∞ v¤(t) = limt!∞ v¤(t).
Hence we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 15. Let t > 0 ﬁxed, and suppose that the solution v¤(t;λ) of equation (4.1)
converges to v¤ 2 ˆ X as λ ! ∞. Then v¤ is weakly Pareto efﬁcient.27
We will have further discussions about efﬁciency in Section 4.5, in which we
will show that the limit allocation v¤ is Pareto efﬁcient for almost all distributions
µ satisfying mild assumptions, and Pareto efﬁcient for all convex X.
4.4 Duration of Search
In this section, we will discuss the duration of search in our model. Our argu-
ment consists of three steps: In Section 4.4.1 we will show that even under the quite
weak conditions in Assumption 1, search takes a positive time even in the limit as
the friction vanishes. In Section 4.4.2, we argue that the limit duration becomes
longer as the number of involved agents gets larger. This extra duration is caused
27 Note that this does not necessarily imply weak Pareto efﬁciency in the convex hull when X is
nonconvex. That is, the convex hull can contain allocations that Pareto-dominate the limit expected
payoff proﬁle, while such allocations cannot be achieved under a trembling-hand equilibrium. See
footnote 38 for a further discussion on this.
101by two effects called the “ascending acceptability effect” and the “preference het-
erogeneity effect.” We will provide a method to decompose the extra duration by
these two effects. In Section 4.4.3, we demonstrate that the limit duration is “close”
to the durations for ﬁnite arrival rates. This provides evidence that our limit analy-
sis contains economically-meaningful content, and the mere existence of some fric-
tion is actually the main driving force of positive duration in reality—so the effects
that we identify in Steps 1 and 2 are the keys to understand the positive duration
in reality.
First, let us explain how we compute the expected duration. Given arrival rate
λ > 0, by the differential equation (4.1) we can compute the equilibrium path of the
cutoff proﬁle v¤(t;λ). Given v¤(t;λ), one can compute the acceptance probability
p(t;λ) at each time ¡t as follows:
p(t;λ) = µ(A(v¤(t;λ))).
Let P(t;λ) be the probability that there is no agreement until time ¡t:
P(t;λ) = e¡
R T
t λp(s;λ)ds. (4.3)
Notice that
dP(t;λ)
dt = λp(t;λ)P(t;λ). We often omit λ and simply denote p(t) and
P(t) when there is no room for confusion. As an example, Figure 4.5 graphs p(t)
for λ = 1,10,100 when n = 2, X = fx 2 R2
+ j x1 + x2 · 1g, µ is the uniform distri-
bution on X, and T = 1. Figure 4.6 shows a graph of P(t) in the same environment.
Let D(λ) be the expected duration in the equilibrium for given λ when T = 1.
Since we have v¤(T;λ) = v¤(1;λT) as discussed in Section 4.3, the search duration
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p(t)
−1 0
1
λ = 1
λ = 10
λ = 100
Figure 4.5: A numerical example of p(t) for the case when n = 2, X = fx 2 R2
+ j x1 + x2 ·
1g, µ is the uniform distribution on X, and T = 1.
is proportional to T, and thus the expected duration for general T is written as
D(λ)T. We use these p(t;λ) and P(t;λ) to solve for D(λ), using integration by
parts:
D(λ)T = T ¢ P(0;λ)
| {z }
The probability of no agreement
until time 0
+
Z T
0
(T ¡ t)
| {z }
The duration when the search
ends at time ¡t
¢ P(t;λ)
| {z }
The probability that
the search does not end until ¡t
¢ λp(t;λ)
| {z }
The probability density of
agreement at time ¡t
dt
= T ¢ P(0;λ) + [(T ¡ t)P(t;λ)]
T
0 +
Z T
0
P(t;λ)dt
=
Z T
0
P(t;λ)dt. (4.4)
This ﬁnal expression has a direct interpretation: For each time ¡t, P(t) is the prob-
ability that the duration is greater than T ¡ t. Since P(t) > P(t0) for t > t0, P(t) is
integrated for the length of T ¡ t (from T to t). Thus the expression measures the
expected duration.
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P(t)
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1
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Figure 4.6: A numerical example of P(t) for the case when n = 2, X = fx 2 R2
+ j x1 + x2 ·
1g, µ is the uniform distribution on X, and T = 1.
Finally, deﬁne
D(∞) = lim
λ!∞
D(λ)
whenever the limit is well-deﬁned.
In Steps 1 and 2, we will analyze D(∞). Then in Step 3 we will demonstrate
that D(λ) converges to D(∞) reasonably fast.
4.4.1 Step 1: Positive Duration
The ﬁrst step of our argument shows the following: For any number of players n
and any probability distribution over feasible allocations µ satisfying fairly weak assump-
tions, the limit expected search duration as the search friction vanishes is strictly positive.
We ﬁrst show the result for the case with n = 1 (Theorem 5) and detail the
intuition. Then, using this result, we generalize to an arbitrary number of players
(Theorem 6).
104Single Agent
Roughly, there are two effects of having a higher arrival rate. On one hand, for
any (small) given time interval, there will be an increasing number of opportuni-
ties, thus it becomes easier to get a lucky draw. On the other hand, since there will
be more and more opportunities in the future as well, the player becomes pickier.
Our result shows that these two effects balance each other out. The incentives are
complicated. Waiting for a future opportunity to arrive offers an incremental gain
in payoffs, but an increased possibility of reaching the deadline. Both the rewards
and the costs go to zero as the search friction vanishes; the optimal balance is difﬁ-
cult to quantify because agents need to make decision of before observing all future
options.
To explain the detailed intuition for our result, let us specialize to the case of
X = [0,1] and µ being the uniform distribution. We ﬁrst show that if the acceptance
probability at each time ¡t is O( 1
λt) then the limit duration is strictly positive.28
Then we show that the acceptance probability must be indeed O( 1
λt).
Suppose the acceptance probability at each time ¡t is O( 1
λt). Then, the proba-
bility that the agreement does not take place by time ¡T
2 is at least
e¡λC 1
λT/2 = e¡2 C
T
for some constant C > 0, and this is strictly positive. This means that the limit
expected duration is at least a strict convex combination of 0 and T
2, and therefore
is strictly positive.
Now we explain why we expect such a small acceptance probability. Fix time
28 For functions g(y) and h(y), we say that g(y) = O(h(y)), if there exist C > 0 and ¯ y such that
jg(y)j · C ¢ jh(y)j for all y ¸ ¯ y.
105¡t. Note that the cutoff at ¡t must be equated with the continuation payoff at ¡t
by optimality at ¡t, and the continuation payoff must be at least as good as the
expected payoff by playing some arbitrarily speciﬁed strategy from time ¡t on by
optimality in the future. Also, the cutoff at ¡t uniquely determines the acceptance
probability at ¡t. That is, by specifying a future strategy, we can obtain a lower
bound of continuation payoff which must be equal to the cutoff, and this gives us
an upper bound of the acceptance probability:
The acceptance probability
= 1¡ the cutoff of the optimal strategy
= 1¡ the continuation payoff from the optimal future strategy
· 1¡ the continuation payoff from an arbitrarily speciﬁed future strategy.
To see what type of future strategy will generate an interesting bound, ﬁrst
consider specifying a constant cutoff from ¡t on. Suppose that at any time ¡s after
¡t the cutoff is 1¡O( 1
λt). Then, a lower bound of the probability that there will be
no acceptance in the future can be calculated as
e¡λC 1
λt = e¡ C
t
for some constant C > 0, and this is strictly greater than 0 irrespective of λ. This
means that even in the limit as λ ! ∞, the probability of no agreement at time 0
does not shrink to zero. But then, the continuation payoff from this strategy must
be at most a strict convex combination of a number at most 1 (the best possible
payoff) and 0 irrespective of λ, which means that the acceptance probability is at
least a positive number independent of λ. Hence p(t) cannot be O( 1
λt).
106Next, consider a future strategy such that at any time ¡s after ¡t the cutoff
is such that the player accepts with a higher order than 1
λt (thus she accepts with
a higher probability; e.g., 1 p
λt). Then the probability of acceptance in the future
indeed tends to 1 as λ ! ∞, but the payoff conditional on acceptance is smaller
than the best payoff (i.e., 1) by the amount of the order higher than 1
λt. Hence the
cutoff at ¡t must be smaller than the best payoff by such an amount, which means
that the acceptance probability at ¡t is of the order higher than 1
λt.
The analysis of the above two scenarios reveals the tradeoff faced by the player:
Setting a high cutoff gives her a high payoff conditional on acceptance, but reduces
the acceptance probability. On the other hand, setting a low cutoff results in a
low payoff conditional on acceptance but raises the acceptance probability. This
suggests thata good strategy must specify a high cutoff for a sufﬁciently long time
to ensure a high payoff conditional on acceptance, and lower cutoffs towards the
endtoensureahighenoughacceptanceprobability. Speciﬁcally, considerthecutoff
1 ¡ 2
λs+2 for each time ¡s after time ¡t. This plan has a feature that for any ﬁnite
time s > 0, the acceptance probability is
2
λs + 2
=
λt + 2
λs + 2
¢
2
λt + 2
= O
³ 1
λt
´
,
thus for any positive future time, the player’s payoff conditional on acceptance
is smaller than the best payoff by the amount O( 1
λt). Yet this gives us the limit
acceptance probability of 1, as the probability for no acceptance can be calculated
as:
e¡
R t
0 λ 2
λs+2ds = e¡[2ln(λs+2)]t
0 =
³ 2
λt + 2
´2
! 0 as λ ! ∞.
A rough intuition for why this can achieve the limit acceptance probability of 1 is
107that, for each time subinterval [¡ T
2k¡1,¡ T
2k] for k = 1,2,..., this strategy makes an
acceptance with probability at least
1¡ e
¡λ¢ 2
λ(T/2k¡1)+2¢ T
2k = 1¡ e
¡ λT
λT+2k ! 1¡
1
e
> 0 as λ ! ∞.
Since 1 ¡ 1
e is a positive constant independent of k, the acceptance probability in-
creases with an exponential speed as k increases. We can indeed check that the
future cutoff scheme 2
λs+2 gives the player a continuation payoff of 2
λt+2 = O( 1
λt)
at time ¡t.
Overall, we have shown that when X = [0,1] and the distribution µ is uniform,
the limit expected duration is strictly positive. This argument is generalized to the
cases of general distributions satisfying Assumption 1 and the following assump-
tion. Let F(x) be the cumulative distribution function of µ.
Assumption 2. There exists concave function ϕ such that 1 ¡ ϕ(x) is of the same
order as 1¡ F(x) in fx 2 Rj F(x) < 1g.29
To see what this assumption implies, consider two separate cases—bounded X
and unbounded X. If X is bounded, besides pathological cases where F is non-
differentiable at inﬁnitely many points, the assumption amounts to say that the
slope of the cdf F cannot diverge to inﬁnity at the maximum payoff. If X is un-
bounded, a simple sufﬁcient condition to guarantee that the assumption holds is to
require there exists ˜ x such that F is concave on (˜ x,∞), or equivalently, there exists
a nonincreasing density function f on (˜ x,∞). Concavity of ϕ lets us invoke the
Jensen’s inequality to bound the cumulative acceptance probability.
29 For functions g(y) and h(y), we say that g(y) is of the same order as h(y) in Y µ R if there exist
c,C > 0 and ¯ y < sup(Y) such that cjh(y)j · jg(y)j · Cjh(y)j for all y ¸ ¯ y.
108Recall that D(λ)T is the expected duration in the equilibrium for given arrival
rate λ. Then we obtain the following:
Theorem 5. Suppose n = 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, liminfλ!∞ D(λ) > 0.
In the Appendix we also provide a proof that the conclusion of this result holds
when X is bounded with another assumption: for ¯ x 2 X, ln
¡
µ
¡
fx 2 X jj¯ x ¡ xj ·
εg
¢¢
is of the same order as lnε when ε > 0 is small. A sufﬁcient condition for this
is that there exists α > 0 such that µ
¡
fx 2 X jj¯ x ¡ xj · εg
¢
is of the same order as
εα when ε > 0 is small.
Multiple Agents
Now we extend our argument to the case of n ¸ 2. The basic argument is
the same as in the case of n = 1: We ﬁx some strategies for players other than
i, and consider bounding i’s continuation payoff. However, it is not the case that
we can implement this proof for any given strategies by the opponents. To see
this point, consider the case of 2 players with X = fx 2 R2
+ j x1 = x2 · 1g and
the uniform distribution. Suppose that we are given player 2’s strategy to set the
cutoff v2 = 0 for the time interval
·
¡t,¡
µ
t ¡
1
p
λt
¶¸
, and then the cutoff v2 = 1
for the rest of the time. Then, player 1’s upper bound of acceptance probability
cannot be given by O( 1
λt) because, to ensure the acceptance of a positive payoff,
player 1 must accept within the time interval
·
¡t,¡
µ
t ¡
1
p
λt
¶¸
, and to do so she
must set a low enough cutoff.30
What is missing in the above strategy of player 2 is the feature that a player’s
cutoff must be decreasing over time. In the above strategy, the cutoff starts from 0
30 There also exist strategies for player 2 that are independent of λ and still give rise to a low cutoff
for player 1, such as v2(t) = e¡(T¡t).
109and then jumps up to 1. We use the decreasingness to show our result.
To see how the decreasingness helps, ﬁx t and consider player ¡i’s equilibrium
cutoffs at time ¡t, and suppose for the moment that they will keep using these
cutoffs in the future as well. Then, by the result in the case of n = 1, we know that
the acceptance probability at ¡t by playing optimally in the future against such
strategies isO( 1
λt) as long as Assumption 2 is met for any cutoff proﬁles of the other
players (sufﬁcient conditions for this to hold are analogous to what we discussed
after introducing Assumption 2). Let p(s) for s < t be the acceptance probability
given by i’s optimal strategy against ¡i’s ﬁxed strategies. Now, consider the actual
equilibrium cutoff strategy for ¡i and consider a new future strategy for player i,
which is to accept at each time ¡s with probability p(s). Notice that, since each
opponent’s cutoff is decreasing, the expected payoff conditional on acceptance at
each time ¡s must be greater than the case with ﬁxed cutoffs for ¡i, while at each
moment the acceptance probability is identical to that case. This means that i’s
continuation payoff at ¡t must be higher than in the original case, which implies
that the acceptance probability at ¡t must be O( 1
λt).
Hence, we obtained the following: Recall that D(λ)T is the expected duration
in the equilibrium for given arrival rate λ. Let F
v¡i
i be the marginal cumulative
distribution function of player i’s payoff conditional on cutoff proﬁles v¡i of the
other players with µ(A(0,v¡i)) > 0.
Assumption 20. There is i 2 N such that for all v¡i with µ(A(0,v¡i)) > 0, there
exists a concave function ϕ such that 1 ¡ ϕ(xi) is of the same order as 1 ¡ F
v¡i
i (xi) in
fxi 2 Rj F
v¡i
i (xi) < 1g.31
Theorem 6. Suppose n ¸ 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 20, liminfλ!∞ D(λ) > 0.
31 This assumption reduces to Assumption 2 when n = 1.
1104.4.2 Step 2: Effects of the Larger Number of Agents
The second step of our argument concerns the effect of having a larger number
of players.
In what follows we demonstrate that there are two reasons that we expect longer
durations when there are more players. The effects that underlie these reasons are
called ascending acceptability effect and preference heterogeneity effect. We explain these
effects in turn.
Ascending Acceptability Effect
In Section 4.4.1 we demonstrated that the decreasingness of the opponents’ cut-
offs can be used to reduce the acceptance probability (through the rise of continu-
ation payoffs). The ascending acceptability effect is also based on the fact that the
opponents’ cutoffs are decreasing.
To isolate such an effect, let us consider the case when we add players whose
preferences are independent of those of the existing players. Speciﬁcally, let two
problems (X,µ),(Y,γ) satisfy Assumption 1 where X µ Rn
+, Y µ Rm
+, µ 2 ∆(X),
γ 2 ∆(Y), and n,m ¸ 1. Consider three models: (i) n player model (X,µ), (ii) m
player model (Y,γ), and (iii) n + m player model (X £Y,µ £ γ).
Theorem 7. Suppose that the limit expected durations exist for models (i) and (ii) with
T = 1, denoted by DX and DY, respectively. Then the limit expected duration DXY also
exists in model (iii) with T = 1, and satisﬁes
DXY = 1¡
(1¡ DX)(1¡ DY)
1¡ DXDY
(4.5)
if DXDY < 1, and DXY = 1 if DXDY = 1.
111The reasoning of this proposition will be given in Section 4.4.2. Theorem 7
implies an immediate corollary:
Corollary 4. Under the assumption in Theorem 7, DXY > maxfDX,DYg if DX,DY 2
(0,1).
In Section 4.4.2, we provide the explicit formula for the probability distribution
of the expected duration. The formula in particular implies that the distributions
of the durations in models (i) and (ii) are ﬁrst-order stochastically dominated by
that of model (iii), which implies Corollay 4.
There is a simple reasoning behind Corollay 4. Note ﬁrst that the locus of the
path in model (iii) projected on X is identical to the one in model (i) because, by
(4.1), the direction of the vector is determined by the position of the barycenter in
the acceptance set. Notice further that if we exogenously specify the strategies of
additional m players to be the ones that accept any payoff proﬁles, then the time
path of the cutoffs for the original n players should remain unchanged. In equi-
librium, however, these m players’ cutoffs are decreasing, so there will be more
chances for desirable draws to be accepted (“ascending acceptability”). This is why
we expect a longer duration with more players. Another way to put this is that the
increase in the acceptance probability caused by additional m players corresponds
to an increase in arrival rates over time. This means that a larger fraction of oppor-
tunities comes at the late stage of the game, so we expect a longer duration.
To understand the formula (4.5) in Theorem 7, manipulate it to get:
The expected remaining time in model (iii)
The expected remaining time in model (i)
=
1¡ DXY
1¡ DX
=
1¡ DY
1¡ DXDY
< 1. (4.6)
Notice that 1 ¡ DX denotes the expected remaining time until the deadline at the
112time of agreement given X, and the same interpretation is valid for 1¡ DXY. Thus,
the left hand side of equation (4.6) is the ratio of remaining time with X £ Y com-
pared to that of X. This ratio is strictly smaller than 1 whenever DX < 1, by the
expression in the right hand side, and increases as DY grows. This is intuitive:
Higher DY implies a slower speed for the continuation payoffs of the additional
players to move. Thus players in X have more incentives to wait than in the case
with a lower DY.
Preference Heterogeneity Effect
Theorem 7 considers the case where preferences of players in model (i) and
those of players in model (ii) are independent. In many relevant cases, players’
preferences are not independent. Speciﬁcally, they are often heterogeneous. We
now analyze how heterogeneity in preferences, captured by the change in X and µ,
affects the duration. In this subsection, we ﬁrst provide a general duration formula
to understand how preference heterogeneity affects the duration. Then we use this
formula in speciﬁc examples to analyze the effect of preference heterogeneity.
Let us deﬁne values r,r as follows:
r = liminf
t!∞ ∑
i2N
di(v¤(t)) ¢ bi(v¤(t)), r = limsup
t!∞ ∑
i2N
di(v¤(t)) ¢ bi(v¤(t)) (4.7)
113where
bi(v) = gi(A(v)) ¡ vi, b(v) = (b1(v),...,bn(v)),
di(v) =
1
µ(A(v))
¢
liminf
ε!0
µ(A((vj + εbj(v))j<i,(vj)j¸i)) ¡ µ(A((vj + εbj(v))j·i,(vj)j>i)))
εjb(v)j
,
di(v) =
1
µ(A(v))
¢
limsup
ε!0
µ(A((vj + εbj(v))j<i,(vj)j¸i)) ¡ µ(A((vj + εbj(v))j·i,(vj)j>i)))
εjb(v)j
,
and g(Y) = (g1(Y),..., gn(Y)) denotes a barycenter of the set Y µ Rn with respect
to µ. Recall that P(t;λ) is the probability of no agreement until time ¡t, and D(λ)
is the limit expected duration when T = 0. Now we can show that P(t;∞) =
limλ!∞ P(t;λ) can be written in the following way:
Theorem 8. Under Assumption 1, for all ¡t 2 [¡T,0]
³ t
T
´1/r
· liminf
λ!∞
P(t;λ) and limsup
λ!∞
P(t;λ) ·
³ t
T
´1/r
, and
1
1+ r¡1 · liminf
λ!∞
D(λ) and limsup
λ!∞
D(λ) ·
1
1+ r¡1.
Thus, if r = r =: r, then for all ¡t 2 [¡T,0]
P(t;∞) =
³ t
T
´1/r
and D(∞) =
1
1+ r¡1.
Proof Sketch. Let us provide a proof when r = r = r, and µ has a density function.
A formal proof in the general case is given in the Appendix. To show the result, we
114ﬁrst prove
lim
λ!∞
p(t) ¢ λt =
1
r
where p(t) = µ(A(v¤(t))). By the ODE (4.1), v¤0(t) = λ(g(A(v¤(t)))¡v¤(t))¢ p(t).
Differentiating p(t) = µ(A(v¤(t))),
p0(t) = ∑
i2N
∂µ(A(v))
∂vi
¯
¯ ¯
v=v¤(t)
v¤0
i (t)
= ∑
i2N
∂µ(A(v))
∂vi
¯
¯ ¯
v=v¤(t)
λ ¢ (gi(A(v¤(t))) ¡ v¤
i (t)) ¢ p(t)
= ¡ ∑
i2N
di(v¤(t))p(t) ¢ λbi(v¤(t)) ¢ p(t).
Therefore
p0(t)
λp(t)2 = ¡ ∑
i2N
di(v¤(t))bi(v¤(t)).
This implies that r is the limit of ¡p0(t)
±
λp(t)2 as t ! ∞. If the limit exists, for any
ε > 0 there exists ¯ t such that t ¸ ¯ t implies
r ¡ ε · ¡
p0(t)
λp(t)2 · r + ε. (4.8)
This means that p(t) is approximated by the solution of ODE p0(t) = ¡rλp(t)2
with an initial condition at t = ¯ t. Solving this equation, for large t,
p(t) ¼
1
rλ(t ¡ ¯ t) + p(¯ t)¡1.
Hence we get limλ!∞ p(t) ¢ λt = 1
r. We can compute the approximated probabil-
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Figure 4.7: Density term and barycenter term.
ity of disagreement P by following formula (4.3), showing that P(t;∞) =
¡ t
T
¢ 1
r.32
Applying formula (4.4), one can easily obtain D(∞) = 1
1+r¡1.
Moreover, Theorem 8 immediately implies that if r = r = r, then P(t;∞) is
increasing in t, and (a) for r < 1, P(t;∞) is concave and limt!0 P0(t;∞) = ∞, (b)
for r = 1, P(t;∞) is linear and P0(t;∞) = 1
T, and (c) for r > 1, P(t;∞) is convex and
limt!0 P0(t;∞) = 0.
The graphical intuition for the formula in Theorem 8 is depicted in Figure 4.7.
The ﬁrst term di(v¤(t)), which we call the density term, is i’s marginal density at
her continuation payoff conditional on the distribution restricted to the acceptance
set. The second term bi(v¤(t)), which we call the barycenter term, measures the
distance between the barycenter of the acceptance set and the cutoff. Remember
that the speed at which the cutoff moves towards the limit point is determined by
this distance, by equation (4.1). Hence the formula for r in equation (4.7) measures
the speed at which the acceptance set shrinks. This is consistent with the fact that
32 The computation is given in Lemma 7 in the Appendix.
116the duration formula in equation (4.7) is increasing in r > 0 because if the accep-
tance probability shrinks quickly, then players reject with high probability for a
long time, resulting in a long duration.
Theorem 8 also explains the reasoning behind the formula in Theorem 7. Let rX,
rY, and rXY be associated with models (i), (ii), and (iii), respectively. rX and rY are
well-deﬁned as DX and DY exist. Then, by deﬁnition, rXY must be equal to rX +rY.
Hence the limit expected duration in model (iii) exists and it is 1
1+r¡1
XY
= 1
1+(rX+rY)¡1.
Rearranging terms, we get the formula in Theorem 7.
NowweusetheformulagiveninTheorem8toanalyzespeciﬁcclassesofgames
to understand the preference heterogeneity effect.
Example 1 (Bounded X, smooth boundary, and continuous and strictly positive
density).
Here we impose assumptions employed often in the literature on multi-agent
search (Wilson (2001), Compte and Jehiel (2010), and Cho and Matsui (2011)).
Assumption 3. (a) X is convex and compact subset of Rn
+, and has a smooth
Pareto frontier.
(b) The probability measure µ is absolutely continuous with respect to the
Lebesgue measure on Rn, and admits a probability density function f that is
continuous and bounded away from zero, i.e., infx2X f(x) > 0.
In this case, when the cutoffs for players are high enough, the acceptance set can
be approximated with an n-dimensional pyramid by the assumption of smooth
boundary, and the distribution over this acceptance can be approximated with a
uniformdistributionduetotheassumptionofcontinuousandstrictlypositiveden-
sity. This allows us to explicitly compute the limit expected duration, as follows:
117Table 4.1: Limit expected duration of search as opportunities arrive more and more fre-
quently.
Number of agents 1 2 3 5 10 100
Limit expected duration .333 .571 .692 .806 .901 .990
Proposition 16. Under Assumptions 1 and 3, limλ!∞ D(λ) =
n2
n2 + n + 1
.
Corollary 5. Under Assumptions 1 and 3, limλ!∞ D(λ) is increasing in n.
In the proof in the Appendix, we show this result under much more general
assumptions (Assumptions 1, 4, and 7).
The solution of the expected duration provided in Proposition 16 implies that, if
only two players are involved in search, the expected duration is 4
7T, and it mono-
tonically increases to approach T as n gets larger. Table 4.1 shows the limit expected
duration for several values of n when T = 1.
If Assumption 3 holds, then the limits in di and di coincide. Let us denote
di(v) = di(v) = di(v). When X is bounded, as assumed in Assumption 3, di(v)
grows to inﬁnity as v comes close to the Pareto frontier, while bi(v) decreases to
zero. For this reason we normalize these terms as follows: For Y µ X, let s(Y) =
V(Y)
1
n be the “size” of Y in X. Let us deﬁne the normalized terms as
˜ di(v) = di(v)s(A(v))
=
s(A(v))
µ(A(v))
¢
lim
ε!0
µ(A((vj + εbj(v))j<i,(vj)j¸i)) ¡ µ(A((vj + εbj(v))j·i,(vj)j>i)))
εjb(v)j
,
˜ bi(v) =
bi(v)
s(A(v))
=
gi(A(v)) ¡ vi
s(A(v))
.
118Notice that if V(A(v)) = 1, then ˜ di(v) = di(v) and ˜ bi(v) = bi(v).
When the acceptance set is approximated by an n-dimensional pyramid whose
area is normalized to 1, the density term is
¡
n
n¡1
n
¢
£ n where “£n” accounts for the
fact that there are n agents, and the barycenter term is n
1
n/(n + 1).
UnderAssumption3, theascendingacceptabilityeffectcanbeseeninFigure4.7
by noting that the area that corresponds to the density term has two segments (n
segments in the case of n players), each corresponding to each player. Thus, adding
a player results in an extra region of payoffs that will be accepted in the future. The
probability density in the extra region increases not only because the number of
segments increases, but also because the length of each segment increases. This
happens precisely because players’ preferences are heterogeneous so the density
of the marginal distribution of a player’s payoff increases as her payoff decreases.
This means that the “extra region” that a player’s opponents accept in the future
contains relatively more favorable allocations for the player when there are more
opponents. Although the barycenter term deceases due to this preference hetero-
geneity as well, the overall effect is positive. We call this effect the preference het-
erogeneity effect. Note well that the effect of preference heterogeneity is to (only)
magnify the ascending acceptability effect by lengthening the length of each seg-
ment.
The argument so far suggests that, under Assumption 3, we can make the fol-
lowing decomposition:
The limit duration with n agents =
1
1+
¡
n ¢ n
n+1
¢¡1
119=
1
1+
0
B
B B
@
n ¢ n
n¡1
n | {z }
density term
¢
n
1
n
n + 1 | {z }
barycenter term
1
C
C C
A
¡1.
We next use the formula (4.7) to conduct several comparative statics with re-
spect to preference heterogeneity, holding ﬁxed the number of players.
Example 2 (Change in the shape of X around the limit payoff proﬁle).
First, consider the two-player case, under Assumptions 1 and 3 but dropping
the assumption that the Pareto frontier is smooth (assumed in Assumption 3 (b)).
In this environment, generally X has a kink at the limit expected payoff, so that the
acceptance set when t is large can be approximated by a quadrilateral similar to
cof(0,0)(1,0)(0,1)(q,q)g after rescaling each axis. In this case the limit duration is
computed as
The limit duration =
1
1+
³
2¢
2q+1
6q
´¡1 =
1
1+
0
B
B B
B
@
2¢
1
p
q
| {z }
density term
¢
2q + 1
6
p
q
| {z }
barycenter term
1
C
C C
C
A
¡1. (4.9)
Notice that the term corresponding to the preference heterogeneity effect,
2q+1
6q ,
is decreasing in q. This is consistent with how the shape of acceptance set changes
with respect to q. As q grows, the kink of the boundary at the limit payoff becomes
sharper, so the preferences among the players become less heterogeneous. This
means that the “extra region” that a player’s opponent accepts in the future does
120not contain relatively favorable allocations for the player. As a result, the limit
duration can be calculated as D(∞) =
2q+1
5q+1, and this is decreasing in q.
Example 3 (Change in the shape of X under Assumptions 1 and 3).
Next, consider n-player symmetric X and µ. Consider a transformation of this
problem in the following sense: let Xq and ¯ Xa deﬁned by
Xq = fx 2 X j max
i2N
xi ¡ min
j2N
xj · qg and ¯ Xa = fya(x)j x 2 Xg
where ya(x) = ax + (1 ¡ a)xe, a 2 (0,1], with xe =
¡x1+¢¢¢+xn
n ,...,
x1+¢¢¢+xn
n
¢
. Deﬁne
µq by µq(C) = 1
µ(Xq) ¢ µ(C \ Xq) and ¯ µa by ¯ µa¡
fya(x)j x 2 Cg
¢
= µ(C) for any
C µ X.
Both µq and ¯ µa shrink the distribution to the middle: µq takes out the offers that
give agents “too asymmetric” payoffs, while ¯ µa moves each point by the amount
proportional to the original distance to the equi-payoff line. See Figure 4.8 for a
graphical description in the case of two players. Proposition 16 shows that as long
asAssumptions1and3aremet, expecteddurationisunaffectedbythespeciﬁcality
of distribution µ. That is,
Proposition 17. If (X,µ) satisﬁes Assumptions 1 and 3, then the limit expected durations
with (Xq,µq) and ( ¯ Xa, ¯ µa) are the same as in the case with (X,µ) for any a 2 [0,1).
The intuition is simple. In both cases, the distribution is still uniform around
the limit point and the boundary is smooth even under ¯ µa, so exactly the same
calculation as in the case with µ suggests that the limit duration is n2
n2+n+1. In
this case, however, durations with ﬁnite arrival rates are affected by the change
in preferences. Table 4.2 shows that the duration becomes shorter as we make the
preferences less heterogeneous, in the case X = fx 2 R2
+ j x1 + x2 · 1g.
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Figure 4.8: Transfer of allocations in the negotiation for µq (left) and ¯ µa (right).
Example 4 (Change in the distribution over unbounded X).
Consider 2-player symmetric X = R2
+ and µ which is associated with a density
function fσ parameterized by σ as follows:
fσ(x1,x2) ∝
8
> > <
> > :
e¡(x1+x2) ¢ 1 p
2πσ2e
¡
(x1¡x2)2
2σ2 if (x1,x2) 2 R2
+.
0 otherwise,
That is, we consider an exponential distribution in the direction of 45 degree line,
and a normal distribution with variance σ2 in the direction of 135 degree line. The
parameter σ measures the heterogeneity of preferences. Notice that the limit dis-
tribution as σ ! 0 is the (degenerate) exponential distribution over 45 degree line,
and the limit distribution as σ ! ∞ is the product measure in which each player’s
marginal distribution is an exponential distribution with parameter
p
2. We can
solve for the limit duration in these two cases analytically using the duration for-
mula in Theorem 8. In the former case the problem is isomorphic to that of one-
122Table 4.2: Preference heterogeneity effect under Assumptions 1 and 3. q and a measure
heterogeneity of preferences.
µq λ
10 20 30 100 ∞
q = 1 0.608 0.591 0.585 0.576 0.571
q = 0.8 0.607 0.590 0.584 0.575 0.571
q = 0.6 0.600 0.586 0.581 0.575 0.571
q = 0.4 0.579 0.574 0.573 0.572 0.571
q = 0.2 0.515 0.534 0.544 0.562 0.571
q = 0 0.398 0.366 0.355 0.340 0.333
¯ µa λ
10 20 30 100 ∞
a = 1 0.608 0.591 0.585 0.576 0.571
a = 0.8 0.625 0.601 0.591 0.578 0.571
a = 0.6 0.604 0.588 0.583 0.575 0.571
a = 0.4 0.567 0.566 0.567 0.570 0.571
a = 0.2 0.489 0.512 0.528 0.557 0.571
a = 0 0.398 0.366 0.355 0.340 0.333
player case and the limit expected duration as λ ! ∞ is 1
2, and in the latter case
it is 2
3. We use the duration formula to numerically compute the limit duration in
the intermediate values of σ, and the result is given in the graph of Figure 4.9. For
any σ > 0, the density term is a constant 1 p
2. It is the barycenter term that varies
with σ. Speciﬁcally, the barycenter term rises with σ from 1 p
2 (when λ ! 0) to
p
2
(when λ ! ∞). This is because, the more heterogeneous the preferences are, the
more realizations of payoffs are scattered outside of the acceptance set.33 Since it
33 The effect that the total probability on the acceptance set decreases for a given value of v does
not matter, as we take the limit as λ ! ∞.
123Figure 4.9: Preference heterogeneity (measured by σ) and the limit search duration.
is more difﬁcult for a realization to stay in the acceptance set if the sum of payoffs
are smaller, heterogeneity implies that, conditional on acceptance, payoffs are high
on average. Thus, if preferences are more heterogeneous (σ is larger), the oppo-
nent’s gain relative to the continuation payoff conditional on acceptance is higher.
This means that the loss from a unit time passing is larger, so the opponent will de-
crease the cutoff faster. This makes the incentive to wait larger, implying a longer
expected duration.
4.4.3 Step 3: Finite Arrival Rate
Our results on the expected duration so far suggest that there are reasons to ex-
pect a positive duration of search even in the limit as the friction of search vanishes.
To evaluate the signiﬁcance of these reasons, we now consider cases with ﬁnite ar-
rival rates. We will show that the expected duration converges to the limit duration very
fast, provides evidence that our limit analysis contains economically-meaningful
content—so the effects that we identify in the previous discussion are the keys to
understand the positive duration in reality.
First, we show that the convergence speed of the duration is high. Recall that
124D(λ) and D(∞) are the expected durations under arrival rate λ and the limit ex-
pected duration for T = 1, respectively. Theorem 8 ensures the existence of D(∞)
if r = r.
Theorem 9. Under Assumption 1, if r = r, then jD(λ) ¡ D(∞)j = O( 1
λ).
This is a fast rate of convergence; for example, when payoffs realize upon
agreement and there is a positive discount rate (with a ﬁnite or inﬁnite horizon),
jD(λ) ¡ D(∞)j is of the same order as 1
λ
1
n+1
under Assumptions 1 and 3.
We further support our claim numerically through a number of examples. We
ﬁnd that the limit duration of Proposition 16 is not far away from those with ﬁnite λ
in many cases. The differential equation (4.1) does not have a closed-form solution
in general, and even if it does, D(λ) may not have a closed-form solution as it
involves further integration. For this reason, we solve the differential equation
and integration numerically to obtain the values of D(λ) for speciﬁc values of λ.
We considered the following distributions standard in the literature with T = 1.
Note that, in the apartment search example, if the couple has ten weeks before
the deadline and a broker provides information of an apartment once per week on
average (very infrequent case), the situation corresponds to λ = 10.
Case 1: µ is the uniform distribution over X = fx 2 Rn
+ j ∑i2N xi · 1g for n =
1,2,3 and λ = 10,20,30,100.
Case 2: µ is the uniform distribution over X = fx 2 Rn
+ j ∑i2N x2
i · 1g for n = 1,2
and λ = 10,20,30,100,1000.
Case 3: µ is the uniform distribution over X = fx 2 Rn
+ j maxi2N xi · 1g for
n = 1,2,3 and λ = 10,20,30,100.
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Figure 4.10: A numerical example of the cumulative probability of agreement.
Case 4: µ is the product measure over X = Rn
+ where each marginal corresponds
to an exponential distribution with parameter ai > 0 for n = 1,2,3,10 and
λ = 10,20,30,100.
Case 5: µ is the product measure over X = Rn
+ where each marginal corresponds
toalog-normaldistributionwithmean0andstandarddeviation σ = 1
4,1,4
for n = 1 and λ = 10,20,30,100.
Figure 4.10 shows a graph of the cumulative probability of agreement for λ =
10 (i.e., 1 ¡ P(t;10)) and for λ ! ∞ (i.e., 1 ¡ limλ!∞ P(t;λ)) of Case 1 with n = 2.
Also, Figure 4.11 shows the probability density function of the duration of search
in such a case (i.e., P(t;λ) ¢ p(t;λ)).
In Table 4.3, we provide the computed values for selected choices of parameter
values and cases. We provide the complete description of all the computed values
in the Appendix.34
According to our calculation, D(λ) is within 10% difference from D(∞) except
34 Some values are computed analytically: The results for Case 1 for n = 1,2, Case 2 for n = 1,
Case 4 for n = 1,2,3,10 are analytical.
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Figure 4.11: The probability density of the duration of search.
for a single case where the difference is 19.4%, which happens in Case 1 with n = 1.
Generally the percentage falls as the number of agents becomes larger and the ar-
rival rate goes up.35 For example if we add another player in Case 1, the difference
falls down dramatically to 6.5%, and if we increase the arrival rate to 20 (ﬁxing the
number of players at n = 1), the difference becomes 9.9%. In all other cases the
difference is much smaller and often less than 5%.36 Notice that we predict “over-
shooting” of the expected duration in Case 2 than in 1. This is because when the
continuation value is far away from the boundary, the shape of the acceptance set
is close to a square with which we expect a shorter duration, and gradually the
shape approaches a triangle (precisely, the density effect would be smaller than the
case of a triangle if the limit shape of the acceptance set were the same as that of
X). This suggests that convexity of the set of available allocations, which is often
assumed in the literature, facilitates a faster convergence. When X is unbounded,
35 The monotonicity with respect to arrival rates can be analytically proven for Case 1 with n = 2.
However, the monotonicity fails in general. To see this, consider the case in which D(∞) = 1. By
optimality it must be the case that D(λ) < 1 for any ﬁnite λ, so in this case the duration cannot be
decreasing in λ. Note also that in Case 2, after the “overshooting” the duration comes back to the
limit duration, thus D(λ) is nonmonotonic.
36 We are planning to extend the analysis to more cases beyond the setting provided here.
127Table 4.3: Expected durations for ﬁnite arrival rates.
Case 1
λ
10 20 30 100 ∞
n = 1
Expected duration 0.398 0.366 0.355 0.340 0.333
Percentage (%) 19.4 9.92 6.64 2.00 0
n = 2
Expected duration 0.608 0.591 0.585 0.576 0.571
Percentage (%) 6.48 3.44 2.35 0.731 0
Case 2
λ
10 20 30 100 1000 ∞
n = 1
Expected duration 0.398 0.366 0.355 0.340 0.334 0.333
Percentage (%) 19.4 9.92 6.64 2.00 0.200 0
n = 2
Expected duration 0.582 0.568 0.565 0.562 0.567 0.571
Percentage (%) 1.90 ¡0.541 ¡1.21 ¡1.61 ¡0.798 0
Case 4
λ
10 20 30 100 ∞
n = 1
Expected duration 0.545 0.524 0.516 0.505 0.5
Percentage (%) 9.09 4.76 3.23 0.990 0
n = 2
Expected duration 0.693 0.681 0.676 0.670 0.667
Percentage (%) 3.91 2.11 1.45 0.465 0
the computed difference was much smaller (Cases 4 and 5).
Thediscussion so far enables us to perform the decomposition mentioned in the
Introduction. The expected duration in the 2-player model with the uniform dis-
tribution over X = fx 2 R2
+ j x1 + x2 · 1g and λ = 10 is 0.608. The limit expected
128duration as λ ! ∞ in this case is 4
7, so the difference is 0.037. This limit duration
4
7 is calculated from the number r that we denote by r2 := 4
3. When there is only
one player and the distribution is uniform over [0,1], the limit duration is 1
3, and
the number r is r1 := 1
3. The difference between r2 and r1—the difference caused
by adding one more player—is determined by two effects, the ascending accept-
ability effect and the preference heterogeneity effect. To calculate the ascending
acceptability effect, we compute r that we would obtain if this additional agent’s
distribution over feasible payoffs is independent of the original player’s, and the
distribution corresponds to the uniform distribution over [0,1]. The duration and r
in this case are 1
2 and rop := 1, respectively, and the difference in terms of r is given
by rop ¡ r1 = 1 ¡ 1
2 = 1
2. Now the preference heterogeneity effect is the change
in r caused by the change in distribution from this product measure to X. This is
given by r2 ¡ rop = 4
3 ¡ 1 = 1
3. In general, ﬁxing an n-player model (X,µ) and an
(n + m)-player model (Y,γ), we can solve for the ascending acceptability effect by
computing the difference between the r in the model (X,µ) and the r in the model
(X £ [0,1]m,µ £ (U[0,1])m). Then the preference heterogeneity effect can be com-
puted by solving for the difference in the latter r and the r in the model (Y,γ).37
This decomposition is well-deﬁned in the sense that the ascending acceptability ef-
fect (resp. preference heterogeneity effect) of changing the models from an n-player
model (X,µ) to an (n+ m)-player model (Y,γ) is identical to the sum of ascending
acceptability effect (resp. preference heterogeneity effect) of changing the models
from an n-player model (X,µ) to an (n + l)-player model (Z,δ) and the ascending
acceptability effect (resp. preference heterogeneity effect) of changing models from
an (n+l)-player model (Z,δ) to an (n+m)-player model (Y,γ) where l < m, since
37 The uniform distribution over [0,1] can be replaced with any distribution with a positive contin-
uous density over a compact interval without changing the computation.
129r is additive.
4.5 Welfare Implications
In Section 4.3, we showed that the limit expected payoff must be weakly Pareto
efﬁcient if the limit exists. In this section we seek further welfare implications. Let
us impose the following assumption to rule out uninteresting cases:
Assumption 4. (a) X is a compact subset of Rn.
(b) X coincides with the closure of its interior (with respect to the standard topol-
ogy of Rn).
(c) The probability measure µ is absolutely continuous with respect to the
Lebesgue measure on Rn, and admits a probability density function f.
(d) The probability density f is bounded above and away from zero, i.e., supx2X
f(x) < ∞ and infx2X f(x) > 0.
Condition (a) in Assumption 4 is a standard assumption when we consider
welfare implications. Note that we do not assume convexity here. Condition (b)
rules out irregularities involving lower dimensional subsets. For example, if X
has an isolated point this condition is violated, because the interior of X does not
contain any isolated points. Condition (c) implies that µ(Y) = 0 for any Y µ X
that has (n-dimensional) Lebesgue measure zero. Condition (d) is a condition that
makes our analysis tractable.
In general, v¤ is not necessarily (strictly) Pareto efﬁcient in X even if v¤ exists.
There is an example of a distribution µ satisfying Assumptions 1 and 4 in which
v¤(t) converges to an allocation that is not Pareto efﬁcient.
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Figure 4.12: A path that converges to a weakly Pareto efﬁcient allocation.
Example 5. Let n = 2, X =
¡
[0,1/2] £ [3/4,1]
¢
[
¡
[3/4,1] £ [0,1/2]
¢
, and f be the
uniform density function on X, which is shown in Figure 4.12. By the symmetry
with respect to the 45 degree line, we must have v¤
1(t) = v¤
2(t) for all t. Therefore
v¤ = (1/2,1/2), which is not Pareto efﬁcient in X.38
Note that v¤ is weakly Pareto efﬁcient, and that X is a non-convex set in this
example. In fact, we can show that v¤ is strictly Pareto efﬁcient if X is convex. Fur-
thermore, even if X is not convex, we can show v¤ is “generically” Pareto efﬁcient,
that is, v¤ is Pareto efﬁcient in X for any generic f that satisﬁes Assumptions 1 and
4.
38 There are (non-trembling-hand) subgame perfect equilibria in which players obtain a more efﬁ-
cient payoff proﬁle than (1/2,1/2). For example, consider a strategy proﬁle in which players agree
with allocations close to (1,1/2) or (1/2,1), and if one of the players rejects such allocations, both
players reject all allocations after the deviation. This is a subgame perfect equilibrium and gives play-
ers expected payoffs close to (3/4,3/4) in the limit. Similar constructions show that any allocations
in the convex hull of general nonconvex X can be an expected payoff proﬁle supported by a subgame
perfect equilibrium. However, we rule out such subgame perfect equilibria in a view that rejecting
anything after deviation is not a credible threat if a player expects the others to accept with a small
probability.
131Formally, let F be the set of density functions that satisfy Assumptions 1 and 4.
We consider a topology on F deﬁned by the following distance in F: For f, ˜ f 2 F,
¯
¯f ¡ ˜ f
¯
¯ = sup
x2X
¯
¯f(x) ¡ ˜ f(x)
¯
¯.
Proposition18. UnderAssumptions1and4, theset ff 2 F jv¤ is Pareto efﬁcient in Xg
is open and dense in F.
This proposition shows that v¤ is efﬁcient only for generic f. However, if X is
convex, then v¤ is efﬁcient for all f.
Proposition 19. Suppose that X is a convex set. Under Assumptions 1 and 4, v¤ is Pareto
efﬁcient in X.
Pareto efﬁciency implies that players reach an agreement almost surely if t is
very large. To see this, let π(t) be the probability that players reach an agree-
ment in equilibrium before the deadline given that no agreement has been reached
until time ¡t. Then the expected continuation payoffs v¤(t) must fall in the set
fπ(t)vjv 2 co( ˆ X)g where co( ˆ X) is the convex hull of ˆ X. This implies v¤(t)/π(t) 2
co( ˆ X). We have v¤
i (t) > 0 for all t > 0 and i 2 N since v¤
i (t) is nondecreas-
ing and v¤0
i (0) > 0 by equation (4.1). Since there is a positive probability that
no opportunity arrives before the deadline, π(t) is smaller than one. Therefore
v¤(t)/π(t) 2 co( ˆ X) Pareto dominates v¤(t). Since co( ˆ X) \ A(v¤(t)) converges to a
singleton as v¤(t) goes to v¤ if v¤ is Pareto efﬁcient, this implies limt!∞ π(t) = 1.
That is, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 20. Suppose that v¤ is Pareto efﬁcient. Then the probability of agreement
before the deadline converges to one as λ ! ∞.
132We note that this proposition fails if v¤ is only weakly Pareto efﬁcient. In Ex-
ample 5, it is evident that players reach no agreement before the deadline with a
positive probability, since the limit allocation is (1/2,1/2) while players should
ﬁnd a good allocations close to (1,1/2) or (1/2,1) in the limit as T ! ∞.
In Propositions 18 and 19, we showed that v¤(t) almost always converges to the
Pareto frontier of X. Now, we consider an inverse problem: For any Pareto efﬁcient
allocation w in X which is not at the edge of the Pareto frontier,39 we show that one
can ﬁnd a density f that satisﬁes Assumptions 1 and 4 such that the limit of the
solution v¤(t) of equation (4.1) is w.
Proposition 21. Suppose that X µ Rn
+ satisﬁes Assumption 4 (a), (b). Suppose that w 2
Rn
++ is a Pareto efﬁcient allocation in X, and is not located at the edge of the Pareto frontier
of X. Then there exists a probability measure µ with support X such that Assumptions 1
and 4 hold, and limλ!∞ v¤(t) = w for all t 2 (0,T].
Intheproof, weconstructaprobabilitydensityfunction f tohavealargeweight
near w 2 X, and show that the limit continuation payoff proﬁle is w if there is a
sufﬁciently large weight near w. Note that this claim is not so obvious as it seems.
Indeed, we will see in Section 4.6 that the limit is independent of density f if there
is a positive discount rate ρ > 0, as long as Assumptions 1 and 4 hold.
4.6 The Payoffs Realizing upon Agreement
In this section, we consider the case where the payoffs realize as soon as an
agreement is reached, as opposed to the assumption in the previous sections that
the payoffs realize only at the deadline. We suppose that if a payoff proﬁle x =
39 We formally deﬁne this property in the proof given in the Appendix.
133(x1,...,xn) is accepted by all players at time ¡t 2 [¡T,0] then player i obtains a
payoff xie¡ρ(T¡t) where ρ ¸ 0 is a discount rate. If no agreement has been reached
until time 0, each player obtains the payoff 0.40 First, we note that if ρ = 0, exactly
the same analyses as in the previous sections apply. This is because with ρ = 0,
player i’s payoff when an agreement occurs at time ¡t is xie¡ρ(T¡t) = xie¡0¢(T¡t) =
xi, which is independent of t. In this section, we focus on the case where ρ > 0. Un-
der Assumption 1, an easy computation shows that the differential equation (4.1)
is modiﬁed in the following way:
v0(t) = ¡ρv(t) + λ
Z
A(t)
¡
x ¡ v(t)
¢
dµ (4.10)
with an initial condition v(0) = (0,...,0) 2 Rn.
Suppose Assumptions 1 and 4 hold. Let v¤(t;ρ,λ) be the (unique) solution of
ODE (4.10).41 If λ is large, the right hand side of equation (4.10) is approximated
by the right hand side of equation (4.1) when the value of the integral is not too
small. Therefore, v¤(t;ρ,λ) is close to the solution of equation (4.1) in the case
of ρ = 0, for λ large relative to ρ. This resemblance of trajectories holds until
v¤(t;ρ,λ) approaches the boundary of ˆ X. In particular, we can show that the path
of v¤(t;ρ,λ) approaches v¤(t;0,∞) = limλ!∞ v¤(t;ρ,λ) arbitrarily closely as λ !
∞, where v¤(t;0,∞) is the limit of the solution of equation (4.1).
40 This is with loss of generality but setting a nonzero threat point payoff leads only to minor mod-
iﬁcations of the statements of our results.
41 Essential uniqueness of trembling-hand equilibrium is obtained by a proof analogous to that for
Proposition 12. The unique solution of equation (4.10) gives the cutoff proﬁle that characterizes a
trembling-hand equilibrium.
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Figure 4.13: Vectors when t ! ∞.
Proposition 22. For all ε > 0, there exists ¯ λ > 0 such that for all λ ¸ ¯ λ,
jv¤(t;0,∞) ¡ v¤(t;ρ,λ)j · ε for some t.
Remark 1. Before analyzing v¤ = limλ!∞ v¤(t;ρ,λ), let us consider another limit
v¤(∞) = limt!∞ v¤(t;ρ,λ). Since the right hand side of equation (4.10) is not pro-
portional to λ, these two limits do not coincide for positive ρ > 0. If the limit v¤(∞)
exists, this must satisfy
ρv¤(∞) = λ
Z
A(v¤(∞))
¡
x ¡ v¤(∞)
¢
dµ. (4.11)
For ρ > 0, equality (4.11) shows µ(A(v¤(∞))) > 0, which implies that v¤(∞) is
Pareto inefﬁcient in X. This will contrast with efﬁciency of v¤ = limλ!∞ v¤(t;ρ,λ)
that we will show in Proposition 23.
Equality (4.11) also implies that v¤(∞) is parallel to the vector from v¤(∞) to
the barycenter of A(v¤(∞)), as shown in Figure 4.13 in the two-dimensional case.
135To avoid complications, we impose the following assumption in addition to
Assumptions 1 and 4:
Assumption 5. (a) The weak Pareto frontier of ˆ X is smooth.
(b) Every component of the normal vector at any Pareto efﬁcient allocation in X is
strictly positive.
(c) There exists ε > 0 such that X contains a set fx 2 Rn
+ jw ¸ x, and jw ¡ xj ·
ε for some weakly Pareto efﬁcient w 2 Xg.
(d) The density function f is continuous.
Nowsupposethat λ isverylarge. Then µ(A(v¤(∞))) mustbeverysmall, which
means that v¤(∞) is very close to the Pareto frontier of X, where v¤(∞) is deﬁned
as in Remark 1. By Assumptions 1 and 4, the density f is approximately uniform
in A(v¤(∞)) if A(v¤(∞)) is a set with a very small area. To obtain an intuition,
suppose that A(v¤(∞)) is a small n-dimensional pyramid. The vector in the right
hand side of equality (4.11) is parallel to the vector from v¤(∞) to the barycenter
of A(v¤(∞)). We use this property to show that the boundary of A(v¤(∞)) at its
barycenter is tangent to the hypersurface deﬁned by ∏i2N xi = a for some constant
a. We refer to such a Pareto efﬁcient allocation as a Nash point, and the set of all
Nash points as the Nash set of ( ˆ X,0) (Maschler, Owen, and Peleg (1988), Herrero
(1989)). The Nash set contains all local maximizers and all local minimizers of the
Nash product. If X is convex, there exists a unique Nash point, called the Nash
bargaining solution.
The above observation leads to the next proposition.
Proposition 23. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 4, and 5 hold, and that any Nash point
is isolated in X. Then the limit v¤ = limλ!∞ v¤(t;ρ,λ) exists and belongs to the Nash
136set of the problem ( ˆ X,0) for all t > 0. If X is convex, this limit coincides with the Nash
bargaining solution of (X,0).
Therefore, the trajectory of v¤(t) for very large λ starts at v¤(t) = 0, approaches
v¤(t;0,∞), and moves along the Pareto frontier until reaching a point close to a
Nash point.
Finally we consider the duration of search in the equilibrium. In contrast to
Theorems 5 and 6 in the case when payoffs realize at the deadline (or ρ = 0), we
show that an agreement is reached almost immediately if λ is very large.
Proposition 24. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 4, and 5 hold. If ρ > 0, then D(∞) = 0.
4.7 Discussions
4.7.1 Non-Poisson Arrival Processes
In the main sections we considered Poisson processes to make the presentation
of the results easier. The Poisson process assumes that the probability of oppor-
tunity arrival is zero at any moment, so in particular the probability of receiving
one more opportunity shrinks continuously to zero as the deadline approaches.
However in some circumstances it would be more realistic to assume there is a
well-deﬁned “ﬁnal period” that can be reached with a positive probability. In this
section we generalize our model to encompass such cases and show that our results
are unaffected.
Speciﬁcally, consider dividing the time horizon of length T into small subin-
tervals each with length ∆t (so there are T
∆t periods in total). At the end of each
subinterval, players obtain an opportunity with probability π(∆t). Notice that
the Poisson process corresponds to the case when π(∆t) = λ∆t for some λ > 0
137and we let ∆t ! 0. Here we allow for general π function, such as π(∆t) = a or
π(∆t) = a
p
∆t for some constant a > 0. Let vi(n) be the continuation payoff at
time n∆t. Then,
vi
³ t
∆t
+ 1
´
=
¡
1¡ π(∆t)
¢
vi
³ t
∆t
´
+ π(∆t)
µZ
XnA(v( t
∆t))
vi
³ t
∆t
´
dµ +
Z
A(v( t
∆t))
xi dµ
¶
= vi
³ t
∆t
´
+ π(∆t)
Z
A(v( t
∆t))
³
xi ¡ vi
³ t
∆t
´´
dµ.
Hence,
vi
³ t
∆t
+ 1
´
¡ vi
³ t
∆t
´
= π(∆t)
Z
A(v( t
∆t))
³
xi ¡ vi
³ t
∆t
´´
dµ. (4.12)
Notice that if we set π(∆t) = λ∆t and take the limit as ∆t ! 0, the left hand
side divided by ∆t converges to v0
i(t) in the Poisson model and the right hand side
divided by ∆t converges to λ
R
A(v(t))(xi ¡ vi(t))dµ, consistent with equation (4.1).
Proposition 25. If lim∆t!0
π(∆t)
∆t = ∞, under Assumptions 1 and 3, the limit expected
duration is n2
n2+n+1T.
Note that this result is consistent with Proposition 16 where we consider the
Poisson process and take a limit of λ ! ∞. Thus our limit result is robust to the
move structure.
4.7.2 Relative Importance of Discounting and Search Friction
In the main sections, we have shown that if ρ = 0, the limit expected duration
as λ ! ∞ is positive under certain assumptions, and the limit equilibrium payoff
proﬁles are efﬁcient but depend on the distribution µ. In Section 4.6, in contrast,
the limit duration is zero, and the limit payoffs are the Nash bargaining solution
138if ρ > 0 is ﬁxed. In this section, we show that the limit duration and the limit
equilibrium payoffs as λ ! ∞ and ρ ! 0 simultaneously depend on the limit of
λρn.
Proposition 26. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3, and 5 hold. The limit expected duration
D(∞) and the limit allocation v¤ = limλ!∞,ρ!0 v¤(t;ρ,λ) satisfy the following claims:
(i) If λρn ! 0, then D(∞) > 0, and v¤ = limλ!∞ v¤(t;0,λ), which is the limit analyzed
in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. (ii) If λρn ! ∞, then D(∞) = 0, and v¤ = limλ!∞ v¤(t;ρ,λ)
for ρ > 0, which is the limit shown in Section 4.6.
An insight behind this result is as follows: The limit of the expected payoffs
depend on whether the ﬁrst term in ODE (4.10) is negligible or not when compared
to the second term. Let z(t;ρ,λ) be the Hausdorff distance from v¤(t;ρ,λ) to the
Pareto frontier of X. If ρ is very small and λ is not very large, Proposition 22 shows
that v¤(t;ρ,λ) is close to limλ!∞ v¤(t;0,λ) which is on the Pareto frontier. Then we
canapplyananalogousargumenttotheoneprovidedinthediscussionintheproof
sketch of Theorem 8 to show that z(t;ρ,λ) is approximately proportional to λ¡1/n.
Since µ(A(t)) approximates z(t;ρ,λ)n (times some constant), and the length of the
vector from v¤(t;ρ,λ) to the barycenter of A(t) is linear in z(t;ρ,λ), the second
term is of order λ ¢ λ¡1/n ¢ λ¡1 = λ¡1/n. Therefore if λρn ! 0 the ﬁrst term, which
approximates ρv¤, is negligible because ρ vanishes more rapidly than λ¡1/n. Thus
the limits in this case are the same as in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. If λρn ! ∞, the
ﬁrst term is signiﬁcant because ρ does not vanish rapidly compared to λ¡1/n. This
corresponds to Section 4.6. An analogous argument can be made for the limit of
durations.
1394.7.3 Inﬁnite-Horizon and Static Games
Although we consider a ﬁnite-horizon model, our convergence result in Propo-
sition 23 is suggestive of that in inﬁnite-horizon models such as Wilson (2001),
Compte and Jehiel (2010), and Cho and Matsui (2011), all of whom consider the
limit of stationary equilibrium outcomes as the discount factor goes to one in
discrete-time inﬁnite-horizon models. This is because the threatening power of
disagreement at the deadline is quite weak if the horizon is very far away, and
thus the inﬁnite-horizon model is similar to a ﬁnite-horizon model with T ! ∞
if ρ > 0. In fact, we can show that the iterated limit as T ! ∞ and then ρ ! 0
is the Nash bargaining solution in our model if X is convex. By Proposition 26,
limρ!0 v¤(T;αρ,αλ) with α = ρ¡a is the Nash bargaining solution for all a >
n/(n + 1). As a ! ∞, we see that the iterated limit limρ!0 limα!∞ v¤(T;αρ,αλ) is
also the Nash bargaining solution. Since enlarging T is equivalent to raising both
λ and ρ in the same ratio by the form of ODE (4.10), the iterated limit as T ! ∞
ﬁrst and then ρ ! 0 must be the Nash bargaining solution. For the same reason,
the expected duration in the limit as the discount factor goes to one in the inﬁnite-
horizon model is zero, being analogous to our Proposition 24 in which we send λ
to ∞ while ρ > 0 is ﬁxed. Therefore we obtained the following proposition:
Proposition 27. In the inﬁnite-horizon search model, the expected duration in a stationary
equilibrium converges to zero as the discount factor goes to one.
Propositions 12 and 13 imply that the limit continuation payoff of a player is es-
sentially equal to the cutoff, which is expressed by a single variable. In this sense,
there is some connection between our model and a static game considered by Nash
(1953) himself, who provided a characterization of the Nash bargaining solution by
140introducing a static demand game with perturbation described as follows.42 Sup-
pose that X is convex. The basic demand game is a one-shot strategic-form game
in which each player i calls a demand xi 2 R+. Players obtain x = (x1,...,xn)
if x 2 X, or 0 otherwise. In the perturbed demand game, players fail to obtain
x 2 X with a positive probability if x is close to the Pareto frontier. Under certain
conditions, he showed that the Nash equilibrium of the perturbed demand game
converges to the Nash bargaining solution as the perturbation vanishes.
Let us compare the perturbed Nash demand game with our multi-agent search
model with a positive discount rate. Let p(x) = µ
¡
A(x)
¢
be the probability that
players come across an allocation which Pareto dominates or equals x 2 X at an
opportunity. If T is very large and t is close to T, players at time ¡t choose almost
the same cutoff proﬁle, say x, contained in the interior of X. The average duration
that players wait for an allocation falling into A(x) is almost 1/λp(x). During this
time interval, payoffs are discounted at rate ρ. Since xi must be equal to her con-
tinuation payoff in an equilibrium, i would lose nearly (1¡e¡ρ/λp(x))yi on average
by insisting on cutoff xi where y is the expected allocation conditional on y 2 A(x).
Note that this loss vanishes as ρ ! 0 for every x in the interior of X. Let probability
P(y) satisfy P(y) = e¡ρ/λp(x). Player i loses the same expected payoff when y 2 X
is demanded in the perturbed demand game where the probability of successful
agreement is P(y).
The key tradeoff in this game, the attraction to larger demands or the fear of
failure of agreement, is parallel to that in the multi-agent search, to be pickier or to
avoid loss from discounting.
42 We here follow a slightly modiﬁed game considered by Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, Sec-
tion 4.3). Despite the difference, the model conveys the same insight as the original.
1414.7.4 Time Costs
In the model of the main sections, whether or not players discount the future
does not affect the outcome of the game, as payoffs are received at the deadline.
However, theremaystillbeatimecostassociatedwithsearch. Inthissubsectionwe
analyze a model with time costs, and show numerically that the search durations
with “reasonable parameter values” are close to the limit duration with zero time
cost that we solved for in the main sections.
Consider a model in which each player incurs a ﬂow cost c > 0 until the search
ends. In this model, it is straightforward to see that the differential equation (4.1)
is modiﬁed in the following way:
v0
i(t) = ¡c + λ
Z
A(t)
¡
xi ¡ vi(t)
¢
dµ (4.13)
for each i 2 N, with an initial condition v(0) = (0,...,0) 2 Rn.
The analysis of this differential equation is similar to the one in Section 4.6,
with an exception that under Assumptions 1, 3, and 5, the limit expected payoff
proﬁle as λ ! ∞ for a ﬁxed cost c > 0 is now a point that maximizes the sum
of the payoffs, denoted vS. Let v¤(t;c,λ) be the expected payoff at time ¡t when
parameters c and λ are given. A proof similar to the one for Proposition 26 shows
the following:
Proposition 28. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3, and 5 hold. The limit expected duration
D(∞) and the limit allocation v¤ = limλ!∞,c!0 v¤(t;c,λ) satisfy the following claims:
(i) If λcn ! 0, then D(∞) > 0, and v¤ = limλ!∞ v¤(t;0,λ), which is the limit analyzed
in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. (ii) If λcn ! ∞, then D(∞) = 0, and v¤ = vS for c > 0.
The proposition suggests that for a high arrival rate λ, the expected duration
142c
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Figure 4.14: Time costs and arrival rates. The shaded region describes the set of pairs (c,λ)
with which the expected search duration is within 5% difference from the limit
duration.
does not change so much when we increase the cost from zero to a small but posi-
tive number. Combined with our argument in Step 3, this suggests that whenever
the cost is sufﬁciently small, our limit arguments in Steps 1 and 2 are economically
meaningful. Now we numerically show that the degree to which the cost should
be small is not too extreme. Speciﬁcally, we consider the case when n = 2 and µ is
a uniform distribution over X = fx 2 R2
+ j x1 + x2 · 1g, and solve for the range of
pairs of costs and arrival rates such that the expected search duration is within 5%
difference from the limit duration. As shown in Figure 4.14, such a range contains a
wide variety of pairs of parameter values (note that the expected limit payoff is 0.5
in this game, so the cost of 0.05 corresponds to the setting with a fairly high cost).
When n = 2 and µ is an independent distribution such that each player’s marginal
is an exponential distribution, whenever the cost c is less than 10% of the expected
payoff given with c = 0 and λ = 100, we ﬁnd that λ for which the expected dura-
tion is of 95% of the limit duration is more than 100, and that of 105% is less than
14310.43 These results suggest that the limit argument that we conducted in Steps 1
and 2 of the main sections is economically reasonable.44
4.7.5 Counterexamples of Positive Duration of Search
In Theorems 5 and 6, we showed that the limit expected duration of search
is positive if certain assumptions hold. In this section, we present examples of
distributions under which assumptions are not satisﬁed and the expected duration
may not be positive as λ ! ∞.
First, note that it is straightforward to see that if µ assigns a point mass to a
point that Pareto-dominates all other points in the support of µ, the limit expected
duration is zero. Less obvious is the situation where µ allows for point masses
while no point Pareto-dominates all the other points. Even in this case, Kamada
and Sugaya (2010)’s “three-state example” shows that trembling-hand equilibrium
maynotbeunique, andthedurationcanbezeroinatrembling-handequilibrium.45
Our Assumption 1 (b) requires a more stringent condition that the marginal distri-
bution must have a locally bounded density function, and thus does not have a
point mass. Here we present an example in which µ does not have a point mass
while its marginal has a point mass, and there are multiple equilibria and some of
them have zero limit duration.
Example6. Consider X = cof(2,1),(1,1)g[cof(1,2),(1,1)g andlet µ beauniform
distribution over this X. First, consider a strategy proﬁle in which agents accept
43 In this case, we can show that the expected duration is positive even in the limit as λ ! ∞,
exhibiting a stark contrast to Proposition 24. See Kamada and Muto (2011a) for details.
44 We are planning to extend this argument to more cases beyond the setting provided here.
45 Consider µ that assigns equal probabilities to (2,1) and (1,2).
144a payoff strictly above 1 until time ¡t¤ and accept all offers after ¡t¤, where t¤
satisﬁes the indifference condition at ¡t¤:
1 =
1¡ e¡λt¤
2
(1+ 1.5) + e¡λt¤
¢ 0,
or t¤ = 1
λ ln(5). Since given this strategy proﬁle the continuation payoff for both
players is 1 if ¡t · ¡t¤ and it is strictly less than 1 otherwise, this indeed consti-
tutes a trembling-hand equilibrium.
However, there exist other equilibria. For example, consider a strategy pro-
ﬁle which is exactly the same as the above one except that both agents accept the
ﬁrst offer regardless of its realization. Since the continuation payoff at the time
of the ﬁrst arrival is 1 for both players as we have argued, this also constitutes
an trembling-hand equilibrium. Thus there are multiple trembling-hand equilib-
ria. Also the limit expected duration under the second equilibrium is trivially zero,
suggesting the need for Assumption 1 (b) for Theorem 6 to hold.
The key to multiplicity and zero duration is the fact that payoff proﬁles at
which players are indifferent arrive with positive probability due to the atom on
marginals. Assumption 1 rules out such a situation.
Next, we show that even if µ has no point mass, the limit expected duration
may be zero when µ does not satisfy Assumption 2 (nor Assumption 6 in Ap-
pendix C.2.4).
Example 7. For n = 1, let F be a cumulative distribution function deﬁned by
F(x) = 1 +
1
ln(1¡ x)
for x 2 [1 ¡ e¡1,1), and F(1) = 1. The density is f(x) =
1451
(1¡x)(ln(1¡x))2. Recalling formula (4.7), the density term is
d(v) =
f(v)
1¡ F(v)
= ¡
1
(1¡ v)ln(1¡ v)
,
and the barycenter term b1(v) is clearly smaller than 1¡ v. Since limλ!∞ v¤(t) = 1,
r = lim
v!1
d1(v)b1(v)
· lim
v!1
¡1
ln(1¡ v)
= 0.
By Theorem 8, the limit duration is zero.
In this example, it is easy to show that for all α > 0, there exists ε > 0 such
that 1 ¡ (1 ¡ x)α ¸ F(x) for all x 2 [1 ¡ ε,1]. Distribution F is very close to a
discrete distribution, in that F(x) converges to 1 as x ! 1 at a speed slower than
any polynomial functions. In such a case, the above computation shows that the
limit duration can be zero, which is the same as the case with discrete distributions.
4.7.6 The Effect of a Slight Change in the Distribution
The limit result in Proposition 16 depends crucially on the assumption of
smooth boundary and continuous positive density. Although this is the assump-
tion that is often invoked in the literature, it is desirable to know how robust this
result is. To this end, consider X = Rn
+ and a distribution over X, µ, which may or
may not be full-support. Introduce a notion of distance between two distributions,
d(µ,γ) = supAµX jµ(A) ¡ γ(A)j.
A standard argument on ordinary differential equations shows the following:
146Proposition 29. For any λ, the limit duration is continuous in distribution almost every-
where.
That is, for any ﬁnite arrival rate, the limit duration is not substantially affected
by a slight change in distribution. Combined with the result that our limit result
approximates the situation with a ﬁnite but high arrival rate, this suggests that our
limit duration is relevant even for the distributions that are not very different from
a distribution that satisﬁes our assumptions (Assumptions 1 and 4).
4.7.7 Time Varying Distributions
In the main model we considered the case in which the distribution µ is time-
independent. This benchmark analysis is useful in understanding the basic incen-
tive problems that agents face, but in some situations it might be more realistic that
the distribution changes over time. In this section, we examine whether the pos-
itive duration result in Theorem 5 (the case with a single agent) is robust to this
independence assumption. An analogous argument can be made for the multiple-
agent case. Let Ft be the cumulative distribution function of the payoff at time ¡t.
First, consider the case in which the distribution becomes better over time in
the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. In this case, it is easy to see that the
expected duration is still positive and it becomes longer at least in certain cases:
For each t, consider the cutoff at each time ¡s 2 (¡t,0] that equates the acceptance
probability with the one that the agent would get at ¡s if the distribution in the
future were ﬁxed at Ft. This gives a higher continuation payoff at ¡t as the distri-
bution becomes better over time. Thus the cutoff at ¡t must be greater than the
continuation payoff at ¡t that the agent would obtain by ﬁxing the distribution at
Ft ever after. This means that at any ¡t, the acceptance probability is smaller than
147the one obtained by ﬁxing the distribution at Ft ever after. Hence the acceptance
probability at ¡t is O( 1
λt), so we have a positive duration. If (Ft)t2[0,T] is such that
the acceptance probability at time ¡s, p(s), when the payoff is drawn by the ﬁxed
Ft independently over time does not depend on t, then the above argument also
implies that the duration becomes longer.
Now consider the case when the distribution may become worse off. First,
if the support of the distribution becomes worse off, then there is no guarantee
of positive duration. For example, if the upper bound of the support decreases
exponentially then the analysis of the duration becomes equivalent to that for the
case with discounting, in which Proposition 24 has already shown that the limit
expected duration is zero.
If the support does not change, then the positive duration result holds quite
generally: In the proof of Theorem 5 provided in the Appendix, we did not use
the fact that F does not depend on t. The following modiﬁcation of Assumption 2
guarantees the positive duration.
Assumption 200. There exists a concave function ϕ such that 1¡ ϕ(x) is of the same order
as 1¡ Ft(x) in fx 2 Rj Ft(x) < 1g for all t.
Notice that we require the existence of ¯ x and ϕ that are applicable to all Ft.
Proposition 30. Suppose n = 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 200, liminfλ!∞ D(λ) > 0.
4.7.8 Dynamics of the Bargaining Powers
Consider the case where X = fx 2 R2
+ j x1 + x2 · 1g and a density f such that
f(x) > f(x0) if x2 ¡ x1 > x0
2 ¡ x0
1. Suppose that the payoff realizes upon agree-
ment as in Section 4.6, and the discount rate ρ > 0 is very small. In this case, the
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Figure 4.15: Paths of continuation payoffs. The probability density is low near (1,0), and
high near (0,1).
limit of the solution of ODE (4.1) with ρ = 0, denoted v¤(T;0,∞), locates at the
boundary of X by Proposition 19, and it is to the north-west of (1
2, 1
2), which is the
Nash bargaining solution and is the limit of the solution of ODE (4.10). Hence,
by Proposition 22, the continuation payoff when the players receive payoffs upon
the agreement starts at a point close to (1
2, 1
2), and goes up along the boundary of
X and reaches a point close to v¤(T;0,∞), and then goes down to (0,0). On this
path of play, player 1’s expected payoff is monotonically decreasing over time. On
the other hand, player 2’s expected payoff changes non-monotonically. Speciﬁ-
cally, it rises up until it reaches close to v¤
2(T;0,∞), and then decreases over time.
Figure 4.15 illustrates this path.
Underlying this non-monotonicity is the change in the bargaining powers be-
tween the players. When the deadline is far away, there will be a lot of opportu-
nities left until the deadline, so it is unlikely that players will accept allocations
that are far from the Pareto efﬁcient allocations, so the probability distribution over
such allocations matters less. Since X is convex and symmetric, two players ex-
149pect roughly the same payoffs. However, as the time passes, the deadline comes
closer, so players expect more possibility that Pareto-inefﬁcient allocations will be
accepted. Since player 2 expects more realizations favorable to her than player 1
does, player 2’s expected payoff rises while player 1’s goes down. Finally, as the
deadline comes even closer, player 2 starts fearing the possibility of reaching no
agreement, so she becomes less pickier and the cutoff goes down accordingly.
4.7.9 Market Designer’s Problem
In this section we consider problems faced by a market designer who has a
control over some parameters of the model.
First, consider the case when the payoffs realize at the deadline, and the de-
signer can tune the horizon length T. In this case there is no point in making the
horizon shorter, as the continuation payoff v(t) is increasing in t.
Second, still in the case with payoffs realizing at the deadline, suppose that the
designer can instead affect the probability distribution over potential payoff pro-
ﬁles, by “holding off” some offers. Formally, given µ, let the designer choose a
distribution µ0 such that µ0(C) · µ(C) for all C µ X.46 In this case the designer
faces a tradeoff: On one hand, tuning the distribution can affect the path of contin-
uation payoffs and the ex ante expected payoff at time ¡T (an analogous argument
to Proposition 21). On the other hand, however, changing the distribution will de-
crease the expected number of offer arrivals in the ﬁnite horizon, so v(T) is lower
than the case when the distribution is instead given by µ00 such that µ00(C) =
µ0(C)
µ(X0)
for all C µ X. The explicit form of an optimal design would depend on the speciﬁ-
calities of the problem at hand and the objective function of the designer, but basi-
46 Note that µ0 may not be a probability measure because it might be the case that µ0(X) < 1.
150cally if the horizon length T is high then reducing probabilities would not lead to
too much loss.
Next, consider the case with payoffs realizing upon agreement. In this case
there can be a beneﬁt from reducing T. As in the case with payoffs realizing at the
deadline, lower T means that the expected payoff at time ¡T is less close to the
Pareto boundary. However, if the solution when payoffs realizing at the deadline,
v¤(T;0,∞), is socially desirable than the Nash bargaining solution, then by reduc-
ing T appropriately the expected payoff proﬁle will come closer to v¤(T;0,∞) (pro-
vided that the expected payoffs are in between these two payoffs before shortening
T; remember that by Proposition 22 the expected payoffs for intermediate values
of time t is close to v¤(T;0,∞)).
On the other hand, tuning the distribution has a smaller effect than the case
with payoffs realizing at the deadline, as we know that the payoffs eventually con-
verge to the Nash bargaining solution. However, since v¤(T;0,∞) depends on the
distribution, Proposition 22 implies that the direction from which the payoff con-
verges varies as the designer varies the distribution.
4.7.10 Majority Rule
In the main sections we considered the case when players use unanimous rule for
their decision making. This is a reasonable assumption in many applications such
as the apartment search, but there are certain other applications in which majority
rule ﬁts the reality better. This section is devoted to the analysis of such a case.
Precisely speaking, by majority rule we mean the decision rule such that the
objectofsearchisacceptedifandonlyif k < n playerssay“accept”uponitsarrival.
First of all, it is straightforward to check that Propositions 12 and 13 (the
151trembling-hand equilibrium is essentially unique and players use cutoff strategies)
carryovertothiscase. If X isconvex, andsatisﬁesAssumption4, thelimitexpected
payoff cannot be weakly Pareto efﬁcient. To see this, suppose that the limit payoff
is weakly Pareto efﬁcient. Then, as shown in Figure 4.16, there is a region with a
positive measure such that the acceptance takes place. However the barycenter of
these regions is in the interior of X by convexity, and hence the limit payoff proﬁle
must be an interior point as well. This contradicts the assumption that the limit
payoff proﬁle is weakly Pareto efﬁcient. Now, let the true limit point be ˜ v. Since
any payoffs that strictly Pareto dominate ˜ v must be accepted by all players, and
the measure of this region is strictly positive, the limit duration must be zero.47 We
summarize our ﬁnding as follows:
Proposition 31. Under the majority rule with k < n, if X is convex and satisﬁes Assump-
tion 4, then the limit expected payoff proﬁle is not weakly efﬁcient, and the limit expected
duration of search is zero.
We note that the conclusion of this proposition still holds even if the smooth-
ness assumption in Assumption 4 is replaced by the following assumption, which
essentially says that the Pareto frontier is downward-sloping with respect to other
players’ payoffs: For all i 2 N, xi(x¡i) = supfxi j(xi,x¡i) 2 Xg is decreasing in xj
for all j 6= i.
4.7.11 Negotiation
Our model assumes that players cannot transfer utility after agreeing on an
allocation. We believe our model keeps the deviation from the standard single-
47 This discussion is parallel to Compte and Jehiel (2010, Proposition 7) who consider majority rules
in a discrete-time inﬁnite-horizon search model.
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˜ v The barycenter of
the shaded region.
The limit acceptance set given
that v∗ is the limit payoﬀ proﬁle.
Figure 4.16: Equilibriumcontinuationpayoffsunderamajorityrule: Ifthepoint v¤ werethe
limit payoff proﬁle, then all payoffs in the shaded region are in the acceptance
set, and the barycenter of the shade region, ˜ v, is in the interior of X as X is
convex.
agent inﬁnite-horizon search model minimal so that the analysis puriﬁes the effect
ofmodifyingthenumberofagentsandthelengthofthehorizon. Also, ourprimary
interest is in the case where such negotiation is impossible or the case where the
stake of the object is very high so even if players could negotiate, the impact on the
outcome is negligible. However, in some cases negotiation may not be negligible.
Here we discuss such cases. We will show that the duration continuously changes
with respect to the degree of impact of negotiation, hence our results are robust
with respect to the introduction of negotiation. Our extension also lets us obtain
intuitive comparative statics results.
Suppose that players can negotiate after they observe a payoff proﬁle x 2 X
at each opportunity at time ¡t. Players can shift their payoff proﬁle by making a
transfer, and may agree with the resulting allocation. We assume that the allocation
they agree with is the Nash bargaining solution where a disagreement point is the
continuation payoff proﬁle at the time ¡t in the equilibrium deﬁned for this mod-
153iﬁed game.48 When making a transfer, we suppose that a linear cost is incurred: If
player i gives player j a transfer z, j obtains only az for a 2 [0,1). This cost may
be interpreted as a misspeciﬁcation of resource allocation among agents, or a pro-
portional tax assessed on the monetary transfer. Note that a measures the degree
of impact of negotiation. Our model in the main sections corresponds to the case
of a = 0.
To simplify our argument we restrict attention to a speciﬁc model with two
players.49 Speciﬁcally, we consider the case with costly transferable utility: Sup-
pose that X = fx 2 R2
+ j x1 + x2 · 1g with the uniform distribution µ on X. For
each arrival of payoff proﬁle x, players can negotiate among the set of feasible al-
locations deﬁned by
S(x) =
8
> <
> :
x0 2 X
¯ ¯
¯
¯ ¯
¯ ¯
a(x1 ¡ x0
1) ¸ x0
2 ¡ x2 if x1 ¸ x0
1,
x0
1 ¡ x1 ¸ a(x2 ¡ x0
2) if x1 < x0
1
9
> =
> ;
.
We suppose that each player says either “accept” or “reject” to the Nash bargain-
ing solution obtained from the feasible payoff set S(x) and the disagreement point
given by the continuation payoff proﬁle v(t).
By looking at geometric properties of the Nash bargaining solution, we can
compute the limit expected duration in this environment.
Proposition 32. Under Assumptions 1, 4, and 7, the limit expected duration in the game
with negotiation is D(∞) =
4+ 4a2
7+ 6a + 7a2 for a 2 [0,1).
48 This use of Nash bargaining solution is not critical to our result. Similar implications are obtained
from other bargaining solutions such as the one given by take-it-or-leave-it offers by a randomly
selected player.
49 We expect that nothing substantial would change even if we extended the argument to the cases
of three or more players.
154Since D(∞) is decreasing in a, the limit expected duration becomes shorter in
the presence of negotiation. This is intuitive, as negotiation essentially precludes
extreme heterogeneity in the offer realization, thus the agreement can be reached
soon. Notice also that the proposition claims that the duration must be strictly
positive even with negotiation, and D(∞) converges to 4/7 as a ! 0, which is the
same duration as we claimed in Proposition 16. That is, our main result is robust
to the introduction of negotiation.
Note that the proposition does not apply to the case in which utilities are per-
fectly transferable, i.e., a = 1. However, this is due to the fact that the analysis
above is in a knife-edge case because the Pareto frontier consists of a straight line:
If X is strictly convex, then even if a = 1, the acceptance set shrinks with a faster
speed than the case that we analyzed above, and the resulting duration is longer in
such case.50
4.8 Conclusion
This paper analyzed a modiﬁcation of the standard search problem by intro-
ducing multiplicity of players and a ﬁnite horizon. Together, these extensions sig-
niﬁcantly complicate the usual analysis. Our main results identiﬁed the reasons
behind the widely-observed phenomenon that such searches often take a long (or
at least some) time. We ﬁrst showed that the search duration in the limit as the
search friction vanishes is still positive, hence the mere existence of some search
friction has a nonvanishing impact on the search duration. This limit duration is
increasing in the number of players as a result of two effects: the ascending ac-
50 This suggests that with negotiation, preference heterogeneity may help shortening the search
duration. We plan to explore this issue in our continuation work.
155ceptability effect and the preference heterogeneity effect. In short, the ascending
acceptability effect states that a player has an extra incentive to wait as the op-
ponents accept more offers in the future, and the preference heterogeneity effect
states that such “extra offers” include increasingly favorable offers for a player due
to heterogeneity of preferences. Then we showed that the convergence speed of
the duration as the friction vanishes is high, and numerically demonstrated that
durations with positive frictions are reasonably close to the limit duration in our
examples. This provides evidence that our limit analysis contains economically-
meaningful content, and the mere existence of some friction is actually the main
driving force of the positive duration in reality—so the effects that we identify in
Steps 1 and 2 are the keys to understand the positive duration in reality.
We also conducted a welfare analysis, and showed that the limit expected pay-
off is generically Pareto efﬁcient, and depends on the distribution of offers. Lastly,
we provided a wealth of discussions to examine the robustness of our main con-
clusions and to analyze a variety of alternative speciﬁcations of the model.
Our paper raises many interesting questions for future research. First, it would
be interesting to consider the case where agents can search for another offer even
after they agree on an offer (i.e., search with recall). In this case the search duration
in equilibrium must be always T, but the duration until the ﬁrst agreement is not
obvious, because players’ preferences are heterogeneous: Player 1 may not want to
agree on the offer that gives player 2 a high payoff, expecting 2’s future reluctance
to accept further offers. In our continuation work Kamada and Muto (2011c) we
analyze this case and ﬁnd that under some assumptions, the duration until the ﬁrst
acceptance is positive even in the limit as the friction vanishes. In that paper we
also ﬁnd that players may no longer use cutoff strategies, and as a result the shape
156of the acceptance set is quite complicated.
Second, it would be interesting to consider a large market model where at each
period a ﬁxed number of agents from a large population are matched and some
payoff proﬁle is realized. If all agents agree on the proﬁle, they leave the mar-
ket. There are at least two possible speciﬁcations for such a model. First, we can
consider the situation where an overlapping generation model with agents fac-
ing different deadlines, and there is a constant inﬂow of agents. In our ongoing
research, we solve for a steady state equilibrium strategy and characterize the ex-
pected search duration of each agent in the population under certain regularity
assumptions. On the other hand, if all agents share the same deadline, the arrival
rate must decrease or the set of feasible payoffs must shrink over time to reﬂect
the change in the measure of agents who remain in the market, and it is not obvi-
ous whether the positive duration results carry over. Our result on time-varying
distributions in Section 4.7.7 may be useful in such an analysis.
Finally, in order to isolate the effects of multiple agents and a ﬁnite horizon
as cleanly as possible, we attempted to minimize the departure from the standard
model. Inevitably, this entailed ruling out some properties that would be relevant
in particular applications. For example, in some cases there may be uncertainty
(perhaps resolving over time) about the distribution over outcomes or the oppo-
nents’ preferences. We conjecture such uncertainty would increase the duration.
Another example would be the possibility of agents using effort to increase the ar-
rival rate or perhaps sacriﬁcing a monetary cost to postpone the deadline. Again
this would increase the search duration, as players could make these decisions con-
ditional on the time left to the deadline. These extensions of our model are left for
future work.
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158A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We provide the proof of Proposition 1 (the existence and differentiability of
the optimal path). First, we present a simple but useful lemma. Recall that we
are assuming that the optimal action a¤ is different form the Nash action aN (A1).
Then consider
A¤ :=
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
[aN,a¤] if aN < a¤
[a¤,aN] if a¤ < aN
The next lemma shows that we can restrict our attention to the trigger strategy
equilibria whose action always lies in A¤.
Lemma 2. For any trigger strategy equilibrium x 2 X¤, there is a trigger strategy equi-
librium b x 2 X¤ such that 8t b x(t) 2 A¤ and π(b x(t)) ¸ π(x(t)).
Proof. We show this for the case of A¤ = [aN,a¤]. By assumptions A2 and A5, the
graph of π is continuous and “single peaked”, and therefore if π(aN) < π(x(t))
and x(t) / 2 A¤ then there must be b x(t) 2 A¤ such that π(b x(t)) = π(x(t)) and
b x(t) < x(t) (see Figure A.1).
Replace such x(t) by b x(t) 2 A¤ deﬁned above. If π(aN) ¸ π(x(t)), replace x(t)
by b x(t) ´ aN. If x(t) 2 A¤, let b x(t) = x(t). Note that π(b x(t)) = max
©
π(x(t)),πNª
and this is measurable (so that b x is feasible). Lastly, we show that b x satisﬁes the
159Figure A.1: The graph of π(¢).
incentive constraint (2.3). Since π(b x(t)) ¸ π(x(t)), the right hand side of (2.3) is
weakly larger under b x for all t. Hence we only need to show d(b x(t)) · d(x(t)) for
all t. This is trivially true when b x(t) = aN. Otherwise, we have aN < b x(t) · x(t).
Since d(a) is increasing for a > aN (by A6), we have d(b x(t)) · d(x(t)).
This Lemma shows that the optimal trigger strategy (if any) can be found in the
set X¤¤ of trigger strategy equilibria whose range is A¤(= [aN,a¤] or [a¤,aN]):
X¤¤ := fx 2 X¤j8t x(t) 2 A¤g.
Proposition 33. There is an optimal trigger strategy equilibrium x(t) (i.e., x 2 X¤ and
V(x) = maxx2X¤ V(x), where V denotes the expected payoff associated with x) which is
continuous in t.
Proof. We show that there is a trigger strategy equilibrium in X¤¤ that attains max
x2X¤¤V(x) (by Lemma 2, it is the true optimal in X¤). We consider the case aN < a¤,
so that x(t) 2 A¤ = [aN,a¤].
160Since V(x) is bounded above by π(a¤) = maxa π(a), supx2X¤¤ V(x) is a ﬁnite
number. Hence, by Lemma 2, we can ﬁnd a sequence xn, n = 1,2,... in X¤¤ such
that limn!∞ V(xn) = supx2X¤¤ V(x).
Note that fπ(xn(¢))gn=1,2,... is a collection of countably many measurable func-
tions. This implies that π(t) := supn π(xn(t))(< ∞) is also measurable. Now let
us deﬁne x(t) to be the solution to
Problem P(t): max
x(t)2[aN,a¤]
π(x(t))
s.t. d(x(t))e¡λt ·
Z t
0
³
π(s) ¡ πN
´
λe¡λsds. (A.1)
Note that the right hand side of the constraint (A.1) is well-deﬁned, because π(¢) is
measurable. Also note that the right hand side is nonnegative by π(s) ¸ πN.1
Under Assumptions A5 and A6, both π(a) and d(a) are increasing on [aN,a¤].
Hence the solution x(t) to Problem P(t) is either a¤ or the action in [aN,a¤) with the
binding constraint (A.1) by continuity of d (which follows from A2). Let us write
down the solution in the following way. Note ﬁrst that, by Assumptions A2 and
A6, d is continuous and strictly increasing on [aN,a¤], and therefore its continu-
ous inverse d¡1 exists (if we regard d as a function from [aN,a¤] to d([aN,a¤]) =
[0,d(a¤)]). Then the optimal solution x(t) can be expressed as
x(t) =
8
> <
> :
a¤ if d(a¤) < h(t)
d¡1 (h(t)) otherwise
, (A.2)
1 By A5, xn(t) 2 [aN,a¤] implies π(xn(t)) ¸ πN. Hence π(t) = supn π(xn(t)) ¸ πN.
161where
h(t) := eλt
Z t
0
³
π(s) ¡ πN
´
λe¡λsds.
A crucial step in the proof is to note that h(t) is continuous in t for any measur-
able function π(¢).2 Since d¡1 is continuous, x(t) is continuous whenever x(t) 2
[aN,a¤). Moreover, since h(t) is increasing in t, (A.2) means that x(t) = a¤ implies
x(t0) = a¤ for all t0 > t. Hence ¯ x is continuous for all t.
Lastly, we show that x is a trigger strategy equilibrium. The continuity of x and
π implies that π(x(¢)) is a measurable function. Therefore, x is feasible. We show
that x also satisﬁes the (trigger strategy) incentive constraint IC(t) for all t. Recall
that xn is a trigger strategy equilibrium for all n = 1,2,.... Then we have
d(xn(t))e¡λt ·
Z t
0
³
π(xn(s)) ¡ πN
´
λe¡λsds (xn is an equilibrium)
·
Z t
0
³
π(s) ¡ πN
´
λe¡λsds. (by deﬁnition of π)
This means that xn(t) satisﬁes the constraint of Problem P(t). Since x(t) is the
solution to Problem P(t), we have
8n 8t π(x(t)) ¸ π(xn(t)) (A.3)
and therefore
8t π(x(t)) ¸ π(t) = sup
n
π(xn(t)). (A.4)
2 Note to ourselves (may be omitted): The standard result in measure theory shows that, for any
measurable function f(t), the Lebesgue integral
R t
0 f(s)ds is absolutely continuous in t, so it is con-
tinuous in t. (See, for example, S. Ito Thm 19.2).
162Hence, for all t, x(t) satisﬁes the incentive constraint IC(t):
d(x(t))e¡λt ·
Z t
0
³
π(s) ¡ πN
´
λe¡λsds (x(t) satisﬁes (A.1))
·
Z t
0
³
π(x(t)) ¡ πN
´
λe¡λsds.
Thus we have shown that x is a trigger strategy equilibrium (x 2 X¤), and
V(x) ¸ V(xn) for all n (by (A.3)). By deﬁnition limn!∞ V(xn) = supx2X¤¤ V(x),
and the above inequality implies V(x) ¸ supx2X¤¤ V(x). Since x 2 X¤¤, we
must have V(x) = supx2X¤¤ V(x) = maxx2X¤¤ V(x)(= maxx2X¤ V(x) by Lemma
2). Hence we have established that there is an optimal and continuous trigger
strategy equilibrium x.
Next, we show that x(t) satisﬁes binding incentive constraint and is differen-
tiable. The continuity of x plays a crucial role in the proof.
Proposition 34. The optimal trigger strategy equilibrium x(t) satisﬁes the binding incen-
tive constraint
d(x(t))e¡λt =
Z t
0
³
π(x(t)) ¡ πN
´
λe¡λsds.
if x(t) 6= a¤, and x(t) is differentiable when x(t) 6= a¤,aN .
Proof. The proof of Proposition 33 shows that, if x(t) 6= a¤, then
d(x(t))e¡λt =
Z t
0
³
π(s) ¡ πN
´
λe¡λsds
·
Z t
0
³
π(x(t)) ¡ πN
´
λe¡λsds. (A.5)
We now show that the weak inequality above is actually an equality (and therefore
we have the binding incentive constraint). If the above inequality were strict for
163some t, by (A.4), we would have
e¡λTπ(T) +
Z T
0
π(s)λe¡λsds < e¡λTπ(x(T)) +
Z T
0
π(x(s))λe¡λsds = V(x).
Since π(s) := supn π(xn(t)), the left hand side is more than or equal to V(xn)
for all n. Since limn!∞ V(xn) = supx2X¤¤ V(x), the above inequality implies
supx2X¤¤ V(x) < V(x). This contradicts x 2 X¤¤. Hence (A.5) should be satis-
ﬁed with an equality (i.e., x satisﬁes the binding incentive constraint), if x(t) 6= a¤.
Next we show the differentiability. We continue to consider the case aN < a¤,
so that x(t) 2 A¤ = [aN,a¤]. By Assumptions A2 and A6, d is continuous and
strictly increasing on [aN,a¤] and therefore its inverse d¡1 exists. Hence, if x(t) 6=
a¤, the binding incentive constraint implies
x(t) = d¡1
µ
eλt
Z t
0
³
π(x(s)) ¡ πN
´
λe¡λsds
¶
.
The continuity of x implies that
¡
π(x(s)) ¡ πN¢
λe¡λs is continuous, and the fun-
damental theorem of calculus shows that
R t
0
¡
π(x(s)) ¡ πN¢
λe¡λsds is differen-
tiable with respect to t (with the derivative
¡
π(x(t)) ¡ πN¢
λe¡λt). Hence the ar-
gument of d¡1 is differentiable with respect to t, and therefore x(t) is differentiable
whenever (d¡1)0 exists. Note that (d¡1)0 = 1/d0(x(t)) indeed exists if x(t) 6= aN,
because d0 exists (Lemma 3 in Appendix C) and d0(x(t)) > 0 (Assumption A6).
164A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We provide the proof of Proposition 2 (essential uniqueness of the optimal
path):
Proof. Suppose H := ftjπ(y(t)) > π(x(t))g has a positive measure. Then, deﬁne
z(t) :=
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
y(t) if t 2 H
x(t) otherwise
.
This has a measurable payoff π(z(t)) = maxfπ(y(t)),π(x(t))g and achieves
strictly higher expected payoff than x(t). Furthermore, z satisﬁes the incentive
constraints
8t d(z(t))e¡λt ·
Z t
0
³
π(z(s)) ¡ πN
´
λe¡λsds.
This follows from the incentive constraints for x and y, together with π(z(t)) =
maxfπ(y(t)),π(x(t))g. Hence, z is a trigger strategy equilibrium path, which
achieves a higher payoff than x(t) does. This contradicts the optimality of x(t),
and therefore H must have measure zero. Hence π(y(t)) · π(x(t)) almost every-
where. If ftjπ(y(t)) < π(x(t))g has a positive measure, y attains a strictly smaller
payoff than x(t) does, which contradicts our premise that y is optimal. Therefore
we conclude that π(y(t)) = π(x(t)) almost everywhere.
Finally we show that y(t) = x(t) almost everywhere. Note that π is not mono-
tone and therefore π(y(t)) = π(x(t)) may not imply y(t) = x(t). Since any trig-
ger strategy equilibrium must play aN at t = 0, suppose π(y(t)) = π(x(t)) but
y(t) 6= x(t), for t > 0. This means y(t) 6= a¤, so suppose y(t) 6= a¤. This will lead
to a contradiction.
165Consider the case of aN · a¤. We must have aN < x(t) < a¤ < y(t) (see
the graph of π (Figure A.1)). Since the incentive constraint is binding when aN ·
x(t) < a¤,
d(x(t))e¡λt =
Z t
0
³
π(x(s)) ¡ πN
´
λe¡λsds.
This implies that y does not satisfy the incentive constraint, because (i) Assump-
tion A6 and aN < x(t) < y(t) imply d(x(t)) < d(y(t)), and (ii) π(y(s)) = π(x(s))
almost everywhere. This is a contradiction, and therefore y(t) = x(t) almost ev-
erywhere.
A.3 Auxiliary Lemmas for Theorem 1
We provide auxiliary lemmas to prove Theorem 1. First, we show that d0 and
d00 exist and are continuous under our assumptions.
Lemma 3. Under A2-A4, both d0(x) and d00(x) exist and are continuous. In particular,
d0(x) =
∂π1(BR(x),x)
∂x2
¡
∂π1(x,x)
∂x1
¡
∂π1(x,x)
∂x2
, (A.6)
d
00
(x) = ¡
µ
∂2π1(BR(x),x)
∂x1∂x2
¶2
/
∂2π1(BR(x),x)
∂2x1
+
∂2π1(BR(x),x)
∂2x2
¡
∂2π1(x,x)
∂2x1
¡ 2
∂2π1(x,x)
∂x1∂x2
¡
∂2π1(x,x)
∂2x2
, and (A.7)
d00(aN) =
¡
³
∂2π1(aN,aN)
∂2x1 +
∂2π1(aN,aN)
∂x1∂x2
´2
∂2π1(aN,aN)
∂2x1
(A.8)
Proof. We ﬁrst examine the properties of BR(x). To this end, we apply the implicit
166function theorem to the ﬁrst order condition
∂π1(BR(x),x)
∂x1 = 0 (A4). The assumptions
of implicit function theorem are satisﬁed:
²
∂2π1(BR(x),x)
∂2x1 6= 0 (by A4) and
²
∂π1(x1,x2)
∂x1 is continuously differentiable (A2).
Hence BR(x) is a continuously differentiable function (and therefore also con-
tinuous), with
BR0(x) = ¡
∂2π1(BR(x),x)
∂x1∂x2
/
∂2π1(BR(x),x)
∂2x1
,
and it is ﬁnite. Given this, differentiating d(x) := π1(BR(x),x) ¡ π1(x,x) and
usingtheﬁrstordercondition
∂π1(BR(x),x)
∂x1 = 0(A4), weobtain(A.6). Differentiating
this once again and using the above formula for BR0(x), we obtain (A.7). By the
twice continuous differentiability of π1 (A2),
∂2π1(BR(x),x)
∂2x1 6= 0 (by A4), and the
continuity of BR(x), both d0 and d00 are continuous. Lastly, (A.8) is obtained from
(A.7), by noting that BR(x) = x when x is equal to the Nash action aN.
Next we show f(x) :=
λ(d(x)+π(x)¡πN)
d0(x) , which deﬁes the differential equation
dx/dt = f, is continuously differentiable.
Lemma 4. Function f(x) :=
λ(d(x)+π(x)¡πN)
d0(x) is continuously differentiable for x 6= aN.
Proof. Note that d0(x) 6= 0 if x 6= aN (A6). Then, f 0 =
λ((d0+π0)d0¡(d+π¡πN)d00)
(d0)2 is a
continuous function, by Lemma 3.
We now examine the behavior of dx/dt = f(x) when x is close to aN. In
particular, we evaluate f N := limx!aN
λ(d(x)+π(x)¡πN)
d0(x) .
167Lemma 5.
f N : = lim
x!aN
λ
¡
d(x) + π(x) ¡ πN¢
d0(x)
= ¡λ π0(aN)
.
³
∂2π1(aN,aN)
∂2x1 +
∂2π1(aN,aN)
∂x1∂x2
´2
∂2π1(aN,aN)
∂2x1
.
Under Assumptions A1-A6, f N is always non-zero, and f N = ∞ or ¡∞ if and only if
∂2π1(aN,aN)
∂2x1 +
∂2π1(aN,aN)
∂x1∂x2 = 0.
Proof. By de l’Hopital rule,
lim
x!aN
λ
¡
d(x) + π(x) ¡ πN¢
d0(x)
=
λπ0(aN)
d00(aN)
where we used d0(aN) = 0 (A6). Then the expression of the lemma directly follows
from (A.8) in Lemma 3. The numerator is non-zero, because π0 = 0 only at the
optimal action a¤ (A5). By the second order condition at the Nash equilibrium
(A4),
∂2π1(aN,aN)
∂2x1 < 0. Hence, f N 6= 0 in general, and f N = ∞ or ¡∞ if and only if
∂2π1(aN,aN)
∂2x1 +
∂2π1(aN,aN)
∂x1∂x2 = 0.
Remark 2. The condition for the ﬁniteness of f N,
∂2π1(aN,aN)
∂2x1 +
∂2π1(aN,aN)
∂x1∂x2 6= 0 is equiv-
alent to BR0(aN) 6= 1. This follows from the implicit function theorem BR0 =
¡
∂2π1
∂x1∂x2/
∂2π1
∂2x1 .
Finally we show that the ﬁnite time condition (2.8) is satisﬁed under our as-
sumptions. Recall that we are looking at the case where aN < a¤.
Lemma 6. For any x0 2 (aN,a¤], t(x0) := lima!aN
R x0
a
1
f(x)dx < ∞.
Proof. Recall
1
f
=
d0(x)
λ(d(x) + π(x) ¡ πN)
168and it is ﬁnite when x 2 (aN,a¤) because the numerator is ﬁnite by Lemma 3 and
the denominator is nonzero by A5 and A6. Note that 1/f(x) is not deﬁned for
x = aN (both the numerator and denominator of the right hand side is zero at
x = aN). By Lemma 5, we have
lim
a!aN
1
f(a)
=
1
f N =
¡
³
∂2π1(aN,aN)
∂2x1 +
∂2π1(aN,aN)
∂x1∂x2
´2
λπ0(aN)
∂2π1(aN,aN)
∂2x1
,
By Assumption A5 (and aN < a¤), we have π0(aN) > 0, and also
∂2π1(aN,aN)
∂2x1 < 0 by
A4. Also the numerator is ﬁnite by A2. Therefore lima!aN 1
f(a) is a ﬁnite number.
Hence, t(x0) := lima!aN
R x0
a
1
f(x)dx is a ﬁnite number.
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B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Suppose that the premise of the lemma holds. Let t¤ be the supremum of t
such that At is false. If t¤ = ¡∞, then we are done. Suppose that t¤ > ¡∞. Then it
must be the case that for any   > 0, there exists t0 2 (t¤ ¡ ,t¤] such that At0 is false.
But by the deﬁnition of t¤, there exists  0 > 0 such that statement At0 is true for all
t0 2 (t¤ ¡  0,t¤] because the premise of the lemma is true. Contradiction.
B.2 A Sharper Result for the Case when Players Move at ¡T
Proposition 35. Suppose that players choose their action at ¡T and consider a component
game of a revision game with a strictly Pareto-dominant action proﬁle x¤. Then there exists
T0 such that for all T > T0, in all SPE, x(0) = x¤ with probability 1.
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that λ1 · λ2. Consider ﬁrst the case of
λ1 < λ2. Fix an SPE strategy proﬁle where player 1 prepares x1 6= x¤
1 in T < 0. In
this case, player 1’s expected payoff at time ¡T is at most
u1(x¤) ¡ e¡λ1Tm,
as with probability e¡λ1T, player 1 has no further revision opportunities. On the
other hand, one possible deviation is to play x¤
i for all [¡T,0], and in that case the
170expected payoff is
u1(x¤) ¡ e¡λ2TM,
since by Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 1, it follows that player 2 will switch to x¤
2 as
soonashehasachancetorevise, andafterwardsthePAPneverchanges.1 However
the assumption that λ1 < λ2 implies that for sufﬁciently large T, the latter value
becomes strictly greater than the former, implying that in any SPE, player 1 must
prepare x¤
1 when T is sufﬁciently large. Given this, player 2 has a strict incentive
to prepare x¤
2 at ¡T as that would give him the highest possible expected payoff
in equilibrium, while preparing some other action results in a strictly lower payoff
because there is a strictly positive probability that he has no chance to revise the
action in the future.
Suppose λ1 = λ2 ´ λ. Fix a revision equilibrium, and let Vt
i (x) be player i’s
value from the revision equilibrium when the PAP is x at time t. Let vt
1(x2) =
maxx16=x¤
1 Vt
1(x1,x2), that is, player 1’s maximum value at t when player 2 prepares
x2 conditional on that player 1 does not prepare x¤
1. On the other hand, for any t,
the lower bound of always taking x¤
1 at t is
u1(x¤) ¡ eλ2tM (B.1)
since player 1 can stick to x¤
1 in the continuation game after t. It sufﬁces to show
that for any x2 6= x¤
2, there exists ¯ t such that player 1 strictly prefers taking x¤
1 at ¯ t
when PAP by player 2 is x2:
1 Here we use the fact that there are only two players. If there are two or more opponents, Step 1
cannot be used to conclude that all the opponents will switch to actions prescribed by x¤.
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¯ t
1(x2) < u1(x¤) ¡ eλ2¯ tM. (B.2)
To see this, suppose player 2 prepares x2 at t < ¯ t. Player 1 wants to prepare
x¤
1 from t and ¯ t. Conditional on that player 2 can move once by ¯ t, player 1 gets
the highest payoff u1(x¤). Conditional on that player 2 cannot move by ¯ t, PAP at ¯ t
is x2 and player 1’s value is highest at x¤
1. Hence, x¤
1 becomes a strictly dominant
strategy eventually and player 1 takes x¤
1 for sure at the beginning of the game.
Given that, player 2’s unique best response is to take x¤
2.
Take any x2 6= x¤
2 and S with eλS < 1. Since both players need to move after-
wards to go to x¤ from (x1,x2),
vS
1(x2) · u1(x¤) ¡ m
³
eλ1S + eλ2S ¡ e(λ1+λ2)S
´
. (B.3)
Below, we will show that, at nS, one of the following two is correct: (i) we have
(B.2) with ¯ t = nS or (ii)
vnS
1 (x2) · u1(x¤) ¡
³
n + 1¡ neλS
´
menλS. (B.4)
For n = 1, (B.4) is (B.3) with n = 1. Hence, (ii) is true for n = 1. Suppose (i) or (ii)
holds for n = k. If (i) is the case, we are done. Otherwise, at (k + 1)S, the upper
bound of not taking x¤
1 is determined as follows: if player 2 cannot move by ¡kS,
PAP by player 2 at ¡kS is x2. Then, since (i) is not the case, the maximum of player
1’s payoff is given by v¡kS
1 (x2). Therefore,
172u1(x¤) ¡ eλS
|{z}
Pr of 2 not entering by ¡kS
£
³
k + 1¡ keλS
´
mekλS
| {z }
from above,
this is the least loss compared to u1(x¤).
¡
³
1¡ eλS
´
| {z }
Pr of 2 entering by ¡kS
£ eλS
|{z}
Pr of 1 not entering by ¡kS
£ meλkS
| {z }
the least loss for x6=x¤
= u1(x¤) ¡
³
k + 2¡ (k + 1)eλS
´
meλ(k+1)S,
which is (B.4) with n = k+1 as desired. Since (ii) implies (B.2) for sufﬁciently large
n, this completes the proof.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 3: Derivation of t¤
i
We provide a derivation of t¤
1. The value of t¤
2 can be solved for in a symmetric
manner. By the deﬁnition of t¤
1, assuming that both players play best responses to
the PAP at any time strictly after t¤
1, the payoff from playing a best response against
R at t¤
1 and playing otherwise must be equal. Thus, it must be the case that
u1(D,R) = e(λ1+λ2)t¤
1u1(U,R)
| {z }
nobody moves until 0
+
λ1
λ1+λ2(1¡ e(λ1+λ2)t¤
1)u1(D,R)
| {z }
player 1 moves ﬁrst
+ λ2
λ1+λ2(1¡ e(λ1+λ2)t¤
1)u1(U, L)
| {z }
player 2 moves ﬁrst
.
Solving this equation with respect to t¤
1, we obtain the desired expression.
173B.4 Derivation of t¤
i for Non-Homogeneous Poisson Processes
For any non-empty interior time interval [t,t0] µ [¡T,0], let Qi(t,t0) be the
probability that player i has at least one revision opportunity in this interval that
arrives strictly before all revision opportunities of the other player in the same in-
terval. Let Q0(t,t0) denote the probability that no player receives a revision oppor-
tunity in [t,t0]. Namely,
Qi(t,t0) = 1¡
Li(t,t0)
L1(t,t0) + L2(t,t0)
exp
¡
¡
¡
L1(t,t0) + L2(t,t0)
¢¢
for all i
and
Q0(t,t0) = exp
¡
¡
¡
L1(t,t0) + L2(t,t0)
¢¢
.
Given this, deﬁne t¤¤
i as the unique solution for
u1(D,R) = Q0(t¤¤
1 ,0)u1(U,R)
| {z }
nobody moves until 0
+ Q1(t¤¤
1 ,0)u1(D,R)
| {z }
player 1 moves ﬁrst
+ Q2(t¤¤
1 ,0)u1(U, L)
| {z }
player 2 moves ﬁrst
,
u2(U, L) = Q0(t¤¤
2 ,0)u2(U,R)
| {z }
nobody moves until 0
+ Q1(t¤¤
2 ,0)u2(D,R)
| {z }
player 1 moves ﬁrst
+ Q2(t¤¤
2 ,0)u2(U, L)
| {z }
player 2 moves ﬁrst
.
Under non-homogeneous Poisson processes, Theorem 2 holds by replacing t¤
i in its
statement with t¤¤
i deﬁned above.
174C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
C.1 Numerical Results for Finite Arrival Rates
C.1.1 Uniform Distribution over Multi-Dimensional Triangle (Case 1)
Consider the distribution given by the uniform distribution over fx 2 Rn
+ j
∑i2N xi · 1g. The result is summarized in C.1.
C.1.2 Uniform Distribution over a Sphere (Case 2)
Consider the uniform distribution over fx 2 Rn
+ j ∑i2N x2
i · 1g. We get the
result shown in C.2. Note that the limit duration for n = 1 is the same as in the case
of uniform distribution over fx 2 Rn
+ j ∑i2N xi · 1g.
C.1.3 Uniform Distribution over a Cube (Case 3)
Consider the distribution given by the uniform distribution over fx 2 Rn
+ j
maxi2N xi · 1g. The result is summarized in C.3.
C.1.4 Exponential Distribution (Case 4)
Consider the exponential distribution with parameter ai for each player i. The
result is summarized in Table C.4.
175Table C.1: The distribution given by the uniform distribution over fx 2 Rn
+ j ∑i2N xi · 1g
(Case 1).
λ
10 20 30 100 ∞
n = 1
Expected duration 0.398 0.366 0.355 0.340 0.333
Percentage (%) 19.4 9.92 6.64 2.00 0
n = 2
Expected duration 0.608 0.591 0.585 0.576 0.57143
Percentage (%) 6.48 3.44 2.35 0.731 0
n = 3
Expected duration 0.734 0.716 0.709 0.698 0.692
Percentage (%) 5.97 3.35 2.35 0.780 0
Table C.2: The uniform distribution over fx 2 Rn
+ j ∑i2N x2
i · 1g (Case 2).
λ
10 20 30 100 1000 ∞
n = 1
Expected duration 0.398 0.366 0.355 0.340 0.334 0.333
Percentage (%) 19.4 9.92 6.64 2.00 0.200 0
n = 2
Expected duration 0.582 0.568 0.565 0.562 0.567 0.571
Percentage (%) 1.90 ¡0.541 ¡1.21 ¡1.61 ¡0.798 0
176Table C.3: The distribution given by the uniform distribution over fx 2 Rn
+ j maxi2N xi ·
1g (Case 3).
λ
10 20 30 100 ∞
n = 1
Expected duration 0.398 0.366 0.355 0.340 0.333
Percentage (%) 19.4 9.92 6.64 2.00 0
n = 2
Expected duration 0.545 0.524 0.516 0.505 0.5
Percentage (%) 9.09 4.76 3.23 0.990 0
n = 3
Expected duration 0.634 0.618 0.612 0.604 0.6
Percentage (%) 5.62 3.00 2.05 0.643 0
Table C.4: The exponential distribution with parameter ai for each player i (Case 4).
λ
10 20 30 100 ∞
n = 1
Expected duration 0.545 0.524 0.516 0.505 0.5
Percentage (%) 9.09 4.76 3.23 0.990 0
n = 2
Expected duration 0.693 0.681 0.676 0.670 0.667
Percentage (%) 3.91 2.11 1.45 0.465 0
n = 3
Expected duration 0.767 0.759 0.756 0.752 0.75
Percentage (%) 2.27 1.24 0.864 0.284 0
n = 10
Expected duration 0.912 0.911 0.910 0.910 0.909
Percentage (%) 0.370 0.206 0.145 0.0499 0
177Table C.5: The log-normal distribution with µ = 0 (Case 5).
λ
10 20 30 100
σ = 1
4 0.449 0.462 0.469 0.484
n = 1 σ = 1 0.612 0.595 0.588 0.575
σ = 4 0.961 0.952 0.946 0.926
C.1.5 Log-Normal Distribution (Case 5)
Consider the log-normal distribution with the following pdf:
f(x) =
1
xσ
p
2π
e
¡
(lnx¡µ)2
2σ2 .
Assume µ = 0. The expected durations can be calculated and summarized in Table
C.5.
C.2 Proofs of the Results
C.2.1 Computation of the Limit Durations
We here prove a lemma that computes the limit cumulative disagreement prob-
ability and the limit expected duration when the agreement probability p(t) at time
¡t is of the same order as 1
λt.
Lemma 7. The following three statements hold:
(i) If for all ε > 0, there exist C > 0 and ¯ λ such that p(t) · C
λt for all t ¸ ε and all λ ¸
¯ λ, then liminfλ!∞ P(t;λ) ¸
¡ t
T
¢C for all t ¸ 0, and liminfλ!∞ D(λ) ¸ 1
1+C.
178(ii) If for all ε > 0, there exist c > 0 and ¯ λ such that p(t) ¸ c
λt for all t ¸ ε and all λ ¸
¯ λ, then limsupλ!∞ P(t;λ) ·
¡ t
T
¢c for all t ¸ 0, and limsupλ!∞ D(λ) · 1
1+c.
(iii) If limλ!∞ p(t)λt = a > 0 for all t > 0, then P(t;∞) =
¡ t
T
¢a for all t ¸ 0, and
D(∞) = 1
1+a.
Proof. First we prove (i). Let us ﬁx 0 < ε < T. By formula (4.3), for all λ ¸ ¯ λ and
all t ¸ ε,
e¡
R T
t (C/s)ds · P(t;λ)
³ t
T
´C
· P(t;λ).
Since the above inequality is satisﬁed for all ε > 0 and sufﬁciently large λ, we have
liminfλ!∞ P(t;λ) ¸
¡ t
T
¢C for all t ¸ 0. By formula (4.4), D(λ)T =
R T
0 P(t)dt is
bounded as follows:
Z T
ε
³ t
T
´C
dt · D(λ)T
T1+C ¡ ε1+C
(1+ C)TC · D(λ)T.
Since the above inequality is satisﬁed for all ε > 0 and sufﬁciently large λ, we have
liminfλ!∞ D(λ) ¸ T1+C
(1+C)TC¢T = 1
1+C.
Next, a parallel argument shows (ii). Finally, (i) and (ii) together imply (iii).
C.2.2 Proof of Proposition 12
Suppose that there exists at least one trembling-hand equilibrium. We show
that the continuation payoff of player i at time ¡t is unique for almost all histories
in any trembling-hand equilibrium.
179By Assumption 1 (a), the set of player i’s expected payoffs given by any play
of the game within [¡T,0] is bounded by a value xi for each i 2 N. By Assump-
tion 1 (b), we can ﬁnd a Lipschitz constant Li for i 2 N such that µ(fx 2 X j xi 2
[x0
i,x00
i ]g) · Lijx0
i ¡x00
i j forall x0
i,x00
i intheabovedomainofpayoffs. Let L = maxi Li.
Let Si(σ,t) µ R be the support of the continuation payoffs ui(σjh) of player
i after histories h 2 ˜ Ht n Ht realized at time ¡t given a strategy proﬁle σ. For
ε 2 (0, 1
2), let vε
i(t) and vε
i(t) be the supremum and the inﬁmum of
[
σ: Nash equilibrium in Σε
Si(σ,t).
(Note that Assumption 1 (a) ensures boundedness of the support for ﬁnite t.) Let
wε
i(t) = vε
i(t) ¡ vε
i(t), and ¯ wε(t) = maxi2N wε
i(t). We will show that ¯ wε(t) = 0 for
all ε > 0 for any time ¡t 2 [¡T,0]. Note that ¯ wε(0) = 0 for all ε.
Let us consider the ε-constrained game. If player i accepts an allocation x 2 X at
time ¡t, she will obtain xi with probability at least εn¡1. Accepting x is a dominant
action of player i if the following inequality holds:
εn¡1xi + (1¡ εn¡1)vε
i(t) > vε
i(t).
Rearranging this, we have
xi > vε
i(t) +
1¡ εn¡1
εn¡1 wε
i(t).
Let ˜ vε
i(t) = vε
i(t) + 1¡εn¡1
εn¡1 wε
i(t), the right hand side of the above inequality. Then
˜ vε
i(t) ¡ vε
i(t) = 1
εn¡1wε
i(t).
Let X1
i (t) = fx 2 X j xi > ˜ vε
i(t)g, Xm
i (t) = fx 2 X jvε
i(t) · xi · ˜ vε
i(t)g, and
180X0
i (t) = fx 2 X j xi < vε
i(t)g. Then µ(Xm
i ) · L
εn¡1wε
i(t). Any player i accepts
x 2 X1
i (t) and rejects x 2 X0
i (t) with probability 1 ¡ ε after almost all histories
at time ¡t. Note that X =
¡S
j2N Xm
j (t)
¢
[
¡S
(s1,...,sn)2f0,1gn
T
j2N X
sj
j (t)
¢
(where
Xm
j (t)’s have a nonempty intersection). Then
vε
i(t) ·
Z t
0
³
∑
j2N
Z
Xm
j (τ)
xidµ
+ ∑
(s1,...,sn)2f0,1gn
Z
T
j2N X
sj
j (τ)
¡
(1¡ ε)∑j2N sjε∑j2N(1¡sj)xi
+ (1¡ (1¡ ε)∑j2N sjε∑j2N(1¡sj))vε
i(τ)
¢
dµ
´
λe¡λ(t¡τ)dτ,
and
vε
i(t) ¸
Z t
0
³
∑
(s1,...,sn)2f0,1gn
Z
T
j2N X
sj
j (τ)
¡
(1¡ ε)∑j2N sjε∑j2N(1¡sj)xi
+ (1¡ (1¡ ε)∑j2N sjε∑j2N(1¡sj))vε
i(τ)
¢
dµ
´
λe¡λ(t¡τ)dτ.
181Therefore wε
i(t) = vi(t) ¡ vi(t) is bounded as follows:
wε
i(t) ·
Z t
0
³
∑
j2N
Z
Xm
j (τ)
xidµ
+ ∑
(s1,...,sn)2f0,1gn
Z
T
j2N X
sj
j (τ)
¡
1¡ (1¡ ε)∑j2N sjε∑j2N(1¡sj)¢
wε
i(τ)dµ
´
λe¡λ(t¡τ)dτ
·
Z t
0
³
∑
j2N
xi
L
εn¡1wε
j(τ)
+ ∑
(s1,...,sn)2f0,1gn
Z
X
¡
1¡ (1¡ ε)∑j2N sjε∑j2N(1¡sj)¢
wε
i(τ)dµ
´
λe¡λ(t¡τ)dτ
·
Z t
0
³
∑
j2N
max
k2N
fxkg
L
εn¡1
+ ∑
(s1,...,sn)2f0,1gn
¡
1¡ (1¡ ε)∑j2N sjε∑j2N(1¡sj)¢´
wε(τ)λe¡λ(t¡τ)dτ.
Since the above inequality holds for all i 2 N, there exists a constant M > 0 such
that the following inequality holds:
wε(t) ·
Z t
0
Mwε(τ)e¡λ(t¡τ)dτ.
Let Wε(t) =
R t
0 wε(τ)eλτdτ. Then
Wε0(t) = wε(t)eλt
· MWε(t).
Therefore we have d
dt
¡
Wε(t)e¡Mt¢
=
¡
Wε0(t)¡ MWε(t)
¢
e¡Mt · 0. Since Wε(0) = 0
by the deﬁnition of Wε(t), Wε(t)e¡Mt · 0 for all t ¸ 0. This implies that wε(t) ·
MWε(t)e¡λt · 0 for all t ¸ 0. Hence, wε(t) = 0 for all t ¸ 0 and all ε 2 (0, 1
2).
Any trembling-hand equilibria yield the same continuation payoffs after almost all
182histories at time ¡t 2 [¡T,0].
C.2.3 Proof of Proposition 13
We show that a solution v¤(t) of ODE (4.1) characterizes a trembling-hand equi-
librium. For si 2 f+,¡g, and vi 2 [0,∞) let
I
si
i (vi) =
8
> > <
> > :
[0,vi] if si = +,
[vi,∞) if si = ¡,
and p+ = 1¡ ε, p¡ = ε. For ε > 0, let us write down a Bellman equation similar to
(4.2) with respect to a continuation payoff proﬁle vε(t) in the ε-constrained game:
vε
i(t) =
Z t
0
³
∑
s2f+,¡gn
Z
(I
s1
1 (vε
i(τ))£¢¢¢£I
sn
n (vε
i(τ)))\X
¡
ps1 ... psn ¢ xi + (1¡ ps1 ... psn)vε
i(τ)
¢
dµ
´
¢ λe¡(λ+ρ)(t¡τ)dτ
This implies that
vε0
i (t) = ¡ (λ + ρ)vε
i(t) + λ ∑
s2f+,¡gn
Z
(I
s1
1 (vε
i(t))£¢¢¢£I
sn
n (vε
i(t)))\X
¡
ps1 ... psn ¢ xi + (1¡ ps1 ... psn)vε
i(t)
¢
dµ.
This ODE has a unique solution because the right hand side is Lipschitz continuous
in vε
i. Let vε(t) be this solution, which is a cutoff proﬁle of a Nash equilibrium in the
ε-constrained game by construction. Since A(t) = (I+
1 (vε
i(τ)) £ ¢¢¢ £ I+
n (vε
i(τ))) \
X, and p+ ! 1, p¡ ! 0 as ε ! 0, ODE (4.1) is obtained by letting ε ! 0. Therefore
183vε(t) converges to v¤(t) as ε ! 0 because the above ODE is continuous in ε.1 Hence
the cutoff strategy proﬁle with cutoffs v¤(t) is a trembling-hand equilibrium.
C.2.4 Proof of Theorem 5
By Assumption 2, there exists a nondecreasing and concave function ϕ and
κ ¸ 1 such that
1¡ ϕ(x) · 1¡ F(x) · κ
¡
1¡ ϕ(x)
¢
for all x ¸ 0. Let us consider a cutoff strategy with the following cutoff w(t):
w(t) = F¡1
³
1¡
2
λt + 2
´
,
namely, the strategy with acceptance probability 2
λt+2 at time ¡t. By Assumption 2,
we have w(t) ¸ ϕ¡1¡
1 ¡ 2
λt+2
¢
. Let P(t) be the probability that the search stops
before time ¡t when w(t) is played. Then
P(t) = 1¡ exp
³
¡
Z T
t
2
λτ + 2
¢ λdτ
´
= 1¡
³ λt + 2
λT + 2
´2
.
The expected continuation payoff obtained from this strategy is larger than
Z 0
t
w(τ)dP(τ) ¸
Z t
0
ϕ¡1
³
1¡
2
λτ + 2
´
d
¡
1¡ P(τ)
¢
.
Let W(t) be the payoff on the right hand side, and Q(t) be the probability that
the search stops before time ¡t when the player plays a cutoff strategy with cutoff
1 See, e.g., Coddington and Levinson (1955, Theorem 7.4 in Chapter 1).
184W(t).
Q(t) = 1¡ exp
µ
¡
Z T
t
¡
1¡ F(W(τ))
¢
λdτ
¶
· 1¡ exp
µ
¡
Z T
t
κ
¡
1¡ ϕ(W(τ))
¢
λdτ
¶
.
By concavity of ϕ, ϕ(W(τ)) is bounded as follows:
ϕ(W(t)) = ϕ
µZ t
0
ϕ¡1
³
1¡
2
λτ + 2
´
d
¡
1¡ P(τ)
¢¶
¸
Z t
0
ϕ
µ
ϕ¡1
³
1¡
2
λτ + 2
´¶
d
¡
1¡ P(τ)
¢
=
Z t
0
³
1¡
2
λτ + 2
´
d
³³λτ + 2
λT + 2
´2´
= 1¡
4
λT + 2
+
4
(λT + 2)2
¸ 1¡
4
λT + 2
.
Therefore,
Q(t) · 1¡ exp
µ
¡
Z T
t
κ
³ 4
λT + 2
´
λdτ
¶
= 1¡ exp
µ
¡4κ ln
³λT + 2
λt + 2
´¶
= 1¡
³ λt + 2
λT + 2
´4κ
,
which is strictly lower than 1 for all λ > 0 and all ¡t 2 (¡T,0]. Since W(t) is
the continuation payoff calculated from a strategy that is not necessarily optimal,
an optimal strategy gives the player continuation payoffs larger than or equal to
W(t). Therefore an optimal strategy must possess a cutoff higher than or equal to
W(t). Hence, for all ¡t 2 (¡T,0], the search stops with probability strictly lower
185than 1 before time ¡t. This proves Theorem 5.
Next, we show a proposition under an independent assumption of Assump-
tion 2 when the support is bounded.
Assumption 6. If X is bounded, then for ¯ x = supX, there exists α ¸ β > 0 such that
εα · µ
¡
[¯ x ¡ ε, ¯ x]
¢
· εβ for all ε 2 (0,1).
Proposition 36. Suppose that X is bounded, and Assumptions 1 and 6 hold. Then
liminfλ!∞ D(λ) > 0.
Proof. By ODE (4.1), the equilibrium continuation payoff v¤(t) is the solution of
v0(t) = λ
Z ¯ x
v(t)
¡
x ¡ v(t)
¢
dµ(x).
Let z(t) = ¯ x ¡ v¤(t). Since z(t) ! 0 as t ! ∞, there exists ¯ t such that z(t) < 1 for
all t ¸ ¯ t. For t ¸ ¯ t, z(t) satisﬁes
z0(t) = ¡λ
Z ¯ x
¯ x¡z(t)
¡
¯ x ¡ x + z(t)
¢
dµ(x)
· ¡λ
Z ¯ x
¯ x¡
z(t)
2
z(t)
2
dµ(x)
· ¡λ ¢
z(t)
2
¢
³z(t)
2
´α
.
Solving this, z(t) ·
¡
2¡(1+α)λ(t ¡ ¯ t) + z(¯ t)¡α¢¡ 1
α. Therefore,
p(t) = µ
¡
[¯ x ¡ z(t), ¯ x]
¢
· z(t)β
·
¡
2¡(1+α)λ(t ¡ ¯ t) + z(¯ t)¡α¢¡
β
α.
By formulas (4.3) and (4.4), if p(t) is of the order of 1
λt or less, then by Lemma 7 we
186have that liminfλ!∞ D(λ) > 0. This is the desired result.
C.2.5 Proof of Theorem 8
First, we show that Assumption 1 (b) implies that µ(A(v)) is continuous in
v 2 Rn.
By ODE (4.1), v0
i(t) = λbi(v(t)) ¢ p(t) for each i 2 N. Since µ(A(v)) is continu-
ous in v,
liminf
∆t!0
p(t) ¡ p(t + ∆t)
∆t
· ∑
i2N
di(v(t))p(t) ¢ v0
i(t)
= ∑
i2N
di(v(t))p(t) ¢ λbi(v(t))p(t).
By the deﬁnition of r, for all ε > 0, there exists ¯ t such that for all t ¸ ¯ t,
liminf∆t!0
p(t)¡p(t+∆t)
∆t
λp(t)2 ¸ r ¡ ε. (C.1)
Integrating the both sides and letting λ ! ∞, we have
limsup
λ!∞
p(t) ¢ λt · r¡1. (C.2)
An analogous argument shows that
liminf
λ!∞
p(t) ¢ λt ¸ r¡1. (C.3)
187By Lemma 7, we obtain
³ t
T
´1/r
· liminf
λ!∞
P(t;λ) and limsup
λ!∞
P(t;λ) ·
³ t
T
´1/r
, and
1
1+ r¡1 · liminf
λ!∞
D(λ) and limsup
λ!∞
D(λ) ·
1
1+ r¡1.
C.2.6 Proof of Theorem 9
Let r = r = r. Then we can follow the discussion in the proof sketch of The-
orem 8, and obtain inequality (4.8). Since this inequality holds for any λ, for all
ε > 0, there is a large ¯ t such that for all t ¸ ¯ t
¡(r + ε)p(t;1)2 · p0(t;1) · ¡(r ¡ ε)p(t;1)2.
For any small η > 0, let ¯ λ = ¯ t/η. Since p(t;λ) = p(t/λ;1) for all t and λ, we have
¡(r + ε)p(t;λ)2 · p0(t;λ) · ¡(r ¡ ε)p(t;λ)2
for all t ¸ η, and all λ ¸ ¯ λ. Solving this with an initial condition at η, for t ¸ η and
λ ¸ ¯ λ,
1
(r ¡ ε)λ(t ¡ η) + p(η)¡1 · p(t) ·
1
(r + ε)λ(t ¡ η) + p(η)¡1.
By formula (4.3), for t ¸ η and λ ¸ ¯ λ, we have
e
¡
R T
t
1
(r+ε)(s¡η)+p(η)¡1/λ ds
· P(t) · e
¡
R T
t
1
(r¡ε)(s¡η)+p(η)¡1/λ ds
³ rλ(t ¡ η) + p(η)¡1
rλ(T ¡ η) + p(η)¡1
´(r¡ε)¡1
· P(t) ·
³ rλ(t ¡ η) + p(η)¡1
rλ(T ¡ η) + p(η)¡1
´(r+ε)¡1
.
188By formula (4.4), we have
Z T
η
³ rλ(t ¡ η) + p(η)¡1
rλ(T ¡ η) + p(η)¡1
´(r¡ε)¡1
dt
· D(λ)T · η +
Z T
η
³ rλ(t ¡ η) + p(η)¡1
rλ(T ¡ η) + p(η)¡1
´(r+ε)¡1
dt
1
1+ (r ¡ ε)¡1
³
T ¡ η +
1
rλp(η)
¡
1
rλp(η)(T ¡ η) + 1
´
· D(λ)T ·
1
1+ (r + ε)¡1
³
T ¡ η +
1
rλp(η)
¡
1
rλp(η)(T ¡ η) + 1
´
.
Since the above inequalities are satisﬁed for all ε > 0 and η > 0 in the limit as
λ ! ∞, and D(∞) = 1
1+r¡1, jD(λ) ¡ D(∞)j = O( 1
λ).
C.2.7 Proof of Proposition 16
We prove Proposition 16 in an environment more general than Assumption 3.
Assumption 7. (a) The limit v¤ = limλ!∞ v¤(t) is Pareto efﬁcient in X.
(b) The Pareto frontier of X is smooth in a neighborhood of v¤.
(c) For the unit normal vector α 2 Rn
+ at v¤, αi > 0 for all i 2 N.2
(d) Forall η > 0, thereexists ε > 0suchthatfx 2 Rn
+ jjv¤ ¡xj · ε,α¢(x¡v¤) · ¡ηg
is contained in X, where “¢” denotes the inner product in Rn.
(e) µ has a continuous density function.
Proposition 160. Under Assumptions 1, 4, and 7, limλ!∞ D(λ) =
n2
n2 + n + 1
.
2 We can show basically the same results without this assumption. We avoid complications de-
rived from the indeterminacy of a normal vector on the boundary of X.
189Proof. Let fH(t) = maxx2A(t) f(x), and fL(t) = minx2A(t) f(x). Since f is contin-
uous, both fH(t) and fL(t) are continuous and converge to f(v¤) as t ! ∞. For
ε > 0, there is ¯ t such that jv¤ ¡ v¤(t)j · ε for all t ¸ ¯ t. For η > 0, let
A(t) = fx 2 Rn
+ j x ¸ v¤(t),α ¢ (x ¡ v¤) · ¡ηg,
A(t) = fx 2 Rn
+ j x ¸ v¤(t),α ¢ (x ¡ v¤) · ηg.
The volume of A(t) (with respect to the Lebesgue measure on Rn) is
V(A(t)) =
1
n ∏
j2N
³α ¢ (v¤ ¡ v¤(t)) ¡ η
αj
´
, (C.4)
and the volume of A(t) is
V(A(t)) =
1
n ∏
j2N
³α ¢ (v¤ ¡ v¤(t)) + η
αj
´
. (C.5)
Suppose that ε > 0 is small and ¯ t is large. Then by Assumption 7, A(t) ½ A(t) ½
A(t) holds for all η > 0 and all t ¸ ¯ t. The rest of the proof consists of two steps.
Step 1: We show that for any two players i, j 2 N, limt!∞ v¤0
j (t)/v¤0
i (t) = αi/αj.
The ith coordinate of the right hand side of equation (4.1) is bounded as
fL(¯ t)
Z
A(t)
¡
xi ¡ v¤
i (t)
¢
dx
·
Z
A(t)
¡
xi ¡ v¤
i (t)
¢
f(x)dx · fH(¯ t)
Z
A(t)
¡
xi ¡ v¤
i (t)
¢
dx.
190Therefore,
λfL(¯ t)V(A(t))
n + 1
³α ¢ (v¤ ¡ v¤(t)) ¡ η
αi
´
· v¤0
i (t) ·
λfH(¯ t)V(A(t))
n + 1
³α ¢ (v¤ ¡ v¤(t)) + η
αi
´
for all t ¸ ¯ t and i 2 N. By substituting (C.4) and (C.5),
λfL(¯ t)
n(n + 1)
³α ¢ (v¤ ¡ v¤(t)) ¡ η
αi
´
∏
j2N
³α ¢ (v¤ ¡ v¤(t)) ¡ η
αj
´
· v¤0
i (t) ·
λfH(¯ t)
n(n + 1)
³α ¢ (v¤ ¡ v¤(t)) + η
αi
´
∏
j2N
³α ¢ (v¤ ¡ v¤(t)) + η
αj
´
(C.6)
for all t ¸ ¯ t and i 2 N. By letting η ! 0, ε ! 0, and t ! ∞, we have limt!∞
v¤0
j (t)/v¤0
i (t) = αi/αj.
Step 2: By Step 1, for i and small δ > 0, there exists ˜ t ¸ ¯ t such that
(1¡ δ)
αi
αj
·
v¤
j ¡ v¤
j (t)
v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (t)
· (1+ δ)
αi
αj
for all t ¸ ˜ t and j 2 N. Therefore,
n(1¡ δ)(v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (t)) ·
α ¢ (v¤ ¡ v¤(t))
αi
· n(1+ δ)(v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (t)).
191By inequality (C.6), we have
λfL(¯ t)
n(n + 1)
³
n(1¡ δ)(v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (t)) ¡
η
αi
´
∏
j2N
³
n(1¡ δ)
αi
αj
(v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (t)) ¡
η
αj
´
· v¤0
i (t) ·
λfH(¯ t)
n(n + 1)
³
n(1+ δ)(v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (t)) +
η
αi
´
∏
j2N
³
n(1+ δ)
αi
αj
(v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (t)) +
η
αj
´
for all t ¸ ˜ t and j 2 N. Therefore,
³
n(1¡ δ)(v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (t)) ¡
η
αi
´0
·
¡
λfL(¯ t)(1¡ δ)
n + 1
³
∏
j6=i
αi
αj
´³
n(1¡ δ)(v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (t)) ¡
η
αi
´n+1
, and
³
n(1+ δ)(v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (t)) +
η
αi
´0
¸
¡
λfH(¯ t)(1+ δ)
n + 1
³
∏
j6=i
αi
αj
´³
n(1+ δ)(v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (t)) +
η
αi
´n+1
for all t ¸ ˜ t and j 2 N. By solving differential equations given by the above
inequalities with equality, we have
n(1¡ δ)(v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (t)) ¡
η
αi
·
³
CL +
λfL(¯ t)(1¡ δ)nt
n + 1 ∏
j6=i
αi
αj
´¡ 1
n
n(1+ δ)(v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (t)) +
η
αi
¸
³
CH +
λfH(¯ t)(1+ δ)nt
n + 1 ∏
j6=i
αi
αj
´¡ 1
n
where CL,CH are constants determined by the initial condition at t = ˜ t. Deforming
192the above inequalities,
1
n(1+ δ)
³CH
λt
+
fH(¯ t)(1+ δ)n
n + 1 ∏
j6=i
αi
αj
´¡ 1
n
¡
(λt)
1
nη
n(1+ δ)αi
· (v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (t))(λt)
1
n ·
1
n(1¡ δ)
³CL
λt
+
fL(¯ t)(1¡ δ)n
n + 1 ∏
j6=i
αi
αj
´¡ 1
n
+
(λt)
1
nη
n(1¡ δ)αi
.
As η ! 0, ¯ t ! ∞, δ ! 0, and t ! ∞, we have
lim
t!∞
(v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (t))(λt)
1
n =
1
n
³ f(v¤)n
n + 1 ∏
j6=i
αi
αj
´¡ 1
n
lim
t!∞
αi(v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (t))(λt)
1
n =
³ n + 1
f(v¤)nn+1 ∏
j2N
αj
´ 1
n
,
which is a positive constant.
Step 3: By the deﬁnition of A(t), A(t),
fL(t)V(A(t)) · p(t) · fH(t)V(A(t)).
Inequalities (C.4), (C.5) implies that by letting η ! 0 we have
lim
t!∞
p(t) ¢ λt = lim
t!∞
f(v¤)
n ∏
j2N
³∑i2N αi(v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (t))(λt)
1
n
αj
´
.
By the result of Step 2, this limit exists and computed as follows:
lim
t!∞
p(t) ¢ λt =
f(v¤)
n ∏
j2N
Ã
n
αj
³ n + 1
f(v¤)nn+1 ∏
k2N
αk
´ 1
n
!
=
n + 1
n2 .
193By Lemma 7, the limit expected duration is
D(∞) =
1
1+ n+1
n2
=
n2
n2 + n + 1
.
C.2.8 Proof of Proposition 18
Let v¤(t; f) be the solution of ODE (4.1) for density f 2 F, and v¤(f) = limλ!∞
v¤(t; f) = limt!∞ v¤(t; f).
First we show that the set is open, i.e., for all f 2 F with v¤(f) Pareto efﬁcient,
ε > 0, and a sequence fk 2 F (k = 1,2,...) with jfk ¡ fj ! 0 (k ! ∞), there exist
δ > 0 and ¯ k such that
jv¤(fk) ¡ v¤(f)j · ε
for all k ¸ ¯ k.
Since limt!∞ v¤(t; f) = v¤(f), for all δ > 0 there exists ¯ t > 0 such that jv¤(f) ¡
v¤(t; f)j · δ for all t ¸ ¯ t. By Pareto efﬁciency of v¤(f), let δ > 0be sufﬁciently small
so that A
¡
v¤(¯ t; f) ¡ (δ,δ,...,δ)
¢
is contained in the ε-ball centered at v¤(f). Since
the right hand side of ODE (4.1) is continuous in v by Assumption 4, the unique
solution of (4.1) is continuous with respect to parameters in (4.1). Therefore, for a
ﬁnite time interval [0,T] including ¯ t, there exists ¯ k such that jv¤(t; fk)¡v¤(t; f)j · δ
for all t 2 [0,T] and all k ¸ ¯ k. This implies that v¤(t; fk) 2 A
¡
v¤(¯ t; f)¡(δ,δ,...,δ)
¢
,
thereby v¤(fk) 2 A
¡
v¤(¯ t; f) ¡ (δ,δ,...,δ)
¢
. Hence we have jv¤(fk) ¡ v¤(f)j · ε.
Second we show that the set is dense, i.e., for all f 2 F with v¤(f) not strictly
Pareto efﬁcient in X and all ε > 0, there exists ˜ f 2 F such that jf ¡ ˜ fj · ε and
194v¤( ˜ f) is Pareto efﬁcient. Since v¤(f) is only weakly Pareto efﬁcient in ˆ X, there exists
Pareto efﬁcient y 2 X which Pareto dominates v¤(f). Let I = fi 2 N jyi = v¤
i (f)g
and J = N n I. Since y is Pareto efﬁcient, there is δ > 0 such that if x 2 X is weakly
Pareto efﬁcient, satisﬁes jy ¡ xj · δ, and yi = xi for some i 2 N, then there is no
˜ x 2 X such that ˜ xi > yi and jy ¡ ˜ xj · δ.
By Assumption 4, for any small δ/2 > η > 0, there is a small ball contained
in X centered at ˜ y with jy ¡ ˜ yj · η. Let g be a continuous density function whose
support is the above small ball, takes zero on the boundary of the ball, and the
expectation of g is exactly ˜ y. Let ˜ f = (1¡ ε
jfj+jgj)f + ε
jfj+jgjg 2 F. Since f and g are
bounded from above, jf ¡ ˜ fj · ε.
Since v¤(f) is weakly Pareto efﬁcient, if v¤(f) 2 A(v), then A(v) µ
S
i2N
¡
[vi,v¤
i (f)] £ ∏j6=i[0,xj]
¢
. If jv¤(f) ¡ vj · ξ where ξ > 0 is very small,
Z
A(v)
(xi ¡ vi)f(x)dx · fH ∑
j2N
(v¤
j (f) ¡ vj) ∏
k2N
xk
· ξnfH ∏
k2N
xk
If v¤(f) 2 A(v), minj2N(yj ¡ vj) ¸ 2η and jv¤(f) ¡ vj · ξ, we have
Z
A(v)
(xi ¡ vi) ˜ f(x)dx ¡
Z
A(v)
(xi ¡ vi)f(x)dx =
Z
A(v)
(xi ¡ vi)( ˜ f(x) ¡ f(x))dx
=
ε
jfj + jgj
Z
A(v)
(xi ¡ vi)(g(x) ¡ f(x))dx
¸
ε
jfj + jgj
³
(˜ yi ¡ vi) ¡
³
ξnfH ∏
k2N
xk
´´
.
If j 2 J and jv¤(f) ¡ vj · ξ where ξ > 0 is very small, then
Z
A(v)
(xj ¡ vj) ˜ f(x)dx ¡
Z
A(v)
(xj ¡ vj)f(x)dx ¸
ε
2(jfj + jgj)
(˜ yj ¡ v¤
j (f)).
195Let w(t) = v¤(t; ˜ f) ¡ v¤(t; f). Since ODE (4.1) is continuous in the parameters, for
all ζ > 0, there exists ε > 0 such that jw(t)j · ζ for all t 2 [0,T]. Suppose that T
and t are very large so that jv¤(f) ¡ v¤(t; f)j · ξ. For j 2 J, w0
j(t) is estimated as
follows:
w0
j(t) = λ
Z
A(v¤(t; ˜ f))
(xj ¡ v¤
j (t; ˜ f)) ˜ f(x)dx ¡ λ
Z
A(v¤(t;f))
(xj ¡ v¤
j (t; f))f(x)dx
= λ
Z
A(v¤(t; ˜ f))
(xj ¡ v¤
j (t; ˜ f)) ˜ f(x)dx ¡ λ
Z
A(v¤
j (t; ˜ f)))
(xj ¡ v¤
j (t; ˜ f)))f(x)dx
+ λ
Z
A(v¤(t; ˜ f))
(xj ¡ v¤
j (t; ˜ f))f(x)dx ¡ λ
Z
A(v¤(t;f))
(xj ¡ v¤
j (t; f))f(x)dx
¸
λε
2(jfj + jgj)
(˜ yj ¡ v¤
j (f)) ¡ λ
Z
A(v¤(t;f))\A(v¤(t; ˜ f))
wj(t)f(x)dx
¡ λ
Z
A(v¤(t;f))n(A(v¤(t;f))\A(v¤(t; ˜ f)))
(xj ¡ v¤
j (t; f))f(x)dx
¸
λε
2(jfj + jgj)
(˜ yj ¡ v¤
j (f) ¡ ζ) ¡ λζξ ∑
k2N
∏
l6=k
xl ¡ λξnfH ∏
k2N
xk.
Therefore when ξ > 0 is sufﬁciently small, w0
j(t) is bounded away from zero:
w0
j(t) ¸
λε
4(jfj + jgj)
(˜ yj ¡ v¤
j (f) ¡ ζ).
This implies that for small ε > 0 and large t, v¤
j (t; ˜ f) > v¤(f) for all j 2 J. Then
the similar method to Step 3 in the proof of Proposition 19 shows that v¤(t; ˜ f) con-
verges to a Pareto efﬁcient allocation in X.
C.2.9 Proof of Proposition 19
Let fL = infx2X f(x) > 0, fH = supx2X f(x), and xi = maxfxi j x 2 Xg for
i 2 N. Assumption 4 ensures existence of these values. Let A = fx 2 X j x ¸ v¤g,
I = fi 2 N j xi = v¤
i for all x 2 Ag µ N, and J = N n I. Suppose that there exists
196x 2 X which Pareto dominates v¤, thereby J 6= ∅.
Step 1: We show that I is nonempty. If there is no such player, there exist
y(1),...,y(n) such that y(j) 2 A and yj(j) > v¤
j for all j 2 N. This implies that
y = 1
n ∑j2N y(j) strictly Pareto dominates v¤. Since X is convex, y also belongs to
A. This contradicts the weak Pareto efﬁciency of v¤ shown in Proposition 15.
Step 2: Next we show that if v¤ is not Pareto efﬁcient in X, and i 2 I, then
xi · v¤
i for all x 2 X.
Let i be the player in I. Suppose that there exists y 2 X with yi > v¤
i . Since X
is convex, αy + (1 ¡ α)x 2 X for all 0 · α · 1 and x 2 X. Since we assumed that
there exists x 2 X which Pareto dominates v¤, xj > v¤
j for j 2 J. Then there exists
α > 0 such that αy + (1¡ α)x ¸ v¤, and αyj + (1¡ α)xj > v¤
j for some j. By Step 1,
we must have xi = v¤
i . Therefore, αyi + (1 ¡ α)xi > v¤
i , which contradicts the fact
that i 2 I.
Step 3: Finally we show that v¤(t) converges to a Pareto efﬁcient allocation in
X as t ! ∞.
By convexity of X, one can ﬁnd yj, ¯ yj (j 2 J) such that v¤
j < yj < ¯ yj, and
∏i2I[v¤
i ¡ ε,v¤
i ] £ ∏j2J[yj, ¯ yj] is contained in X for small ε > 0. Let ε 2 (0,1/2)
be sufﬁciently small such that ε ·
2fL ∏j2J(¯ yj ¡ yj)
fH ∏j2J xj
. Since v¤(t) converges to v¤
as t ! ∞, there exists ¯ t such that maxi2Nfv¤
i ¡ v¤
i (t)g · ε whenever t ¸ ¯ t. Let
Y(t) = ∏i2I[v¤
i (t),v¤
i ] £ ∏j2J[yj, ¯ yj] µ A(t).
We have A(t) µ ∏i2I[v¤
i (t),v¤
i ] £ ∏j2J[0,xj] since there is no x 2 A(t) with
197xi > v¤
i . By equation (4.1), for i 2 I,
v¤0
i (t) = λ
Z
A(t)
¡
xi ¡ v¤
i (t)
¢
dµ
· λ
Z
∏i02I[v¤
i0(t),v¤
i0]
¡
xi ¡ v¤
i (t)
¢ Z
∏j2J[0,xj]
fH∏
j2J
dvj∏
i02I
dvi0
·
1
2
λfH(v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (¯ t))∏
i02I
(v¤
i0 ¡ v¤
i0(t))∏
j2J
xj
for all t ¸ ¯ t. On the other hand, for j 2 J,
v¤0
j (t) = λ
Z
A(t)
¡
xj ¡ v¤
j (t)
¢
dµ
¸ λ
Z
Y(t)
(yj ¡ v¤
j )dµ
= λ(yj ¡ v¤
j )µ(Y(t))
¸ λfL(yj ¡ v¤
j )∏
i2I
(v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (t))∏
j02J
(¯ yj0 ¡ yj0).
Then for i 2 I and j 2 J,
v¤0
i (t)
v¤0
j (t)
¢
v¤
j ¡ v¤
j (¯ t)
v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (¯ t)
·
fH(v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (¯ t))(v¤
j ¡ v¤
j (¯ t))∏j2J xj
2fL ∏j02J(¯ yj0 ¡ yj0)
·
(v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (¯ t))(v¤
j ¡ v¤
j (¯ t))
ε
· ε ·
1
2
for all t ¸ ¯ t. Therefore,
v¤0
i (¯ t)
v¤0
j (¯ t)
·
v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (¯ t)
2
¡
v¤
j ¡ v¤
j (¯ t)
¢
198holds for all t ¸ ¯ t. This inequality implies
v¤
i (t) ¡ v¤
i (¯ t) ·
v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (¯ t)
2
¡
v¤
j ¡ v¤
j (¯ t)
¢
¡
v¤
j (t) ¡ v¤
j (¯ t)
¢
for all t ¸ ¯ t. By letting t ! ∞ in the above inequality, we have 0 < v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (¯ t) ·
¡
v¤
i ¡ v¤
i (¯ t)
¢
/2, a contradiction. Hence v¤ is strictly Pareto efﬁcient in X.
C.2.10 Proof of Proposition 21
First, we deﬁne the notion of the edge of the Pareto frontier. Suppose that w is
Pareto efﬁcient in X, and wi > 0 for all i 2 X. Let us denote an (n ¡1)-dimensional
subspace orthogonal to w by D = fz 2 Rn jw ¢ z = 0g. For ξ > 0, let Dξ be an
(n ¡ 1)-dimensional disk deﬁned as
Dξ = fz 2 Djjzj · ξg,
and let Sξ be its boundary. We say that a Pareto efﬁcient allocation w in X is not
located at the edge of the Pareto frontier of X if there is ξ > 0 such that for all vector
z 2 Dξ there is a scalar α > 0 such that α(w + z) is Pareto efﬁcient in X. We denote
this Pareto efﬁcient allocation by wz 2 X.
Let Bε(y) = fx 2 X j jw ¡ xj · εg for y 2 X and ε > 0. We denote the
volume of Bε(y) by Vε(y), and the volume of the n-dimensional ball with radius ε
by Vε. Note that miny2X Vε(y) > 0 by Assumption 4. Let g be a continuous density
function on an n-dimensional ball centered at 0 2 Rn with radius ε, assumed to
take zero on the boundary of the ball. Let ˜ f be the uniform density function on X.
For a Pareto efﬁcient allocation y, we deﬁne a probability density function fy on X
199by
fy(x) = η ˜ f(x) + (1¡ η)g(y ¡ x)
Vε
Vε(y)
where η > 0 is small. Note that fy(x) is uniformly bounded above and away from
zero in x and y.
For z 2 Dξ, let ˜ ϕ(z) be the limit of the solution of ODE (4.1) with density fwz,
and deﬁne a function ϕ from Dξ to D by ϕ(z) = ˜ ϕ(z) + δw 2 D for some δ 2 R.
By the form of ODE (4.1), the solution of (4.1) with density fwz is continuously
deformed if z changes continuously. Since w is not at the edge of the Pareto frontier,
˜ ϕ(z) is also Pareto efﬁcient in X and comes close to w if ξ, ε, and η are small.
Therefore ϕ(z) is a continuous function. The rest of the proof consists of two steps.
Step 1: We show that for any ξ > 0, there exist ε > 0 and η > 0 such that
jϕ(z) ¡ zj · ξ for all z 2 Dξ. If a density function has a positive value only in
Bε(y) for some y in the Pareto frontier of X, then the barycenter of A(t) is always
contained in Bε(y). In such a case, the limit allocation with density fy belongs to
Bε(y). As η ! 0, fy approaches the above situation. Therefore, for sufﬁciently
small η > 0, the distance between the limit allocation and y is smaller than 2ε. For
y = wz and letting ε very small, we have jϕ(z) ¡ zj · ξ. Since Dξ is compact, such
we can take such small ε > 0 and η ! 0 uniformly.
Step 2: We show that there is z 2 Dξ such that ϕ(z) = 0. Let ψ(z) = z ¡ ϕ(z).
By Step 1, ψ(z) belongs to Dξ for all z 2 Dξ. By Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem,
there exists z 2 Dξ such that ψ(z) = z. Therefore there exists z 2 Dξ such that
ϕ(z) = 0.
Hence for z 2 Dξ such that ϕ(z) = 0, the limit allocation with density fwz
coincides with w.
200C.2.11 Proof of Proposition 22
Let v0(t;λ) be the solution of (4.1) for ρ = 0. Fix any t 2 [0,T]. Recall that
v0(t;αλ) = v0(αt;λ) forall α > 0. Sincewedeﬁnedaslimλ!∞ v0(t;λ) = v¤(t;0,∞),
there exists ¯ λ1 > 0 such that
¯
¯v¤(t;0,∞) ¡ v0(t;λ)
¯
¯ =
¯
¯v¤(t;0,∞) ¡ v0(λt;1)
¯
¯
· ε/2 (C.7)
for all λ ¸ ¯ λ1.
Since the right hand side of ODE (4.10) is continuous in ρ,λ, and uniformly
Lipschitz continuous in v, the unique solution v¤(t;ρ,λ) is continuous in ρ,λ for
all t 2 [0,T]. Recall that v¤(t;ρ,αλ) = v¤(αt;ρ/α,λ) for all α > 0. Therefore by
continuity in ρ, there exists ¯ λ2 > 0 such that
¯
¯v¤(t;ρ,λ) ¡ v0(t;λ)
¯
¯ =
¯
¯v¤(λt;ρ/λ,1) ¡ v0(λt;1)
¯
¯
· ε/2 (C.8)
for all λ ¸ ¯ λ2. By adding (C.7) and (C.8), we obtain the desired inequality for
¯ λ = maxf¯ λ1, ¯ λ2g.
C.2.12 Proof of Proposition 23
Let v(t) be the solution of ODE (4.10). The proof consists of ﬁve steps.
Step 1: We show that for any t > 0, µ(A(t)) ! 0 as λ ! ∞. If not, there exist a
positive value ε > 0 and an increasing sequence (¯ λk)k=1,2,... such that µ(A(t)) ¸ ε
for all ¯ λk. Since X is compact and f is bounded from above, there exists η > 0 such
201that µ
¡
A(v(t) + (η,...,η))
¢
¸ ε/2. In fact, since
µ
¡
A(v(t)) n A(v(t) + (η,...,η))
¢
· ∑
i2N
µ
³
[vi(t),vi(t) + η] £∏
j6=i
[0,xj]
´
· fH ∑
i2N
η∏
j6=i
xj,
we have µ
¡
A(v(t) + (η,...,η))
¢
¸ ε/2 for η =
ε
2fH ∑i2N ∏j6=i xj
. For this η, the
integral in ODE (4.10) is estimated as
Z
A(t)
¡
xi ¡ vi(t)
¢
dµ ¸
Z
A(v(t)+(η,...,η))
¡
xi ¡ vi(t)
¢
dµ
¸
Z
A(v(t)+(η,...,η))
ηdµ
¸ ηε/2.
By ODE (4.10),
v0
i(t) ¸ ¡ρxi + ¯ λkηε/2,
which obviously grows inﬁnitely as ¯ λk becomes large. This contradicts compact-
ness of X.
Step 2: We compute the direction of
R
A(t)
¡
xi ¡ vi(t)
¢
dµ in the limit as λ ! ∞.
By Step 1, the boundary of X contains all accumulation points of fvi(t)jλ > 0g for
ﬁxed t > 0. Fix an accumulation point v¤(t). There exists an increasing sequence
(λk)k=1,2,... with v¤(t) = limk!∞ v(t). By Assumption 5, there exists a unit normal
vector of X at v¤(t), which we denote by α 2 R++.
Step 1 implies that v(t) is very close to the boundary of X when λk is very
large. By smoothness of the boundary of X, A(t) looks like a polyhedron deﬁned
202by convex hull of fv(t),v(t) + (z1(t),0,...,0),v(t) + (0,z2(t),0,...,0),...,v(t) +
(0,...,0,zn(t))g where zi(t)’s are positive length of edges such that the last n ver-
tices are on the boundary of X. This vector z(t) is parallel to (1/α1,...,1/αn).
Let r(t) be the ratio between the length of z(t) and (1/α1,...,1/αn), i.e., r(t) =
z1(t)α1 = ¢¢¢ = zn(t)αn.
Sincedensity f isboundedfromaboveandawayfromzero, distribution µ looks
almost uniform on A(t) if λk is large. Then the integral
R
A(t)
¡
xi ¡ vi(t)
¢
dµ is al-
most parallel to the vector from v(t) to the barycenter of the polyhedron, namely,
z(t)/(n + 1). Therefore
R
A(t)
¡
xi ¡ vi(t)
¢
dµ is approximately parallel to (1/α1,...,
1/αn) when λk is large.
Step 3: We show that ∑i2N αiv0
i(t) ¸ 0 for large λ. Let (λk)k=1,2,... be the se-
quence deﬁned in Step 2. For large λk, A(t) again looks like a polyhedron with the
uniform distribution. By Step 2, the ODE near vi(t) is written as
v0
i(t) = ¡ρvi(t) + λk
zi(t)
n + 1
¢ µ(A(t)). (C.9)
Note that vi(t) is close to v¤
i (t) and µ(A(t)) is order n of the length of z(t). By
replacing the above equation by r(t), ODE (C.9) approximates
r0(t) = ρa ¡ λkbr(t)n+1 (C.10)
for some constants a,b > 0. Since r(t) is large when t is small, the above ODE
shows that r(t) is decreasing in t. Therefore µ(A(t)) is also decreasing in t. For
large λk, this implies that
α ¢ v0(t) = ∑
i2N
αiv0
i(t) ¸ 0.
203Step 4: We show that the Nash product is nondecreasing if λ is large. By
ODE (C.9), we have
αiv0
i(t) = ¡ραivi(t) + β (C.11)
where β = λkµ(A(t))/(n + 1) independent of i. Let us assume without loss of
generality that α1v0
1(t) ¸ ¢¢¢ ¸ αnv0
n(t). Then we must have 1/α1v1(t) ¸ ¢¢¢ ¸
1/αnvn(t).
Let L(t) = ∑i2N lnvi(t) be a logarithm of the Nash product. Then L0(t) =
∑i2N v0
i(t)/vi(t). By Chebyshev’s sum inequality,
L0(t) = ∑
i2N
v0
i(t)
vi(t)
¸
1
n
³
∑
i2N
αiv0
i(t)
´³
∑
i2N
1
αivi(t)
´
¸ 0.
Hence, L(t) is nondecreasing if λk is large. Moreover, equality holds if and only if
α1v0
1(t) = ¢¢¢ = αnv0
n(t) or α1v1(t) = ¢¢¢ = αnvn(t).
Step 5: We show that v(t) converges to a point in the Nash set as λ ! ∞. Step 4
shows that L0(t) converges to zero as λ ! ∞. Then α1v0
1(t) = ¢¢¢ = αnv0
n(t) or
α1v1(t) = ¢¢¢ = αnvn(t) in the limit of λ ! ∞. The former case implies v0
i(t) = 0
for all i 2 N by Step 3. Then ODE (C.11) shows that the latter case holds. Therefore
thelattercasealwaysholdsinthelimitof λ ! ∞. Thisimpliesthattheboundaryof
X at v¤(t) is tangent to the hypersurface deﬁned by “Nash product = ∏i2N v¤
i (t).”
Hence any accumulation point v¤(t) belongs to the Nash set.
Since we assumed that the Nash set consists of isolated points, v¤(t) is isolated.
If v(t) does not converge to v¤(t), there is δ > 0 such that for any ¯ λ there exists
v(t) with λ ¸ ¯ λ. Let δ > 0 be small such that there is no point in the Nash set in
204fx 2 X jjv¤(t)¡xj · δg. Since v(t) is continuous with respect to λ, for any ¯ λ, there
exists λ > ¯ λ such that δ/2 · jv¤(t) ¡ v(t)j · δ. Since fx 2 X jδ/2 · jv¤(t) ¡ xj ·
δg is compact, v(t) must have an accumulation point in this set. This contradicts
the fact that any accumulation point is contained in the Nash set. Furthermore,
v¤(t) does not depend on t since v¤(t) is continuous in t.
C.2.13 Proof of Proposition 24
(Sketch of proof): The ODE (C.10) is approximated by a linear ODE, which has
a solution converging to v¤ with an exponential speed. Therefore for large λ, r(t) is
approximatedbyr(t) =
³ρa
λb
´ 1
n+1
. Since µ(A(t)) isproportionaltor(t)n, µ(A(t)) =
cλ¡ n
n+1 for a constant c > 0. the probability that players reach an agreement before
time ¡(T ¡ s) is
1¡ e¡
R T
T¡s µ(A(t))λdt = 1¡ e¡scλ
1
n+1 ,
which converges to one as λ ! ∞.
C.2.14 Proof of Proposition 25
By equation (4.12), vi( t
∆t) is a nondecreasing sequence. Since X is bounded and
convex, vi( t
∆t) converges to a Pareto efﬁcient allocations as ∆t ! 0. Let v¤( t
∆t) be
the solution of equation (4.12), and v¤ = lim∆t!0 v¤( t
∆t) for t > 0.
The proof proceeds basically on the same route as that in Proposition 16. Let
fh( t
∆t), fL( t
∆t), be deﬁned as in the proof of Proposition 16. Then a parallel argu-
205ment to Step 1 shows an inequality analogous to (C.6): For large ¯ t,
π(∆t)fL(
¯ t
∆t)
n(n + 1)
³α ¢ (v¤ ¡ v¤( t
∆t)) ¡ η
αi
´
∏
j2N
³α ¢ (v¤ ¡ v¤( t
∆t)) ¡ η
αj
´
· v¤
i
³ t
∆t
+ 1
´
¡ v¤
i
³ t
∆t
´
·
π(∆t)fH(
¯ t
∆t)
n(n + 1)
³α ¢ (v¤ ¡ v¤( t
∆t)) + η
αi
´
∏
j2N
³α ¢ (v¤ ¡ v¤( t
∆t)) + η
αj
´
,
where notations are the same as in the proof of Proposition 16. Therefore we have
lim∆t!0
v¤
j ( t
∆t + 1) ¡ v¤
j ( t
∆t)
v¤
i ( t
∆t + 1) ¡ v¤
i ( t
∆t)
=
αi
αj
. Similar computations as in Step 2 show an ap-
proximation for small ∆t
³
v¤
i ¡ v¤
i
³ t
∆t
+ 1
´´
¡
³
v¤
i ¡ v¤
i
³ t
∆t
´´
¼
¡
π(∆t)fm(
¯ t
∆t)
n(n + 1)
³
∏
j6=i
αi
αj
´³
v¤
i ¡ v¤
i
³ t
∆t
´´n+1
,
where fm( t
∆t) is the average density in A( t
∆t). Then we can show that
lim
∆t!0
αi
³
v¤
i ¡ v¤
i
³ t
∆t
´´
¢
³π(∆t)t
∆t
´ 1
n
=
³ n + 1
f(v¤)nn+1 ∏
j2N
αj
´ 1
n
.
Here we used the fact that ∆t is very small when compared to π(∆t) if ∆t is small,
to ignore the constant derived from an initial condition.
A similar computation to Step 3 shows that
lim
∆t!0
p(t) ¢
³π(∆t)t
∆t
´
=
n + 1
n2 ,
and thus the limit expected duration is D(∞) = n2
n2+n+1.
206C.2.15 Proof of Proposition 26
(Sketch of proof): The approximated ODE (C.10) for large t in the proof of
Proposition 23 is rearranged as follows:
λ
1
nr0(t) = λ
1
nρa ¡ b ¢
¡
λ
1
nr(t)
¢n+1
If λ
1
nρ ! 0, this ODE is approximated as
λ
1
nr0(t) ¼ ¡b
¡
λ
1
nr(t)
¢n+1
which yields r(t) = O
³
1
(λt)
1
n
´
. This is the same case with ρ = 0. On the other hand,
If λ
1
nρ ! ∞, the ODE is approximated as
λ
1
nr0(t) =
¡
(λ
1
nρa)
1
n+1 ¡ b
1
n+1(λ
1
nr(t))
¢
¢
¡
(λ
1
nρa)
n
n+1 + (λ
1
nρa)
n¡1
n+1 ¢ b
1
n+1(λ
1
nr(t)) + ¢¢¢ + b
n
n+1(λ
1
nr(t))n¢
¼ (λ
1
nρa) ¡ (λ
1
nρa)
n
n+1 ¢ b
1
n+1(λ
1
nr(t))
which implies r(t) =
¡ ρa
λb
¢ 1
n+1 ¡O(e¡t). This corresponds to the case with ρ > 0.
C.2.16 Proof of Proposition 32
Bysymmetry, v¤
1(t) = v¤
2(t) and v¤ = (1/2,1/2). Let z(t) = v¤
i ¡v¤
i (t). Suppose
that t is large and z(t) is small, so that z(t) · 1¡a
2(1+a). It is straightforward to see
that an agreement is reached after negotiation with a costly transfer if and only if
realized allocation x 2 X is in the triangle T1 [ T2 [ T3 shown in Figure C.1, where
the slopes of the line segments are ¡a,a,1/a,¡1/a, respectively, from southeast to
northwest.
207v∗(t)
v∗
b1
b2
b3
T1
T2
T3
Figure C.1: The set of realized allocations that
the players accept
S(x)
v∗(t)
NBS
x
Figure C.2: The set of feasible alloca-
tions when x 2 T1 is re-
alized
Suppose that realized allocation x belongs to the triangle T1 in Figure C.1. Then
the set S(x) of feasible allocations is described in Figure C.2. Since the disagree-
ment point is at v¤(t), the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) is located on the bor-
derline between T1 and T3. Therefore the ex post distribution of payoff proﬁles on
agreement has a mass on the line segment between T1 and T3, and the barycenter b1
of the mass is the intersection point between the line segment and the line drawn
through the barycenter of T1 with slope ¡a. The symmetric argument applies to
the case of x 2 T2, and the barycenter b2 of the mass on the borderline between T2
and T3 is computed correspondingly.
If x belongs to T3, the Nash bargaining solution is x itself. The the barycenter
b3 of the set of ex post payoff proﬁles conditional on the realized allocation x being
208contained in T3 is exactly the barycenter of T3. A computation shows that
b1 = v(t) +
³ 2
3(1+ a)
,
2a
3(1+ a)
´
z(t), b2 = v(t) +
³ 2a
3(1+ a)
,
2
3(1+ a)
´
z(t),
b3 = v(t) +
³2
3
,
2
3
´
z(t),
µ(T1) = µ(T2) =
8a
1¡ a2z(t)2, µ(T3) =
2(1¡ a)
1+ a
z(t)2.
Therefore the barycenter of the entire set of ex post payoff proﬁles is computed as
a convex combination of b1,b2,b3. By ODE (4.1),
z0(t) = ¡v0
1(t)
= ¡λ
¡
(b1 ¡ v(t))µ(T1) + (b2 ¡ v(t))µ(T2) + (b3 ¡ v(t))µ(T3)
¢
= ¡λ ¢
8(1+ a2)
3(1¡ a2)
z(t)3.
Since p(t) = µ(T1) + µ(T2) + µ(T3) =
4(1+ a)
1¡ a
z(t)2,
p0(t) =
8(1+ a)
1¡ a
z(t)z0(t)
= λ ¢
4(1+ a2)
3(1+ a)2 p(t)2.
Therefore the constant r deﬁned in Section 4.4.2 is
4(1+a2)
3(1+a)2. By Theorem 8, the limit
duration is
D(∞) =
1
1+
³
4(1+a2)
3(1+a)2
´¡1
=
4+ 4a2
7+ 6a + 7a2.
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